Determinants of Borrowers’ Default in P2P Lending under Consideration of the Loan Risk Class
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Related Literature
2.1. Funding Success of P2P Loans
2.2. Determinants of Borrowers’ Default
3. Data and Method
3.1. The Lending Club Process
3.2. Our Data Set
3.3. Variables of Interest
3.4. Descriptive Statistics
4. Results
Discussion
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Variables of Interest
Borrower’s Self-Reported Information | |
---|---|
Name of variable | Description of variable |
Annual Income | The self-reported annual income provided by the borrower during registration. |
Housing Situation | The home ownership status provided by the borrower during registration. Our values are: RENT, OWN, MORTGAGE, OTHER. |
Length of Employment | Employment length in years. Possible values are between 0 and 10 where 0 means less than one year and 10 means ten or more years. |
Loan Amount | The listed amount of the loan applied for by the borrower. |
Loan Purpose | A category provided by the borrower for the loan request. |
Number of Characters | The number of characters used by borrower for loan description. |
Information From Borrower’s Credit File | |
Name of Variable | Description of Variable |
Debt-to-Income | A ratio calculated using the borrower’s total monthly debt payments on the total debt obligations, excluding mortgage and the requested LC loan, divided by the borrower’s self-reported monthly income. |
Delinquency in Past 2 Years | The number of 30+ days past-due incidences of delinquency in the borrower’s credit file for the past 2 years. |
Length of Credit History | The number of years since the first reported credit line was opened. |
Inquiries in Past 6 Months | The number of inquiries in past 6 months (excluding auto and mortgage inquiries). |
Months since Last Delinquency | The number of months since the borrower’s last delinquency. |
Months since Last Record | The number of months since the last public record. |
Open Credit Lines | The number of open credit lines in the borrower’s credit file. |
Revolving Credit Utilization | Revolving credit line utilization rate or the amount of credit the borrower is using relative to all available revolving credit. |
Appendix B
Descriptive Statistics
Default | Loan Amount | Length of Employment | Annual Income | Number of Characters | Debt-to- Income | Delinquency in Past 2 Years | Lenght of Credit History | Inquiries in Past 6 Months | Months since Last Deliquency | Months since Last Record | Open Credit Lines | Revolving Credit Utilization | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Default | 1 | −0.01 | 0.00 | −0.05 | −0.01 | 0.06 | 0.01 | −0.04 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.08 |
Loan Amount | −0.01 | 1 | 0.12 | 0.29 | 0.05 | 0.04 | −0.01 | 0.16 | −0.01 | −0.01 | −0.06 | 0.19 | 0.07 |
Length of Employment | 0.00 | 0.12 | 1 | 0.09 | −0.09 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.25 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 0.05 |
Annual Income | −0.05 | 0.29 | 0.09 | 1 | 0.00 | −0.15 | 0.04 | 0.17 | 0.05 | 0.03 | −0.01 | 0.14 | 0.00 |
Number of Characters | −0.01 | 0.05 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 1 | −0.05 | −0.02 | −0.01 | 0.00 | −0.03 | 0.01 | −0.02 | −0.04 |
Debt-to-Income | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.07 | −0.15 | −0.05 | 1 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.02 | −0.02 | 0.33 | 0.28 |
