Blockchain Technology for IoT Security and Trust: A Comprehensive SLR
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Analyze IoT Security and Trust Challenges: To provide an understanding of the major security and trust concerns in IoT systems, IoT security challenges are considered at multiple layers of the IoT reference model while illustrating the weaknesses of conventional security mechanisms.
- Assess Blockchain’s Potential Capabilities for IoT Security: To assess the potential capabilities of blockchain technology, including decentralization, transparency, and immutability, while assessing the application of the proposed solutions for IoT architecture with regard to the specified challenges, including data integrity, authentication, and access control.
- Explore Blockchain’s Role in Enhancing IoT Sustainability: To examine the role that blockchain can play in making IoT sustainable by increasing resource utilization, reducing carbon footprint, and increasing openness and veracity of sources.
- Identify Integration Challenges and Future Directions: To provide insights on some of the areas of experimental or technical challenge related to integrating blockchain into IoT and on future research opportunities to enable efficient, scalable blockchain IoT platforms.
- Provide a Comprehensive Review of Recent Studies: Due to rapid advancements in IoT technology, this scoping review aims to locate and consolidate the latest articles published from 2020 to 2024, including the findings, methods, and shortcomings of blockchain IoT security and trust.
2. Methodology
2.1. Planning
2.1.1. Research Questions
- What are the main security and trust challenges in IoT environments?
- How can blockchain technology address these IoT security and trust challenges?
- What are the benefits of combining blockchain with IoT systems?
- What are the potential limitations and challenges in implementing blockchain within IoT environments?
- How does blockchain integration contribute to sustainability in IoT security?
- What are future directions for enhancing blockchain applications in IoT security?
2.1.2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
- Inclusion Criteria
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- Data of publication: This SLR includes papers that were published from 2020 to 2024 to make sure the information is recent.
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- Relevance to the field: This SLR concentrates on papers that focus on how blockchain is used to enhance security and trust in IoT systems.
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- Language: English-language papers were the focus of this SLR to guarantee accessibility and understanding for all readers.
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- Peer-reviewed: Scholarly articles that have undergone peer review were considered for inclusion, such as peer-reviewed journal articles along with conference papers and technical papers.
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- Full-text Access: This SLR includes research papers that have full-text access for detailed examination.
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- Original research papers: This SLR includes research papers that contain research findings such as outcomes or theoretical examinations that contribute to the field of IoT and blockchain security with innovative methods.
- Exclusion Criteria
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- Irrelevant papers: Papers that are not relevant include papers that do not specifically tackle the merging of IoT technologies with blockchain.
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- Non-peer-reviewed: Non-peer-reviewed sources, such as gray literature and opinion articles, are not considered in this literature review.
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- Non-English Papers: Papers written in a language other than English were excluded to prevent translation errors and ensure a grasp of the content.
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- Duplicate Studies: This SLR excluded any studies that were duplicated or redundant across two databases.
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- Inaccessible Papers: Papers that cannot be fully accessed were not considered in the selection process.
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- Paper length: Short papers that do not provide full understanding or lack detailed information about the topic were excluded.
2.2. Conducting
2.2.1. Search Strings
2.2.2. Data Sources
2.3. Reporting
2.3.1. Screening Process
2.3.2. Selection Process
2.4. Threats to Validity in Blockchain and IoT Security Systematic Review
- Selection bias: The selection of studies may not be generalizable to a broader field, especially when few databases were considered (for instance, Google Scholar and Saudi Digital Library only).
- Publication bias: Using only certified articles obtained from peer-reviewed publications in specific databases.
- Temporal Bias: This review may have excluded studies published earlier and important studies related to blockchain and IoT security and focused on works published within a specific period, from 2020 to 2024 only.
- Technological and Methodological Limitations: Blockchain as well as IoT domains are still developing, so the methodology or technology from several years ago may not be valid.
3. Overview of IoT
3.1. IoT Architecture
- Perception Layer: The perception layer is also called the physical layer. This layer contains sensors and different collecting tools that are used for collecting information. Furthermore, collecting and processing the information and then transmitting it to the network layer is the main responsibility of this layer. Moreover, it allows collaboration between IoT nodes within the local networks [7].
- Network Layer: The network layer is also called the transport layer. This layer contains different communication protocols and techniques, like Zigbee, Bluetooth, cellular networks, WiFi, and other technologies. Also, it consists of switches, Internet gateways, and routers. In addition, the main responsibility of this layer is safe and faster data transmission from one layer to another [7].
