Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Experimental Design
2.1. Framing and Subject Pool
2.2. Group Composition and Roles
2.3. Relationship between the Group Members
2.4. Roles and Payoffs
2.4.1. Patient
2.4.2. Physician
2.4.3. Insurer
2.5. Physician Decision Problem and Conjectures
2.6. Experimental Protocol
3. Results
3.1. Average Provision Behavior
3.2. Differences between Fee For Service and Capitation
3.3. Differences between Neutral and Medical Framing
3.4. Differences between Student and Physician Samples
3.5. Regression Analysis—Payoffs and Experimental Variations
4. Discussion and Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Reporting Behavior
Appendix A.1. Differences in Reporting between Fee for Service and Capitation
Payment System | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Patient | Fram.-Subj. | FFS | CAP | U-Test |
Neutr.-Stud. | 1 | 0.22 | *** | |
L | Med.-Stud. | 0.44 | 0.13 | * |
Med.-Doc. | 0 | 0 | ||
Neutr.-Stud. | 0.56 | 0.04 | *** | |
M | Med.-Stud. | 0.52 | 0.33 | |
Med.-Doc. | 0.33 | 0.08 | ||
Neutr.-Stud. | 0 | −0.15 | * | |
H | Med.-Stud. | −0.04 | −0.04 | |
Med.-Doc. | 0 | −0.08 |
Appendix A.2. Differences in Reporting between Neutral and Medical Framing
Framing | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Patient | Payment System | Neutral | Medical | U-Test |
L | FFS | 1 | 0.44 | ** |
CAP | 0.22 | 0.13 | ||
M | FFS | 0.56 | 0.52 | |
CAP | 0.04 | 0.33 | ** | |
H | FFS | 0 | −0.04 | |
CAP | −0.15 | −0.04 |
Appendix A.3. Differences in Reporting between Student and Physician Samples
Subjects | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Patient | Payment System | Students | Doctors | U-Test |
L | FFS | 0.44 | 0 | * |
CAP | 0.13 | 0 | ||
M | FFS | 0.52 | 0.33 | |
CAP | 0.33 | 0.08 | ||
H | FFS | −0.04 | 0 | |
CAP | −0.04 | −0.08 |
Appendix A.4. Provision Conditional on Reporting
Appendix B. Additional Tables
Treatment | Avg. Misreporting | Treatment | CNS | CMS | CMD | FNS | FMS | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CNS | 0.22 ** | CNS | ||||||
CMS | 0.13 * | CMS | ||||||
CMD | 0 | CMD | ||||||
FNS | 1 *** | FNS | *** | *** | *** | |||
FMS | 0.44 *** | FMS | * | * | ** | |||
FMD | 0 | FMD | *** | * |
Treatment | Avg. Misreporting | Treatment | CNS | CMS | CMD | FNS | FMS | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CNS | 0.04 | CNS | ||||||
CMS | 0.33 *** | CMS | ** | |||||
CMD | 0.08 | CMD | ||||||
FNS | 0.56 *** | FNS | *** | *** | ||||
FMS | 0.52 *** | FMS | *** | ** | ||||
FMD | 0.33 ** | FMD | * |
Treatment | Avg. Misreporting | Treatment | CNS | CMS | CMD | FNS | FMS | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CNS | −0.15 * | CNS | ||||||
CMS | −0.04 | CMS | ||||||
CMD | −0.08 | CMD | ||||||
FNS | 0 | FNS | * | |||||
FMS | −0.04 | FMS | ||||||
FMD | 0 | FMD |
Treatment | Avg. Misreporting | Treatment | CNS | CMS | CMD | FNS | FMS | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CNS | 0.04 | CNS | ||||||
CMS | 0.08 | CMS | ||||||
CMD | 0 | CMD | ||||||
FNS | 2.11 *** | FNS | *** | *** | *** | |||
FMS | 0.96 *** | FMS | *** | *** | *** | ** | ||
FMD | 0 | FMD | *** | ** |
Treatment | Avg. Maltreatment | Treatment | CNS | CMS | CMD | FNS | FMS | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CNS | −1 *** | CNS | ||||||
CMS | −0.83 *** | CMS | ||||||
CMD | −1.08 *** | CMD | ||||||
FNS | 0.44 * | FNS | *** | *** | *** | |||
FMS | −0.04 | FMS | *** | ** | ** | |||
FMD | −0.89 *** | FMD | ** |
Treatment | Avg. Maltreatment Treatment | CNS | CMS | CMD | FNS | FMS | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CNS | −0.63 *** | CNS | ||||||
CMS | −0.54 ** | CMS | ||||||
CMD | −0.75 * | CMD | ||||||
FNS | −0.26 * | FNS | ** | |||||
FMS | −0.33 ** | FMS | ||||||
FMD | 0 | FMD | * |
Treatment | Avg. Maltreatment | Treatment | CNS | CMS | CMD | FNS | FMS | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CNS | 0.11 ** | CNS | ||||||
CMS | 0.33 *** | CMS | * | |||||
CMD | 0.08 | CMD | ||||||
FNS | 0.63 *** | FNS | *** | ** | *** | |||
FMS | 0.52 *** | FMS | *** | ** | ||||
FMD | 0.33 ** | FMD |
Treatment | Avg. Maltreatment | Treatment | CNS | CMS | CMD | FNS | FMS | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CNS | 1 *** | CNS | ||||||