Delinquency in Past 2 Years | 0.01 | −0.01 | 0.04 | 0.04 | −0.02 | 0.01 | 1 | 0.09 | 0.01 | −0.01 | −0.01 | 0.06 | 0.00 |
Length of Credit History | −0.04 | 0.16 | 0.25 | 0.17 | −0.01 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 1 | 0.01 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.17 | −0.04 |
Inquiries in Past 6 Months | 0.06 | −0.01 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 1 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.10 | −0.09 |
Months since Last Deliquency | 0.01 | −0.01 | 0.06 | 0.03 | −0.03 | 0.02 | −0.01 | 0.11 | 0.02 | 1 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 0.05 |
Months since Last Record | 0.02 | −0.06 | 0.04 | −0.01 | 0.01 | −0.02 | −0.01 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 1 | −0.01 | 0.01 |
Open Credit Lines | 0.00 | 0.19 | 0.08 | 0.14 | −0.02 | 0.33 | 0.06 | 0.17 | 0.10 | 0.07 | −0.01 | 1 | −0.06 |
Revolving Credit Utilization | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.00 | −0.04 | 0.28 | 0.00 | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.05 | 0.01 | −0.06 | 1 |
Variable / Statistic | N | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Median | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Default | 70,673 | 0.125 | 0.330 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Loan Amount | 70,673 | 10,888 | 6878 | 1000 | 10,000 | 35,000 |
Length of Employment | 68,135 | 5.0 | 3.5 | 0.0 | 5.0 | 10.0 |
Annual Income | 70,673 | 67,154 | 61,531 | 4000 | 57,000 | 7,141,778 |
Number of Characters | 70,673 | 167 | 281 | 0 | 71 | 3853 |
Debt-to-Income | 70,673 | 0.151 | 0.074 | 0.000 | 0.149 | 0.349 |
Delinquency in Past 2 Years | 70,673 | 0.176 | 0.581 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 18.000 |
Length of Credit History | 70,673 | 17.63 | 6.85 | 6.00 | 16.00 | 69.00 |
Inquiries in last 6 Months | 70,673 | 0.812 | 1.013 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 8.000 |
Months since Last Deliquency | 70,673 | 14.07 | 22.24 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 152.00 |
Months since Last Record | 70,673 | 3.31 | 17.63 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 119.00 |
Open Credit Lines | 70,673 | 9.96 | 4.44 | 1.00 | 9.00 | 49.00 |
Revolving Credit Utilization | 70,591 | 0.537 | 0.263 | 0.000 | 0.563 | 1.044 |
Mean of | All Classes | Low-Risk Class | Medium-Risk Class | Risk Class | High-Risk Class | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Default | Non-Default | Default | Non-Default | Default | Non-Default | Default | Non-Default | Default | Non-Default | |
Annual Income | 58,507 | 67,870 | 55,842 | 69,301 | 56,946 | 65,961 | 56,843 | 65,698 | 64,720 | 73,363 |
Employment Length | 5.27 | 5.29 | 5.29 | 5.32 | 5.36 | 5.34 | 5.19 | 5.20 | 5.23 | 5.23 |
Loan Amount | 10,798 | 10,900 | 9295 | 10,017 | 10,289 | 10,720 | 10,315 | 10,820 | 13,172 | 13,624 |
Number of Characters | 157 | 169 | 148 | 170 | 138 | 163 | 159 | 162 | 189 | 190 |
Debt-to-Income | 0.163 | 0.150 | 0.151 | 0.134 | 0.164 | 0.157 | 0.168 | 0.158 | 0.161 | 0.155 |
Deliquency in Past 2 Years | 0.198 | 0.173 | 0.080 | 0.060 | 0.155 | 0.167 | 0.224 | 0.262 | 0.309 | 0.313 |
Lenght of Credit History | 16.99 | 17.72 | 18.69 | 19.04 | 17.15 | 17.44 | 16.59 | 16.82 | 16.10 | 16.83 |
Inquiries in Last 6 Months | 0.977 | 0.788 | 0.783 | 0.635 | 0.816 | 0.694 | 1.207 | 1.088 | 1.063 | 0.941 |