- Application Layer: The application layer is located at the top of the IoT architecture. This layer contains user interfaces, applications, data storage systems, and other services for the users. In addition, the main responsibility of this layer is to provide the interface between the IoT devices and the applications that interact with them. It also ensures the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of the data. Also, it is responsible for interpreting the data to make them meaningful and actionable. Some of the protocols implemented in this layer include HTTP, MQTT, and CoAP, with HTTP supporting different functionalities within the IoT due to its resource availability and network constraints. For instance, HTTP is ideal for web-based IoT applications, MQTT is optimal for small data streaming, and CoAP is meant for restricted devices and networks [7].
3.2. Security Challenges in IoT
- Perception layer: Replay attacks, eavesdropping, timing, node capture, and malicious and fake nodes are all included in the perception layer. By watching how long it takes for systems to react to input or cryptographic algorithms, attackers can use timing attacks to find security flaws and collect secrets kept within a security system [10]. Replay attacks are ones in which hackers listen in on communications between senders and recipients. Then, by pretending to be the real sender, the intruder utilizes the sender’s information to convince the recipient to carry out specific activities [11]. S. Lazzaro et al. [12] attempted to establish the extent to which replay attack vulnerability was apparent in consumer IoT devices as well as the extent to which they are equipped for local communication protection, and they observed that the standard is low. The authors conducted a practical experiment with 41 contemporary IoT devices employing the REPLIOT tool and succeeded with 51% of those not supporting local connectivity, which is promising offline functionality contrary to reliability standards set by ENISA/NIST. Out of all the devices with local connectivity, 75% of them, that is, 15 out of 20 were assessed to be susceptible to replay attacks. This study also identified that those devices relying on unencrypted or only weakly encrypted communication protocols were especially at risk. For all tested attack scenarios with and without device restarts, the replay attacks were accurate across a broad spectrum of IoT categories, smart plugs, cameras, and speakers. This highlights the importance of authentication for both as well as the acknowledgment of the importance of generally accepted protocols on securing consumer IoT devices.Malicious attacks that include adding nodes to systems and creating fraudulent data inputs are referred to as fake nodes. Mainly, this type of attack aims to prevent actual information from being transmitted. Malicious attackers also add nodes to networks, which they then delete because they use the power needed by legitimate nodes to function. By adopting strategies like gateway nodes, attackers can completely gain control of important nodes in node capture attacks [11]. Senders and recipients of secure information can leak information to each other thanks to these nodes. The perception layer is vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks, in which hackers intercept phone calls, text messages, emails, and video conferences. Private communications are targeted by attackers in an attempt to gain personal data. Significant losses result from the information gathered through these methods, mostly from attackers’ access to private data [13]. As a result, developers of IoT structures in various organizations must undertake in-depth studies on the best security methods to use for their perception layers.
- Network layer: Since the network layer transfers data from physical devices over wired or wireless networks, it is frequently the target of attacks. Active attacks known as Denial of Service (DoS) prevent legitimate users from using other devices or network resources. It is frequently achieved by flooding targeted devices or network resources with repetitive requests, which prevents or makes it difficult for legitimate users to utilize their devices [14]. Attacks known as IP spoofing are used to gain unauthorized access to servers. To keep the server from detecting the attacker’s presence on its network, attackers use trusted IP addresses. In addition to these attacks, IP spoofing can also be used for blind spoofing, man-in-the-middle attacks, and non-blind spoofing. One method that makes it challenging to stop these cybercrime activities is the attacker’s use of trusted IP addresses, as servers are unable to recognize that an attacker is accessing data using the trusted IP address rather than an authorized user [15]. Another tactic used in passive attacks is the MiTM attack. In this scenario, attackers manipulate messages sent between senders and recipients who believe they are speaking with one another in real time. Attackers can modify messages to match their requirements or viewpoints thanks to these secret interceptions. Passive attacks involve the eavesdropping of only the provided information, with no communication breaks between the sender and the recipient [16]. Paracha et al. [17] identified several main flaws that have been identified when it comes to the TLS protocol and its security, which can be attacked through MITM attacks. Other vulnerabilities include failure to verify issues like hostname, where an attacker will be able to provide a wrong name to the certificate authorities and allow untrusted certificate chains, making TLS vulnerable to MITM attacks. However, nowadays, the usage of outdated TLS versions (TLS 1.0 or 1.1) or poorly secured cipher suites (for example, RC4 or DES) is still prevalent, which makes a connection vulnerable to certain threats, including POODLE and Sweet32. Where trust in a CA that has been compromised has not been withdrawn, attackers can use the keys of the compromised CA to issue certificates for man-in-the-middle interception, thus violating TLS’s authentication guarantees. The absence of revocation checking only intensifies such a danger given that clients cannot identify certificates that have been revoked because of security breaches, thus giving hackers a free license to eavesdrop on the parties involved. Also, downgrade attacks in which the attackers compel the clients and servers to agree on a weaker version of TLs are successful in constraining forward cryptographic securities and enabling data decryption. All these weaknesses show that an opponent is able to fully violate TLS thus negating most of its inherent security assurances on data in transit.Storage and exploit attacks are two more types of network layer attacks. Passive storage attacks include data breaches that compromise data stored on multiple devices or in the cloud. The attacker can then modify these data to suit their goals. In order to increase the likelihood of future attacks, attackers also repeat the information they obtain [18]. Illegal attacks on software, data chunks, or command sequences are known as exploit attacks. An attack entails taking over these systems and stealing stored data. These kinds of attacks make use of security flaws in systems, hardware, or other apps. Thus, in order to secure the data used in various network tiers, a thorough investigation into appropriate security techniques is required [19].