CMS | 0.83 *** | CMS | ||||||
CMD | 1.08 *** | CMD | ||||||
FNS | 1.41 *** | FNS | *** | *** | ||||
FMS | 1.15 *** | FMS | * | |||||
FMD | 0.89 *** | FMD | * |
Treatment | Reported Type | Provided Services | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Obs. | ||
L | 0 | 23 | 0 | 23 | ||||
CNS | M | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | |||
H | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | |
L | 0 | 22 | 0 | 22 | ||||
CMS | M | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
L | 0 | 12 | 0 | 12 | ||||
CMD | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Obs. | ||
L | 1 | 4 | 8 | 13 | ||||
FNS | M | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 13 | |
L | 2 | 8 | 10 | 20 | ||||
FMS | M | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | |||
H | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5 | |
L | 0 | 9 | 0 | 9 | ||||
FMD | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Treatment | Reported Type | Provided Services | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Obs. | ||
L | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | ||||
CNS | M | 0 | 1 | 23 | 24 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | |
L | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||
CMS | M | 0 | 0 | 16 | 16 | |||
H | 0 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 8 | |
L | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||
CMD | M | 0 | 2 | 9 | 11 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
L | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ||||
FNS | M | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 11 | 16 | |
L | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||
FMS | M | 0 | 2 | 11 | 13 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 14 | |
L | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||
FMD | M | 0 | 1 | 5 | 6 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
Treatment | Reported Type | Provided Services | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Obs. | ||
L | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ||||
CNS | M | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 19 | 24 | |
L | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||
CMS | M | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | |||
H | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 20 | 23 | |
L | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||
CMD | M | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 11 | |
L | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||
FNS | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||
H | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 25 | 27 | |
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Obs. | ||
L | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||
FMS | M | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 22 | 26 | |
L | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ||||
FMD | M | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |||
H | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 |
Patient | Physician | Insurer | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Patient Type L | Fee For Service | −28.57 *** | −29.06 *** | −0.51 | −0.46 | −10.51 *** | −10.91 *** | ||
(3.82) | (3.83) | (2.97) | (2.96) | (2.72) | (2.72) | ||||
Medical Framing | 11.02 *** | 10.75 ** | −8.76 *** | −9.29 *** | 7.52 ** | 7.28 ** | |||
(4.18) | (4.31) | (3.25) | (3.33) | (2.97) | (3.06) | ||||
Medical Doctor | 11.94 ** | 9.50 | −5.68 | −4.35 | 4.23 | 6.18 | |||
(5.56) | (9.26) | (4.32) | (7.15) | (3.96) | (6.57) | ||||
Age | - | 0.25 | - | −0.16 | - | −0.08 | |||
- | (0.52) | - | (0.40) | - | (0.37) | ||||
Female | - | 6.92 | - | −7.04 ** | - | 4.73 | |||
- | (4.27) | - | (3.29) | - | (3.03) | ||||
Pro Social | - | −4.24 | - | 1.75 | - | −4.11 | |||
- | (4.02) | - | (3.10) | - | (2.85) | ||||
Risk | - | 0.43 | - | −0.24 | - | 0.41 | |||
- | (0.89) | - | (0.69) | - | (0.63) | ||||
Constant | 74.79 *** | 64.98 *** | 56.09 *** | 64.59 *** | 77.76 *** | 76.79 *** | |||
(3.48) | (12.90) | (2.70) | (9.96) | (2.48) | (9.15) | ||||