Months since Last Deliquency | 14.66 | 13.99 | 7.68 | 7.78 | 13.56 | 14.97 | 16.90 | 18.07 | 18.14 | 19.37 |
Months since Last Record | 4.48 | 3.15 | 1.80 | 1.31 | 4.34 | 3.59 | 5.73 | 4.64 | 4.90 | 3.87 |
Open Credit Lines | 9.97 | 9.96 | 9.68 | 9.83 | 9.80 | 9.89 | 10.13 | 10.08 | 10.22 | 10.27 |
Revolving Credit Utilization | 0.591 | 0.529 | 0.387 | 0.342 | 0.566 | 0.561 | 0.637 | 0.636 | 0.707 | 0.708 |
Loan Purpose | All Classes | Low-Risk Class | Medium-Risk Class | Risk Class | High-Risk Class | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Default Rate | % (#) of Loans | Default Rate | % (#) of Loans | Default Rate | % (#) of Loans | Default Rate | % (#) of Loans | Default Rate | % (#) of Loans | |
Car | 9.16% | 2.37% (1 671) | 6.05% | 4.29% (860) | 10.92% | 1.86% (476) | 14.55% | 1.46% (220) | 14.78% | 1.16% (115) |
Credit Card | 10.10% | 18.28% (12 900) | 5.33% | 16.58% (3 321) | 9.39% | 20.45% (5 220) | 13.88% | 18.76% (2 832) | 15.91% | 15.38% (1 527) |
Debt Consolidation | 13.14% | 51.94% (36 659) | 6.56% | 43.98% (8 809) | 12.05% | 53.69% (13 706) | 16.93% | 55.85% (8 430) | 20.34% | 57.56% (5 714) |
Education | 14.88% | 0.34% (242) | 4.62% | 0.32% (65) | 18.18% | 0.30% (77) | 13.04% | 0.46% (69) | 32.26% | 0.31% (31) |
Home Improvement | 10.16% | 6.04% (4 263) | 5.08% | 8.84% (1 771) | 10.83% | 5.35% (1 367) | 17.45% | 4.78% (722) | 17.12% | 4.06% (403) |
House | 13.90% | 0.78% (554) | 6.98% | 1.07% (215) | 13.26% | 0.71% (181) | 20.88% | 0.60% (91) | 28.36% | 0.67% (67) |
Major Purchase | 8.43% | 3.95% (2 789) | 4.46% | 6.38% (1 277) | 8.71% | 3.19% (815) | 13.00% | 2.96% (446) | 19.52% | 2.53% (251) |
Medical | 14.91% | 1.53% (1 080) | 7.77% | 1.93% (386) | 17.22% | 1.30% (331) | 18.58% | 1.50% (226) | 23.36% | 1.38% (137) |
Moving | 15.63% | 1.18% (832) | 10.11% | 1.33% (267) | 17.97% | 1.16% (295) | 14.74% | 1.03% (156) | 23.68% | 1.15% (114) |
Other | 14.48% | 7.46% (5 263) | 8.61% | 8.35% (1 672) | 13.78% | 6.79% (1 734) | 18.88% | 6.98% (1 054) | 22.42% | 8.09% (803) |
Renewable Energy | 20.86% | 0.20% (139) | 14.89% | 0.23% (47) | 24.49% | 0.19% (49) | 20.83% | 0.16% (24) | 26.32% | 0.19% (19) |
Small Business | 20.74% | 3.13% (2 208) | 12.94% | 3.43% (688) | 20.44% | 2.47% (631) | 24.63% | 2.66% (402) | 28.95% | 4.91% (487) |
Vacation | 14.26% | 0.90% (638) | 13.27% | 1.13% (226) | 13.36% | 0.85% (217) | 17.19% | 0.85% (128) | 14.93% | 0.67% (67) |
Wedding | 9.92% | 1.90% (1 341) | 5.15% | 2.13% (427) | 10.72% | 1.68% (429) | 12.97% | 1.94% (293) | 14.06% | 1.93% (192) |
Total | 12.50% | 100% (70 579) | 6.59% | 100% (20 031) | 11.81% | 100% (25 528) | 16.51% | 100% (15 093) | 20.06% | 100% (9 927) |
Home Situation | All Classses | Low-Risk Class | Medium-Risk Class | Risk Class | High-Risk Class | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Default Rate | % (#) of Loans | Default Rate | % (#) of Loans | Default Rate | % (#) of Loans | Default Rate | % (#) of Loans | Default Rate | % (#) of Loans | |
Mortgage | 10.79% | 42.86% (30 248) | 5.50% | 51.42% (10 299) | 10.64% | 41.59% (10 617) | 15.29% | 37.55% (5 667) | 19.08% | 36.92% (3 665) |
No information | 17.14% | 0.05% (35) | 0.00% | 0.02% (5) | 33.33% | 0.05% (12) | 11.11% | 0.06% (9) | 11.11% | 0.09% (9) |
Other | 20.00% | 0.16% (110) | 12.50% | 0.08% (16) | 23.08% | 0.15% (39) | 10.00% | 0.20% (30) | 32.00% | 0.25% (25) |