- Application layer: Application layer security issues and threats that are frequently encountered include parameter manipulation, HTTP floods, SQL injections, cross-site scripting, and Slowloris attacks. To improve their application layer security systems, organizations deploy web application firewalls and secure web gateway services [20]. Similarly, MQTT and CoAP are other protocols implemented in the application layer that also have specific challenges. For example, MQTT follows a broker-based approach to data exchange, which does raise certain internal security threats. Since the broker is an intermediary, an untrusted broker may intercept or change all transmitted data, violating confidentiality and integrity. These are some of the hard-to-solve problems with reference to traditional security solutions in that the MQTT decoupling principle eliminates secure end-to-end communication and direct device authentication modes [21]. On the other hand, CoAP has been designed for use by constrained devices; it is commonly exposed to such threats as eavesdropping, message manipulation, or replay attacks in cases where secure transmission protocols are not allowed. To improve MQTT and CoAP security, there must be a strong authentication process, encryption and access control of brokers and devices, and frequent updates. They are useful in protecting the integrity, confidentiality of data, and trustworthiness of devices in an IoT network [21].An injection attack known as cross-site scripting occurs when an attacker inserts client-side scripts that, depending on their objectives, entirely change the content of the apps. Another type of attack is a malicious code attack, in which certain software components are utilized as codes to harm particular computers. This attack is especially problematic since anti-virus software is unable to stop or manage it. Furthermore, it is frequently created as a program that requires users’ attention in order to carry out specific tasks or as an activity in and of itself [9]. The vast volumes of data held on this layer also lead to data loss and network disruptions. It is challenging to build data processing security systems that can guarantee that security is enhanced for all users due to the variety of data transmission activities and devices used in data transmission among users. Since these enormous volumes of data raise issues, there has been a growth in data loss and network disruptions.
3.3. The Most Common Solutions to Address Security Challenges in IoT
4. Overview of Blockchain Technology
4.1. History of Blockchain Technology
4.2. Components of Blockchain
- Hash Functions: The main component of the blockchain ensures that stored data will remain as they are without alteration, which ensures data integrity. Hashing utilizes cryptography algorithms to transfer data into hashing code. Additionally, blockchain uses digital signatures and symmetric and asymmetric encryption to secure data from unauthorized access [7].
- Consensus Mechanisms: Blockchain uses different consensus mechanisms like proof of work and proof of stake to ensure IoT data are decentralized, safe from unauthorized access, and reliable. In addition, consensus mechanisms keep records safe from tampering in IoT environments [1].
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- Proof of Work (PoW): In Proof of Work (PoWs), miners engage in a competition to decode puzzles to earn the privilege of adding a succeeding block to the blockchain system. This method demands computing capability to enhance network security by deterring entities from seizing control of the network at a high cost and resource investment. Bitcoin serves as an illustration employing the PoW mechanism.
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- Proof of Stake (PoS): Proof of stake is a way for participants to validate blocks by holding a number of coins rather than trying to solve difficult puzzles like in proof of work (PoW). This approach minimizes energy usage and promotes dedication to the blockchain network in the run by selecting validators according to their stake. Ethereum has recently made the shift toward utilizing PoS through Ethereum 2. O.
- Smart Contracts: With the management of secure data sharing, automating processes, enabling programmable monetization models, establishing decentralized access control, and improving supply chain traceability for IoT-enabled systems, smart contracts on the blockchain can play an essential role in IoT applications [3].