Patient Type M | Fee For Service | −7.32 *** | −7.55 *** | 10.46 *** | 11.12 *** | −15.27 *** | −15.80 *** | ||
(2.66) | (2.60) | (2.56) | (2.51) | (3.52) | (3.50) | ||||
Medical Framing | 5.72 ** | 5.83 ** | −3.64 | −2.90 | −3.96 | −4.72 | |||
(2.91) | (2.93) | (2.80) | (2.82) | (3.85) | (3.94) | ||||
Medical Doctor | −0.74 | 11.15 * | −5.37 | 5.36 | 9.30 * | −4.33 | |||
(3.88) | (6.29) | (3.73) | (6.06) | (5.12) | (8.47) | ||||
Age | - | −0.77 ** | - | −0.81 ** | - | 0.99 ** | |||
- | (0.35) | - | (0.34) | - | (0.47) | ||||
Female | - | 3.98 | - | −5.30 * | - | 3.76 | |||
- | (2.90) | - | (2.79) | - | (3.90) | ||||
Pro Social | - | −5.29 * | - | 2.43 | - | −0.96 | |||
- | (2.73) | - | (2.63) | - | (3.67) | ||||
Risk | - | 0.49 | - | −0.40 | - | 0.12 | |||
- | (0.60) | - | (0.58) | - | (0.81) | ||||
Constant | 56.66 *** | 72.18 *** | 53.10 *** | 75.29 *** | 77.64 *** | 52.82 *** | |||
(2.43) | (8.77) | (2.33) | (8.44) | (3.21) | (11.80) | ||||
Patient Type H | Fee For Service | 8.66 ** | 6.84 * | 36.30 *** | 36.03 *** | −2.85 * | −2.71 | ||
(4.16) | (4.09) | (1.65) | (1.65) | (1.69) | (1.71) | ||||
Medical Framing | −0.31 | −3.97 | −0.59 | −1.05 | −0.65 | −0.14 | |||
(4.55) | (4.61) | (1.80) | (1.86) | (1.85) | (1.92) | ||||
Medical Doctor | 1.93 | 2.06 | 2.27 | 5.91 | 0.09 | 3.95 | |||
(6.06) | (9.88) | (2.40) | (3.99) | (2.46) | (4.13) | ||||
Age | - | 0.02 | - | −0.25 | - | −0.26 | |||
- | (0.55) | - | (0.22) | - | (0.23) | ||||
Female | - | −3.21 | - | −0.90 | - | 0.93 | |||
- | (4.55) | - | (1.84) | - | (1.90) | ||||
Pro Social | - | −11.80 *** | - | −2.07 | - | 0.48 | |||
- | (4.29) | - | (1.73) | - | (1.79) | ||||
Risk | - | 0.60 | - | 0.22 | - | 0.17 | |||
- | (0.95) | - | (0.38) | - | (0.40) | ||||
Constant | 71.17 *** | 77.16 *** | 49.91 *** | 56.37 *** | 43.93 *** | 48.13 *** | |||
(3.79) | (13.77) | (1.50) | (5.57) | (1.54) | (5.75) |
Appendix C. Instructions Neutral Framing
General Information
The Experiment
Type | Optimal number of services |
L | 2 units |
M | 4 units |
H | 6 units |
- If the number of services provided by participant B is optimal for participant A, he/she receives a payment of 90 Taler with a probability of 95%. With a probability of 5% she receives a payment of 0 Taler.
- If the number of actually provided services by participant B deviates by one unit from the optimal number of services for participant A, participant A receives a payment of 90 Taler with a probability of 65%. With a probability of 35% he/she receives a payment of 0 Taler.
- If the number of actually provided services by participant B deviates by two units from the optimal number of services for participant A, participant A receives a payment of 90 Taler with a probability of 35%. With a probability of 65% he/she receives a payment of 0 Taler.
- If the number of actually provided services by participant B deviates by three units or more from the optimal number of services for participant A, participant A receives a payment of 90 Taler with a probability of 5%. With a probability of 95% he/she receives a payment of 0 Taler.
Participant A of type L | ||
Number of services provided | Probability for | Probability for |
by participant B | payment of 90 | payment of 0 |
1 | 65% | 35% |
2 | 95% | 5% |
3 | 65% | 35% |
4 | 35% | 65% |
5 | 5% | 95% |
6 | 5% | 95% |
Participant A of type M | ||
Number of services provided | Probability for | Probability for |
by participant B | payment of 90 | payment of 0 |
1 | 5% | 95% |
2 | 35% | 65% |
3 | 65% | 35% |
4 | 95% | 5% |
5 | 65% | 35% |
6 | 35% | 65% |
Participant A of type H | ||
Number of services provided | Probability for | Probability for |
by participant B | payment of 90 | payment of 0 |
1 | 5% | 95% |
2 | 5% | 95% |
3 | 5% | 95% |
4 | 35% | 35% |
5 | 65% | 65% |
6 | 95% | 5% |
Budget Group | Cost Table | ||||
Type | Budged Group | Budget | Service Units | Total Costs | |
L | I | 45 | 1 | 15 | |
2 | 30 | ||||
M | 3 | 45 | |||
H | II | 90 | 4 | 60 | |
5 | 75 | ||||
6 | 90 |
- (1)
- Participant B learns in every situation which of the three possible types participant A is in the current case. Participant A and participant C do not have any information about the type of participant A at any point of time.