Own | 13.28% | 8.14% (5 746) | 7.40% | 8.23% (1 648) | 12.03% | 8.13% (2 076) | 17.42% | 8.08% (1 220) | 22.43% | 8.08% (802) |
Rent | 13.84% | 48.80% (34 440) | 7.81% | 40.25% (8 063) | 12.69% | 50.08% (12 784) | 17.25% | 54.11% (8 167) | 20.38% | 54.66% (5 426) |
Total | 12.50% | 100% (70 579) | 6.59% | 100% (20 031) | 11.81% | 100% (25 528) | 16.51% | 100% (15 093) | 20.09% | 100% (9 927) |
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1. | |
2. | The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ordered P2P lending companies to register their loans as securities and provide them through a bank. |
3. | An accurate credit scoring predictive model is crucial for P2P lending platforms. Ref. [16] conduct an extensive literature review of more than 200 articles about credit scoring models. They conclude that there does not exist a single best statistical technique used for the creation of credit scoring models. |
4. | Before the SEC regulation, as discussed above, Prosper used the Dutch auction to determine the appropriate interest rate for borrowers. Moreover, Prosper used social features enabling social network effects between borrowers and lenders. Even after the SEC regulation, there are still significant differences between the platforms. These differences might make the comparison of determinants influencing borrowers’ default inaccurate. |
5. | To better differentiate and highlight variables, we write them with capital letters and in italics. |
6. | According to myf [19], up to 90% of top lenders use the FICO score. |
7. | The FICO score consists of five categories from a person’s financial history: the payment history (about 35% weight), debt burden (30% weight), length of credit history (15%), types of credit used and recent searches for credit (both 10%). |
8. | We have downloaded the data from the download data section at the Lending Club website. Moreover, the download data section’s Data Dictionary provides variable descriptions [18]. |
9. | We do not further comment loans with Renewable Energy purpose, because they make up only a small percentage (0.20%) of all loans. The same applies to the loans with purpose Education (0.34%). |
10. | All statistical analyses are performed using the software R (version 3.2.3) with its integrated development environment called RStudio. We use the glm function of the family binomial. |
11. | We show that loans issued before 2009 have significantly higher default rates than loans issued between 2009 and 2012. |
12. | The standard deviation of the Debt-to-Income ratio is 0.074, see Table A3. Multiplying with the marginal effect (0.1025) results in a predicted change of 0.007585. This is 6% of the average default probability of 0.125. |
Name of Study | Data Set | Method Used | Findings |
---|---|---|---|
Emekter et al. (2015) | May 2007–June 2012 (36- & 60-month loans) | Binary logistic regression | Credit Grade, FICO score, Debt-to-Income and Revolving Credit Utilization |
Serrano-Cinca et al. (2015) | January 2008–December 2011 (36-month loans) | Univariate means test and Cox regression | Credit Grade, Annual Income, Loan Purpose, Debt-to-Income, Current Housing Situation, Credit History Length, Revolving Credit Utilization, Recent Inquiries, Deliquency in Past 2 Years, Open Credit Lines |