- Node: Individual computers or any entity that participates in distributing the transactions, validation, and making a full copy of the blockchain [2].
4.3. How Blockchain Works
4.4. Types of Blockchain
4.5. Advantages of Combining Blockchain with IoT
- Distributed Ledger: The blockchain is used to record IoT data in a distributed ledger that cannot be changed or manipulated by unauthorized users. This feature ensures the traceability and integrity of the data [3].
- Cryptography: Robust cryptography techniques are used in blockchain, like digital signatures and hashing to secure the IoT from disclosure through malicious attacks [2].
- Consensus Mechanism: Blockchain utilizes a consensus protocol to ensure that all participants or nodes in the blockchain agree about the state of the ledger, like proof of work and proof of stake. This feature enhances trust in IoT data and prevents unauthorized editing [43].
- Decentralized Identity: Identity management for IoT devices is decentralized in the blockchain, which means the blockchain identifies, authenticates, and authorizes IoT users, entities, or devices securely. This feature prevents identity theft attacks [6].
- Transparency and Auditability: Transparency and auditability are provided by the uneditable nature of the blockchain ledger, which allows stakeholders to view the history of all activities and transactions stored on the blockchain, which enhances trust [8].
- Prevent Data Manipulation: The blockchain system prevents data manipulation because it does not allow data to be changed without the permission of the participating parties. If you attempt to do so, all participating parties will be notified [7].
4.6. Blockchain’s Cryptographic Techniques and Security Across IoT Layers
4.6.1. Cryptographic Techniques in Blockchain
- Digital Signatures: Each of the parties and devices that are involved in an IoT network is validated by digital signatures that employ asymmetric cryptography. Clients possess distinct private–public keys, guaranteeing the ability to sign and ensure the authenticity of the message. This approach is crucial in as much as it helps to verify that the data used have not been interfered with as they were being transmitted.
- Hashing: Applications employing hash functions include SHA-256, which converts plain text data to fixed-length codes, therefore minimizing the possibility of an intruder decrypting the content. IoT data cannot be subjected to unauthorized modification since they use hashing in block headers and transactions. Hashing also facilitates the indexing and storage of IoT data and generally improves the security of distributed systems where data integrity or ‘immutedness’ is paramount.
- Encryption (Symmetric and Asymmetric): Blockchain uses simple key and complex symmetric encryption methods besides using asymmetric or public key encryption methods to encrypt its data. A symmetric key is most often used for IoT secure communication, and an asymmetric key for blockchain identity checks provides secure and peer-to-peer IoT node exchange.
- Consensus Protocols: Not strictly cryptographic in nature, consensus algorithms like proof of work (pow) or proof of stake (PoS) make sure that blockchains are agreed on in terms of data validity. Thus, applying consensus mechanisms allows the blockchain to ensure data transaction safety, which will contribute to the complete protection of IoT systems from data fraud.
4.6.2. Role of Blockchain in Securing IoT Layers
- Perception Layer: The perception layer involves various IoT physical devices and sensors for data collection. The incorporation of the technology helps to make security better here as information is encrypted and hashed, thereby eliminating the risk of the data collected by sensors being easily accessed by unauthorized entities. Smart contracts, on the other hand, ascertain device identities to help the IoT ecosystem to only allow authorized devices to engage in data exchange. This ensures that no form of access or manipulation at the point of data collection is made by an unauthorized person.
- Network Layer: At the network layer, blockchain uses decentralized and cryptographic functionality to encrypt data transmission across communication channels such as WiFi, Bluetooth, mobile networks, etc. Digital signatures and secure transmission mechanisms help guard against the common forms of attacks that include the man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). Fourth, blockchain disintermediates the need for any central authorities, thereby eliminating single points of vulnerability and malware attacks that target connected control points in the network.
- Application Layer: This layer provides user interfaces, data storage, and service applications where IoT data are retrieved and processed. Blockchain fortifies this layer by offering unchangeable and intelligible transaction records, which provide compliance and confidence within applications. Three key measures of data reliability include the following: Hashing can ensure data authenticity. The use of digital signatures ensures data authenticity. The use of consensus protocols can also ensure the integrity of the records. It is most effective, especially in high-risk IoT domains, for example, smart health and industrial IoT, where data are highly sensitive and must be accurate.