- (2)
- Participant B tells participant C which type participant A is.
- (3)
- On the basis of his/her message about participant A, participant B will be provided a budget group. The budget associated with that will be subtracted from the endowment of participant C.
- (4)
- Participant B decides which number of services she wants to provide for participant A.
Appendix D. Instructions Medical Framing
General Information
The Experiment
Type | Optimal number of Medical Services |
L | 2 units |
M | 4 units |
H | 6 units |
- If the number of Medical Services provided by the Physician is optimal for the Patient, he/she receives a payment of 90 Taler with a probability of 95%. With a probability of 5% she receives a payment of 0 Taler.
- If the number of actually provided Medical Services by the Physician deviates by one unit from the optimal number of Medical Services for the Patient, the Patient receives a payment of 90 Taler with a probability of 65%. With a probability of 35% he/she receives a payment of 0 Taler.
- If the number of actually provided Medical Services by the Physician deviates by two units from the optimal number of Medical Services for the Patient, the Patient receives a payment of 90 Taler with a probability of 35%. With a probability of 65% he/she receives a payment of 0 Taler.
- If the number of actually provided Medical Services by the Physician deviates by three units or more from the optimal number of Medical Services for the Patient, the Patient receives a payment of 90 Taler with a probability of 5%. With a probability of 95% he/she receives a payment of 0 Taler.
Patient of type L | ||
Number of Medical Services provided | Probability for | Probability for |
by participant B | payment of 90 | payment of 0 |
1 | 65% | 35% |
2 | 95% | 5% |
3 | 65% | 35% |
4 | 35% | 65% |
5 | 5% | 95% |
6 | 5% | 95% |
Patient of type M | ||
Number of Medical Services provided | Probability for | Probability for |
by participant B | payment of 90 | payment of 0 |
1 | 5% | 95% |
2 | 35% | 65% |
3 | 65% | 35% |
4 | 95% | 5% |
5 | 65% | 35% |
6 | 35% | 65% |
Patient of type H | ||
Number of Medical Services provided | Probability for | Probability for |
by participant B | payment of 90 | payment of 0 |
1 | 5% | 95% |
2 | 5% | 95% |
3 | 5% | 95% |
4 | 35% | 35% |
5 | 65% | 65% |
6 | 95% | 5% |
Budget Group | Cost Table | ||||
Type | Budged Group | Budget | Service Units | Total Costs | |
L | I | 45 | 1 | 15 | |
2 | 30 | ||||
M | 3 | 45 | |||
H | II | 90 | 4 | 60 | |
5 | 75 | ||||
6 | 90 |
- (1)
- The Physician learns in every situation which of the three possible types the Patient is in the current case. The Patient and the Health Insurance do not have any information about the type of the Patient at any point of time.
- (2)
- The Physician tells the Health Insurance which type the Patient is.
- (3)
- On the basis of her message about the Patient, the Physician will be provided a budget group. The budget associated with that will be subtracted from the endowment of the Health Insurance.
- (4)
- The Physician decides which number of Medical Services she wants to provide for the Patient.