Carmichael (2014) | June 2007–October 2013 (36-month loans) | Dynamic logistic regression | Credit Grade, Annual Income, Loan Purpose, FICO score, Revolving Credit Utilization, Recent Inquiries, Credit History Length, Time since Last Delinquency, Loan Amount, Loan Description |
Part A | Part B | ||
---|---|---|---|
Initial Data Set Distribution | Final Data Set Distribution | ||
Loan Status | # of Loans | Loan Status | # of Loans |
- Fully Paid | 61,836 | - Fully Paid | 61,836 |
- Charged Off | 8779 | - Charged Off | 8837 |
- Current | 33 | ||
- In Grace Period | 6 | ||
- Late (16-30 days) | 6 | ||
- Late (31-120 days) | 81 (46) | ||
- Default | 12 (12) | ||
Total number | 70,753 | Total number | 70,673 |
Part A: Overview of Loan Risk Classes | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Type of Class | Loan Grade | # of Loans | Default Rate | FICO Score |
Low-Risk Class | A | 20,041 | 6.6% | 750 |
Medium-Risk Class | B | 25,539 | 11.8% | 707 |
High-Risk Class | C | 15,117 | 16.5% | 687 |
Very High-Risk Class | D, E, F, G | 9976 | 20.1% | 677 |
All Loan Classes | 70,673 | 12.5% | 710 | |
Part B: Composition of Very High-Risk Class | ||||
Loan Grade | # of Loans | Default Rate | FICO Score | |
D | 8045 | 19.7% | 677 | |
E | 1569 | 21.2% | 675 | |
F | 286 | 22.0% | 673 | |
G | 76 | 30.2% | 672 | |
Very High-Risk Class | 9,976 | 20.0% | 677 |
Variable | All Classes | Low-Risk Class | Medium-Risk Class | High-Risk Class | Very High-Risk Class | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
AME | Std. Errors | AME | Std. Errors | AME | Std. Errors | AME | Std. Errors | AME | Std. Errors | |
Annual Income | −0.0009 *** | 0.0000 | −0.0007 *** | 0.0001 | −0.0008 *** | 0.0001 | −0.0009 *** | 0.0001 | −0.0007 *** | 0.0001 |
HS: None | 0.0458 | 0.0641 | −0.0729 *** | 0.0029 | 0.2064 | 0.1325 | −0.0308 | 0.1249 | not significant | |
HS: Other | 0.0629 * | 0.0368 | 0.0717 | 0.0916 | 0.1216 * | 0.0694 | −0.0686 | 0.0547 | not significant | |
HS: Own | −0.0027 | 0.0047 | −0.0067 | 0.0065 | −0.0084 | 0.0074 | −0.0036 | 0.0112 | not significant | |
HS: Mortgage | −0.0183 *** | 0.0028 | −0.0135 | 0.0039 | −0.0121 ** | 0.0045 | −0.0085 | 0.0069 | not significant | |
Loan Amount | 0.0020 *** | 0.0002 | 0.0007 * | 0.0003 | 0.0013 *** | 0.0004 | 0.0004 | 0.0006 | 0.0013 * | 0.0006 |
Number of Characters | −0.0000 *** | 0.0000 | −0.0000 ** | 0.0000 | −0.0000 *** | 0.0000 | not significant | not significant | ||
LP: Car | −0.0417 *** | 0.0097 | −0.0211 | 0.0114 | −0.0272 | 0.0167 | −0.0446 | 0.0263 | −0.0831 * | 0.0349 |
LP: Credit Card | −0.0563 *** | 0.0057 | −0.0408 *** | 0.0080 | −0.0472 *** | 0.0093 | −0.0497 *** | 0.0138 | −0.0649 *** | 0.0176 |
LP: Debt Consolidation | −0.0277 *** | 0.0054 | −0.0278 *** | 0.0076 | −0.0202 * | 0.0089 | −0.0218 | 0.0129 | −0.0230 | 0.0159 |
LP: Education | 0.0132 | 0.0252 | −0.0404 | 0.0282 | 0.0596 | 0.0477 | −0.0609 | 0.0414 | 0.0770 | 0.0807 |
LP: Home Improvement | −0.0227 *** | 0.0077 | −0.0230 * | 0.0098 | −0.0143 | 0.0128 | 0.0048 | 0.0197 | −0.0364 | 0.0248 |
LP: House | 0.0005 | 0.0165 | −0.0126 | 0.0201 | 0.0010 | 0.0276 | 0.0183 | 0.0438 | 0.0470 | 0.0554 |
LP: Major Purchase | −0.0492 *** | 0.0080 | −0.0361 *** | 0.0097 | −0.0471 *** | 0.0132 | −0.0527 ** | 0.0202 | −0.0254 | 0.0288 |
LP: Medical | 0.0139 | 0.0127 | −0.0064 | 0.0159 | 0.0393 | 0.0227 | 0.0049 | 0.0292 | 0.0205 | 0.0394 |
LP: Moving | 0.0111 | 0.0138 | 0.0131 | 0.0198 | 0.0453 * | 0.0241 | −0.0453 | 0.0300 | 0.0091 | 0.0418 |