5. Related Study
5.1. Trust Management in IoT Networks
5.2. Enhancing Data Security and Privacy
5.3. Scalability and Efficiency Solutions
5.4. Insights and Future Directions
Ref. | Year | Proposal | Methodology | Limitations | Suggested Mitigation |
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[5] | 2021 |
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[44] | 2021 |
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[43] | 2021 |
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[6] | 2023 |
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[8] | 2023 |
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[56] | 2020 |
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[7] | 2020 |
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[45] | 2020 |
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[52] | 2024 |
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[46] | 2021 |
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[47] | 2021 |
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[48] | 2020 |
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[54] | 2020 |
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[50] | 2021 |
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[51] | 2020 |
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[55] | 2021 |
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[49] | 2020 |
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[57] | 2021 |
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[53] | 2023 |
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[3] | 2021 |
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6. Blockchain-Driven Sustainability in IoT Security
- Improving security and trust:
- Data integrity: one of the characteristics of the blockchain is having a tamper-proof and decentralized ledger, which will guarantee that IoT devices remain trustworthy and accurate, mitigating the threat of data manipulation.
- Authentication: Blockchain can prevent unauthorized access and secure device authentication by implementing encryption techniques. This is a very critical point in the smart grid where data integrity is necessary for best sustainable practices.
- Resource efficiency:
- Resource management optimization: Blockchain can facilitate our lives by applying more efficient resource allocation in IoT networks. For instance, in smart agriculture systems, blockchain can contribute to tracking resource usage like the amount of water used, which leads to enhanced input usage and minimizes waste.
- Decentralized energy systems: Peer-to-peer energy trading among IoT devices using blockchain technology can help create decentralized energy systems in energy management that are both resilient and sustainable.
- Accountability and transparency:
- Transparency: Blockchain can enhance transparency by enabling the tracking of products in supply chains and empowering consumers to make informed decisions regarding sustainable products.
- Environmental impact tracking: With the integration of sensors linked to blockchain technology in place, for environmental impact monitoring purposes, companies can actively track their footprint in real time to foster responsibility and advocate for eco-friendly behaviors.
- Reduced carbon footprint:
- Improved efficiency in logistics: Utilizing IoT devices in conjunction with blockchain technology can streamline logistics and transportation processes to minimize fuel usage and emissions—a key factor in maintaining sustainable supply chains.
- Smart waste management: Utilizing blockchain can assist in waste management by offering insights into patterns of waste generation and promoting recycling through incentivized programs.
- Decentralization and resilience:
- Distributed networks: Leveraging the structure of blockchain technology can improve the robustness of IoT systems. This is especially advantageous in emergencies where ensuring communication and data security is crucial, for the distribution of resources.
- Empowerment of local communities: Local communities can gain empowerment through blockchain technology support for decision making and resource management to adopt sustainable practices that suit their unique environments.
- Innovation and collaboration:
- Encouraging research and development: Embracing blockchain technology in the IoT fosters teamwork, across fields and fuels advancements that support the development of eco-friendly technologies.
- Engagement of stakeholders: Collaboration among groups, like governments and businesses, can be improved with the help of blockchain technology to work together toward achieving sustainability goals.
IoT Integration Challenges and Sustainability
7. Challenges, Open Issues, and Future Research Directions
7.1. Challenges of Integrating Blockchain with IoT Environments
- Blockchain networks are often suitable for small-scale applications, while IoT networks contain a lot of restricted devices that introduce a lot of information.
- The restricted devices in IoT environments have limited memory, computational power, and resources, which make it difficult for blockchain to apply very complex operations on these devices, which will affect their performance.
- Many IoT applications require fast responses, like emergency notifications in medical environments, while the networks of blockchain have lower latency, which may impact the response time.
- IoT devices suffer from many security challenges, like malware, physical tampering, or network-based attacks, which cannot be solved with blockchain. Even if it provides security countermeasures over the network, providing security to IoT devices exceeds its capabilities. Thus, ensuring the full security and privacy of IoT data is impossible.
- Some consensus mechanisms, like proof of work, consume a lot of energy, which may not align with IoT-restricted resources.
7.2. Future Directions
- Energy-Efficient Consensus Protocols: Centralized traditional consensus mechanisms such as proof of work (PoW) demand high computational power and energy, which become increasingly infeasible in the IoT context. The suggested future work is on extending stateless and resource-limited lightweight protocols such as PoS and DPoS to IoT networks. In addition, expanding the research focused on the set of adjustments that allow for the inclusion of minimal PoW with other minimal protocols would further help to achieve the balance between security and efficiency.