Appendix E. Control Questions Neutral Framing
Appendix F. Control Questions Medical Framing
Appendix G. Screenshots of Experimental Decision
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Number of Services Provided | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | ||
L | 65 | 95 | 65 | 35 | 5 | 5 | |
Patient Type | M | 5 | 35 | 65 | 95 | 65 | 35 |
H | 5 | 5 | 5 | 35 | 65 | 95 |
Number of Services Provided | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | |
Costs | 15 | 30 | 45 | 60 | 75 | 90 |
Reported Patient Type | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
L | M | H | ||
L | Truthful | Overreporting | Overreporting | |
True Patient Type | M | Underreporting | Truthful | Overreporting |
H | Underreporting | Underreporting | Truthful |
Number of Services Provided | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | ||
Payment System | Fee For Service | 15 | 30 | 45 | 60 | 75 | 90 |
Capitation | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
(Reported) Type | L | M | H |
---|---|---|---|
Costs for optimal service | 30 | 60 | 90 |
Budget Group | I | II | |
Available Budget | 45 | 90 |
Treatment | Payment System | Framing | Subjects | N |
---|---|---|---|---|
CNS | Capitation | Neutral | Students | 27 |
CMS | Capitation | Medical | Students | 24 |
CMD | Capitation | Medical | Doctors | 12 |
FNS | Fee For Service | Neutral | Students | 27 |
FMS | Fee For Service | Medical | Students | 27 |
FMD | Fee For Service | Medical | Doctors | 9 |
Patient Payoff | Physician Payoff | Insurer Payoff | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Services Provided | L | M | H | FFS | CAP | L | M | H | |||
1 | 58.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 15 | 50 | 85 | 85 | 40 | |||
2 | 85.5 | 31.5 | 4.5 | 30 | 85 | 85 | 40 | ||||
3 | 58.5 | 58.5 | 4.5 | 45 | 85 | 85 | 40 | ||||
4 | 31.5 | 85.5 | 31.5 | 60 | 50 | 40 | |||||
5 | 4.5 | 58.5 | 58.5 | 75 | 40 | ||||||
6 | 4.5 | 31.5 | 85.5 | 90 | 40 |
Payment System | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Patient | Fram.-Subj. | FFS | CAP | U-Test |
L | Neutr.-Stud. | 2.11 | 0.04 | *** |
Med.-Stud. | 0.96 | 0.08 | *** | |
Med.-Doc. | 0 | 0 | ||
M | Neutr.-Stud. | 0.44 | −1 | *** |
Med.-Stud. | −0.04 | −0.83 | ** | |
Med.-Doc. | −0.89 | −1.08 | ||
H | Neutr.-Stud. | −0.26 | −0.63 | ** |
Med.-Stud. | −0.33 | −0.54 | ||
Med.-Doc. | 0 | −0.75 |
Framing | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Patient | Payment System | Neutral | Medical | U-Test |
L | FFS | 2.11 | 0.96 | ** |
CAP | 0.04 | 0.08 | ||
M | FFS | 0.44 | −0.04 | |
CAP | −1 | −0.83 | ||
H | FFS | −0.26 | −0.33 | |
CAP | −0.63 | −0.54 |
Subjects | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Patient | Payment System | Students | Doctors | U-Test |
L | FFS | 0.96 | 0 | ** |
CAP | 0.08 | 0 | ||
M | FFS | −0.04 | −0.89 | |
CAP | −0.83 | −1.08 | ||
H | FFS | −0.33 | 0 | |
CAP | −0.54 | −0.75 |
Patient | Physician | Insurer | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
Patient Type L | Fee For Service | −28.57 *** | −0.51 | −10.51 *** |
(3.82) | (2.97) | (2.72) | ||
Medical Framing | 11.02 *** | −8.76 *** | 7.52 ** | |
(4.18) | (3.25) | (2.97) | ||
Medical Doctor | 11.94 ** | −5.68 | 4.23 | |
(5.56) | (4.32) | (3.96) | ||
Constant | 74.79 *** | 56.09 *** | 77.76 *** | |
(3.48) | (2.70) | (2.48) | ||
Patient Type M | Fee For Service | −7.32 *** | 10.46 *** | −15.27 *** |
(2.66) | (2.56) | (3.52) | ||
Medical Framing | 5.72 ** | −3.64 | −3.96 | |
(2.91) | (2.80) | (3.85) | ||
Medical Doctor | −0.74 | −5.37 | 9.30 * | |
(3.88) | (3.73) | (5.12) | ||
Constant | 56.66 *** | 53.10 *** | 77.64 *** | |
(2.43) | (2.33) | (3.21) | ||
Patient Type H | Fee For Service | 8.66 ** | 36.30 *** | −2.85 * |
(4.16) | (1.65) | (1.69) | ||
Medical Framing | −0.31 | −0.59 | −0.65 | |
(4.55) | (1.80) | (1.85) | ||
Medical Doctor | 1.93 | 2.27 | 0.09 | |
(6.06) | (2.40) | (2.46) | ||
Constant | 71.17 *** | 49.91 *** | 43.93 *** | |
(3.79) | (1.50) | (1.54) |
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Reif, S.; Hafner, L.; Seebauer, M. Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2020, 17, 5540. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155540
Reif S, Hafner L, Seebauer M. Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2020; 17(15):5540. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155540
Chicago/Turabian StyleReif, Simon, Lucas Hafner, and Michael Seebauer. 2020. "Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17, no. 15: 5540. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155540
APA StyleReif, S., Hafner, L., & Seebauer, M. (2020). Physician Behavior under Prospective Payment Schemes—Evidence from Artefactual Field and Lab Experiments. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17(15), 5540. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17155540