LP: Renewable Energy | 0.0793 * | 0.0370 | 0.0984 | 0.0615 | 0.1198 * | 0.0638 | 0.0113 | 0.0806 | 0.0422 | 0.1030 |
LP: Small Business | 0.0814 *** | 0.0107 | 0.0595 *** | 0.0160 | 0.0801 *** | 0.0189 | 0.0744 ** | 0.0255 | 0.0749 ** | 0.0258 |
LP: Vacation | 0.0044 | 0.0156 | 0.0466 * | 0.0237 | −0.0022 | 0.0248 | −0.0135 | 0.0358 | −0.0656 | 0.0461 |
LP: Wedding | −0.0442 *** | 0.0101 | −0.0351 * | 0.0132 | −0.0248 | 0.0177 | −0.0556 * | 0.0233 | −0.0816 * | 0.0293 |
Debt-to-Income | 0.1025 *** | 0.0177 | 0.0867 *** | 0.0249 | 0.0799 ** | 0.0289 | 0.2006 *** | 0.0424 | 0.1758 ** | 0.0569 |
Delinquency in Past 2 Years | 0.0114 *** | 0.0019 | 0.0162 *** | 0.0043 | not significant | −0.0082 * | 0.0047 | not significant | ||
Length of Credit History | −0.0009 *** | 0.0002 | not significant | not significant | not significant | −0.0022 *** | 0.0007 | |||
Inquiries in Past 6 Months | 0.0225 *** | 0.0012 | 0.0126 *** | 0.0017 | 0.0152 *** | 0.0020 | 0.0163 *** | 0.0029 | 0.0181 ** | 0.0038 |
Months since Last Delinquency | 0.0002 * | 0.0001 | not significant | −0.0002 * | 0.0001 | −0.0003 * | 0.0001 | not significant | ||
Months since Last Record | 0.0004 *** | 0.0001 | not significant | 0.0002 * | 0.0001 | 0.0003 * | 0.0001 | 0.0004 * | 0.0002 | |
Open Credit Lines | not significant | not significant | not significant | not significant | not significant | |||||
Revolving Line Utilization | 0.1111 *** | 0.0052 | 0.0642 *** | 0.0081 | 0.0371 *** | 0.0097 | not significant | not significant | ||
Number of observations | 70,673 | 20,041 | 25,539 | 15,117 | 9976 |
Variable/Paper | Serrano-Cinca et al. (2015) [6] | Carmichael (2014) [5] | Emekter et al. (2015) [4] | Our Classes | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
All | Low-Risk | Medium-Risk | High-Risk | Very High-Risk | ||||
Annual Income | x | x | x | x | x | x | x | |
Loan Amount | x | x | x | x | x | x | ||
Number of Characters | not measured | not measured | not measured | x | x | x | ||
Debt-to-Income | x | x | x | x | x | x | x | |
Delinquency in Past 2 Years | x | not measured | x | x | x | |||
Length of Credit History | x | x | x | x | ||||
Inquiries in Past 6 Months | x | x | x | x | x | x | x | |
Months since Last Delinquency | x | x | x | x | ||||
Months since Last Record | not measured | not measured | x | x | x | x | ||
Open Credit Lines | x | not measured | ||||||
Revolving Credit Utilization | x | x | x | x | x | x | ||
Loan Purpose | x | x | x | x | x | x | x | |
Home Situation | x | not measured | not measured | x | x | x | x |
© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Polena, M.; Regner, T. Determinants of Borrowers’ Default in P2P Lending under Consideration of the Loan Risk Class. Games 2018, 9, 82. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040082
Polena M, Regner T. Determinants of Borrowers’ Default in P2P Lending under Consideration of the Loan Risk Class. Games. 2018; 9(4):82. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040082
Chicago/Turabian StylePolena, Michal, and Tobias Regner. 2018. "Determinants of Borrowers’ Default in P2P Lending under Consideration of the Loan Risk Class" Games 9, no. 4: 82. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040082
APA StylePolena, M., & Regner, T. (2018). Determinants of Borrowers’ Default in P2P Lending under Consideration of the Loan Risk Class. Games, 9(4), 82. https://doi.org/10.3390/g9040082