- Scalability in Large-Scale IoT Networks: Comprising several thousands or sometimes millions of interconnected devices within a distinct IoT network, scalability then becomes a problem within traditional consensus approaches. There is a lack of research on network-wide consensus algorithms like sharding or the use of Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), in which the validation process is split across multiple subnets or in which the transactions can be validated asynchronously. Such approaches could increase the throughput, decrease the latency, and keep security; therefore, these techniques might be useful for a large-scale IoT environment.
- Latency-Optimized Consensus for Real-Time Applications: IoT interface response validity is critical in many interfaces, mainly due to the required real-time feedback in various healthcare monitoring or industrial automation applications. Other consensus mechanisms with fast finality that can also be further researched and modified for IoT consist of the BFT variants and Raft. These protocols reduce the delay by checking and affirming transactions in a more centralized or hierarchical model, making the response time for crucial applications optimum.
- Consensus Mechanisms with Built-In Security and Privacy for IoT: The point is that the IoT is an open and typically unstructured environment, so solutions based on consensus mechanisms, which also include lightweight encryption or even privacy-preserving techniques such as zero-knowledge proofs could boost both security and privacy. Further research can investigate ways of developing consensus algorithms that naturally address permission, privacy, and security issues in achieving consensus across IoT devices with minimal computational cost.
- Adaptive and Flexible Consensus Protocols for Dynamic IoT Environments: Indeed, IoT environments are characterized by continuous device onboarding and disconnection. Dynamic consensus protocols that provide flexibility in parameters such as the number of nodes involved in consensus and validation rules involved in the consensus are required. Studying non-rigid or auto-configurable protocols on which ML or auto-configuration algorithms for the assessment of network states and subsequent fine-tuning of consensus mechanisms could considerably enhance the stability and throughput of consensus across IoT networks.
8. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
IoT | Internet of Things; |
MiTM | Man in The Middle; |
SLR | Systematic Literature Review; |
DoS | Denial of Service; |
AI | Artificial Intelligence; |
ML | Machine Learning; |
VPN | Virtual Private Network; |
IDS | Intrusion Detection System. |
Appendix A. Included Papers in the SLR
Ref. No. | Title | Authors | Year |
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[5] | A blockchain-based trust management method for Internet of Things | Wu, Xu and Liang, Junbin | 2021 |
[44] | A data driven trust mechanism based on blockchain in IoT sensor networks for detection and mitigation of attacks | Sivaganesan, D | 2021 |
[43] | A blockchain-based trust model for the internet of things supply chain management | Al-Rakhami, Mabrook S and Al-Mashari, Majed | 2021 |
[6] | A new blockchain-based authentication framework for secure IoT networks | Al Hwaitat, Ahmad K and Almaiah, Mohammed Amin and Ali, Aitizaz and Al-Otaibi, Shaha and Shishakly, Rima and Lutfi, Abdalwali and Alrawad, Mahmaod | 2023 |
[8] | A review of IoT security and privacy using decentralized blockchain techniques | Gugueoth, Vinay and Safavat, Sunitha and Shetty, Sachin and Rawat, Danda | 2023 |
[56] | A trust-evaluation-enhanced blockchain-secured industrial IoT system | Wu, Di and Ansari, Nirwan | 2020 |
[7] | Addressing security and privacy issues of IoT using blockchain technology | Mohanta, Bhabendu Kumar and Jena, Debasish and Ramasubbareddy, Somula and Daneshmand, Mahmoud and Gandomi, Amir H | 2020 |
[45] | Blockchain-based infrastructure to enable trust in IoT environment | De Santis, L and Paciello, Vincenzo and Pietrosanto, Antonio | 2020 |
[52] | A Novel Distributed Authentication of Blockchain Technology Integration in IoT Services | Deep, Avishaek and Perrusquía, Adolfo and Aljaburi, Lamees and Al-Rubaye, Saba and Guo, Weisi | 2024 |
[46] | A scalable key and trust management solution for IoT sensors using SDN and blockchain technology | Hameed, Sufian and Shah, Syed Attique and Saeed, Qazi Sarmad and Siddiqui, Shahbaz and Ali, Ihsan and Vedeshin, Anton and Draheim, Dirk | 2021 |
[47] | Trust-based blockchain authorization for iot | Putra, Guntur Dharma and Dedeoglu, Volkan and Kanhere, Salil S and Jurdak, Raja and Ignjatovic, Aleksandar | 2021 |
[48] | Towards a secure behavior modeling for iot networks using blockchain | Ali, Jawad and Khalid, Ahmad Shahrafidz and Yafi, Eiad and Musa, Shahrulniza and Ahmed, Waqas | 2020 |
[54] | Toward trust in Internet of Things ecosystems: Design principles for blockchain-based IoT applications | Lockl, Jannik and Schlatt, Vincent and Schweizer, André and Urbach, Nils and Harth, Natascha | 2020 |
[50] | Securing IoT devices using zero trust and blockchain | Dhar, Suparna and Bose, Indranil | 2021 |
[51] | Decentralized blockchain-based trust management protocol for the Internet of Things | Kouicem, Djamel Eddine and Imine, Youcef and Bouabdallah, Abdelmadjid and Lakhlef, Hicham | 2020 |
[55] | Blockchain-based IoT access control system: towards security, lightweight, and cross-domain | Sun, Shuang and Du, Rong and Chen, Shudong and Li, Weiwei | 2021 |
[49] | Blockchain and trust for secure, end-user-based and decentralized IoT service provision | Shala, Besfort and Trick, Ulrich and Lehmann, Armin and Ghita, Bogdan and Shiaeles, Stavros | 2020 |
[57] | Achieving IoT data security based blockchain | Liao, Dan and Li, Hui and Wang, Wentao and Wang, Xiong and Zhang, Ming and Chen, Xue | 2021 |
[53] | Blockchain-based data access control and key agreement system in iot environment | Lee, JoonYoung and Kim, MyeongHyun and Park, KiSung and Noh, SungKee and Bisht, Abhishek and Das, Ashok Kumar and Park, Youngho | 2023 |
[3] | A survey on the integration of blockchain with IoT to enhance performance and eliminate challenges | Al Sadawi, Alia and Hassan, Mohamed S and Ndiaye, Malick | 2021 |
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Layer | Threat | Description | The Most Common Solutions |
---|---|---|---|
Perception Layer | Node tampering [22] | In a common attack situation, sensor nodes are spread out across locations without supervision. | Authentication, encryption, and access control. |
Cyber-physical [20] | Trying to damage a device physically. | To determine the defective nodes in the system, a technique for detecting faults is employed. | |
Fake node injection [23] | An injection attack occurs when harmful code is inserted into the network to extract data from the database and transmit them to the attacker. | Ways to verify identity and control access to information securely. | |
Sensor tracking [24] | Using a laser beam is quite effective for monitoring and identifying an object. | Distributed ledger technology includes blockchain as one of its variations. | |
Unauthorized access [25] | Anyone can access the IoT device using the Internet. | The IoT gadget must also undergo authentication to avoid any misuse. | |
Storage access attack [26] | Accessing the cloud storage where all the device information is stored could potentially manipulate results by device. | Access control mechanisms, assigned permissions. | |
Eavesdropping [25] | It is like an intrusion during an activity. Like when someone interrupts a video chat or a text exchange out of nowhere. | Implementing an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). | |
Replay attack/play back attack [23] | The perpetrator saves data exchanged through the network with the possibility of transmitting them at a time. | Utilizing session keys alongside timestamps and unique passwords for security measures. | |
Node capture [27] | The intruder seizes authority over the primary node, like the gateway, and could establish a harmful node there to expose all the data stored within it. | Involves encryption methods to protect data integrity and confidentiality; authentication processes to verify user identities; and access control measures to manage permissions effectively. | |
Network Layer | DoS [28] | Keeping a network asset from being utilized for its intention. | Examples of ingress and egress filtering include D WARD technology and the use of hop count filtering, along with implementing SYN Cookies. |
Replay [29] | Rearrange the data packets and manipulate the stream of the messages. | Timeliness of message. | |
DoS [28] | This attack floods the network with requests, causing it to crash and become unusable even for authorized users. | Standardized IPv6 mechanisms. | |
Spoofing attacks [30] | Spoofing occurs when a hacker pretends to be a user or device to carry out data theft and malware distribution or bypass security measures. | Authentication, encryption, and access control. | |
DoS [28] | This assault overwhelms the network with requests until it crashes and becomes inaccessible to authorized users. | Secure data with AES encryption or configuring a firewall to prevent ping requests. | |
MiTM attack [31] | The intruder disrupts communications by pretending to be the sender and making the recipient think the message originated from the sender. | Advanced encryption techniques and digital signatures are utilized for security purposes. | |
Selective forwarding [32] | An intruder pretending to be a regular node in the routing process selectively drops packets from nodes. | Safety measures such as firewalls and encryption, along with certificates, are components for protecting data and ensuring cybersecurity. | |
MiTM attack [33] | Confidentiality and integrity of data transmission have been compromised. | Securing data with encryption and verifying identities through authentication. | |
Traffic analysis [34] | The greater the number of messages seen and analyzed, the more insights may be gathered. | machine learning (ML) model. | |
Sybil attack [35] | The attacker disrupts the reputation system by creating identities and leveraging them to exert significantly greater influence. | Network features and encryption. | |
DoS [28] | Stopping a network asset from being utilized as intended. | ML algorithms. | |
MiTM attack [36] | Confidentiality and integrity of data transmission have been compromised. | IDS and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). | |
Application Layer | Malicious code attacks [30] | Malicious codes are used to launch attacks. | Inspecting the firewall while it is running. |
Cross-site scripting attack [37] | The intruder injects scripts into the victims’ web browser by adding code to genuine websites and gains the ability to tamper with the application. | Verifying user input to ensure it is safe and accurate on the webpage. | |
Botnet [38] | The hacker takes over a group of devices through Botnet and can manage them from an access point. | Enabling router encryption, like WPA3, for security measures. | |
SQL injection [39] | Accessing the device utilizing an SQL script. | Incorporating parameterized phrases within the logging page script. | |
Mirai malware [40] | Accessing an IoT device using a default Telnet or SSH account. | Making changes or updates to the default Telnet and SSH accounts. | |
Buffer overflow [31] | The extra information leaks into the surrounding memory areas and disrupts and replaces the existing data stored there. | The permission levels for users and items are decided by access control techniques. | |
Viruses, malware attack [40] | Malware refers to a form of cyberattack where malicious software carries out activities on the target computer system. | User authentication methods for individuals. | |
Malicious code injection attack [30] | Malicious software is often created with the intention of altering the flow of data. This can lead to the loss of data and decreased functionality of applications. | Utilizing encryption methods along with two-factor authentication for added security measures for your API access. | |
IRCTelnet [41] | Compromising the LINUX operating system of a device by exploiting the Telnet port. | The Telnet port is turned off. | |
Account hijacking, ransomware [26] | A form of extortion known as ransomware involves perpetrators gaining access to a person’s computer documents, locking them through encryption, and then asking for payment in exchange for returning the data to their previous condition. | Authentication and Artificial Intelligence (AI). | |
Service interruption attacks [42] | Interruptions can make resources unusable or out of reach for a while or permanently. | Guidelines for verifying identity and securing data through encryption. | |
Injection [39] | Malicious commands or codes are inserted to take advantage of the application vulnerabilities, which lead to unauthorized access or data breaches. | Ensure and control input validation. |
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Area | Contribution to Sustainability |
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Improving Security and Trust | Helps to maintain data integrity through the use of indemnified ledgers and authentication, a key note for credible, long-term IoT applications like smart grids. |
Resource Efficiency | For example, monitoring water in smart agriculture increases the effectiveness of resource use in IoT networks and helps to implement decentralized and resistant energy systems. |
Accountability and Transparency | Improves transparency, enabling people to make sustainable decisions in a supply chain; tracks impact for corporate responsibility. |
Reduced Carbon Footprint | Optimizes operational and transportation processes to reduce emissions; supports waste management by studying the patterns of waste produced and encouraging the recycling of waste material. |
Decentralization and Resilience | Enhances the resilience of IoT systems against failures or malicious action; fosters the use of collective adherence to resource conservation and management. |
Innovation and Collaboration | Promote the technological process of environment conservation, and enhance the idea of a partnership between various players toward environmental sustainability. |
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Almarri, S.; Aljughaiman, A. Blockchain Technology for IoT Security and Trust: A Comprehensive SLR. Sustainability 2024, 16, 10177. https://doi.org/10.3390/su162310177
Almarri S, Aljughaiman A. Blockchain Technology for IoT Security and Trust: A Comprehensive SLR. Sustainability. 2024; 16(23):10177. https://doi.org/10.3390/su162310177
Chicago/Turabian StyleAlmarri, Seetah, and Ahmed Aljughaiman. 2024. "Blockchain Technology for IoT Security and Trust: A Comprehensive SLR" Sustainability 16, no. 23: 10177. https://doi.org/10.3390/su162310177
APA StyleAlmarri, S., & Aljughaiman, A. (2024). Blockchain Technology for IoT Security and Trust: A Comprehensive SLR. Sustainability, 16(23), 10177. https://doi.org/10.3390/su162310177