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Article

Study on the Impact of Trust and Contract Governance on Project Management Performance in the Whole Process Consulting Project—Based on the SEM and fsQCA Methods

by
Kejian Shang
1,
Jie Wu
2,* and
Yunyun Cao
2
1
School of Management, Henan University of Urban Construction, Pingdingshan 467000, China
2
School of Business Administration, Liaoning Technical University, Huludao 125000, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Buildings 2023, 13(12), 3006; https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13123006
Submission received: 18 September 2023 / Revised: 17 October 2023 / Accepted: 30 November 2023 / Published: 1 December 2023
(This article belongs to the Section Construction Management, and Computers & Digitization)
Browse Figure
Versions Notes

Abstract

:
In order to strengthen the cooperation ability between the owner and the consultant and improve the project management performance of the whole process engineering consulting, this study firstly introduces knowledge sharing as a mediator variable and constructs a theoretical model between trust and contract governance—knowledge sharing—project management performance. A structural equation model was then used to empirically test the questionnaire data. The results show that contract governance indirectly promotes project performance through the intermediary of explicit knowledge sharing, and trust indirectly promotes project performance through the intermediary of knowledge sharing (explicit knowledge sharing and tacit knowledge sharing). Based on the above, for further analysis of the complex antecedent configuration and improvement path that affect management performance, fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis was used for group analysis with contract governance, trust, explicit knowledge sharing, and tacit knowledge sharing as conditional variables and project management performance as the outcome variable. The results show that there are two parallel paths that can improve the whole process engineering consulting project management performance: contract governance*explicit knowledge sharing*tacit knowledge sharing→project management performance and contract governance*trust*explicit knowledge sharing→project management performance. Finally, through analysis of the research results, it is suggested that in whole process engineering consulting projects, the owner and the consultant should actively promote the willingness and behavior of the consultant to share knowledge based on therational use of trust and contract governance, to better improve project management performance.

1. Introduction

As one of China’s pillar industries, the construction industry has remained at more than 6.7% of GDP, with an overall upward trend, which plays a great role in promoting China’s economic development [1]. However, with the promotion of the concept of high-quality development, the crude development method of the construction industry has gradually revealed more problems. The various stages of construction project management are isolated from one another, and this fragmentation pattern has an impact on construction’s future growth, which urgently requires a shift from high-speed to high-quality development. Engineering consulting is inseparably related to the construction industry. Engineering consulting is a crucial step in the construction of engineering projects, and this major decision is directly related to the rational degree, economic benefits, and use value of the whole project. Therefore, the high-quality development of engineering consulting plays a significant role in promoting the transformation of the construction industry. The concept of whole process engineering consulting was first proposed by the state in 2017, followed by the promulgation of relevant documents by provinces and cities to begin the pilot work of whole process engineering consulting projects (hereinafter referred to as whole consulting projects). Whole process engineering consulting aims to provide engineering consulting services involving organization, management, economy, and technology, including planning and design, for the preliminary research and decision-making of engineering construction projects and the whole life cycle of project implementation and operation [2]. This concept was proposed to overcome the fragmented management mode and improve project management performance in China. The concept has altered the original project management model, transforming the owner self-managed into project management entrusted by the owner to the consultant, resulting in a cooperative relationship between the owner and the consultant based on the commissioning agency. In addition, the probability of the owner changing the consulting company is low, which increases the probability of opportunistic behavior from the consultant and thus affects project management performance. How to improve the project management performance of the whole consulting service and how to implement the model have become pressing issues that must be addressed.
The findings of many scholars on project governance theory provide a theoretical basis for improving project management performance. Numerous studies have found that contract governance and trust, as core elements of project governance, are important factors in improving project management performance [3], are frequently used to mitigate conflicts between collaborating parties and inhibit one party’s opportunistic behavior [4], and are regarded as the cornerstone for promoting inter-organizational cooperation. Cheng et al. classified contract governance into three dimensions: control, coordination, and adaptation, and studied its impact on project performance in PPP projects. The results show that the three dimensions of contract governance have a significant positive effect on the improvement of project performance [5]. Qumar analyzed the impact of two contract types on PPP performance, applying empirical tests using LOGIT and difference techniques on 157 Indian highway projects, and the results showed that different strengths of contractual clause regimes can have different impacts on performance [6]. Yang and Chen empirically analyzed the influence of trust between partners on project performance, and the results proved that trust between partners not only directly affects project performance, but also indirectly affects project performance through contract flexibility and risk sharing [7]. Based on attribution theory and dual process theory, Zhang et al. established a dual attribution model for trust development and verified that trust can significantly promote project performance [8]. Lee et al. studied the impact of trust, contract control, and contract coordination on project performance by referring to transaction cost theory and social exchange theory, and the results proved that trust indirectly affects project performance through contract control and coordination [9]. Through the research of relevant scholars, it can be found that reasonable use of the contract governance mechanism and cultivating sufficient trust between both parties can improve the sense of cooperation between the two parties, and reduce the consultant’s possible opportunistic behavior, to improve project management performance.
Simultaneously, the growing importance of knowledge resources causes knowledge sharing to become a research hotspot. The engineering consulting service in the whole consulting project is a highly knowledge-intensive professional consulting service activity. The consultant uses their professional knowledge to provide innovative solutions for the owner. Knowledge content is an important indicator of the quality of consulting services. Therefore, knowledge sharing is becoming increasingly important in the field of engineering consulting. Many studies have shown that knowledge sharing can significantly improve project performance. Li et al. used knowledge management theory to collect 234 valid questionnaires from organizations participating in complex infrastructure projects and conducted an empirical analysis. The results proved that knowledge sharing had a significant positive effect on project performance, and showed multiple mediating effects through knowledge organization, knowledge integration, and knowledge formation [10]. Khan et al. studied the mediating role of knowledge sharing between psychological empowerment and project success, and confirmed that psychological empowerment indirectly affects project success through knowledge sharing [11]. Some scholars have also studied the relationship between trust, contract governance, and knowledge sharing [12,13,14]. For example, Curado studied the relationship between trust, knowledge sharing, and inter-organizational commitment with 582 small- and medium-sized enterprises that are the largest exporters in Portugal. The results showed that trust has a positive and significant impact on knowledge sharing and emotional and normative commitment [15]. Taking supply chain partners as the research object, Jen et al. analyzed the impact of risk-sharing contracts in contract governance on knowledge sharing and project performance. The results showed that contract governance promotes knowledge sharing among partners, and knowledge sharing completely mediates the relationship between contract governance and project performance [16].
In conclusion, knowledge sharing, contract governance, and trust will all affect the whole consulting management performance, but it is still unclear how. Therefore, this paper will construct the corresponding theoretical model. It will then use a structural equation model (SEM) to analyze the direct effects of contract governance and trust on the performance of whole consulting project management as well as the mediating effects of knowledge sharing. At the same time, in order to enable the owner to know more about the factors that effectively improve project performance, to better manage and improve project performance, the antecedent configuration of improving project management performance is analyzed using the qualitative comparison technique of fuzzy sets. Finally, based on the results of empirical research and path configuration analysis, suggestions and measures to improve the whole process engineering consulting project management performance are put forward.

2. Theory and Hypothesis Development

2.1. Trust

The connotation of trust has been defined in research from three main perspectives. Among them, the psychological perspective considers trust as an emotion, a positive pre-judgment of one partner by the other, and the willingness of one partner to take the risk of the opportunistic behavior of the other [17]. Sociological perspective scholars’ understanding of trust is usually macro, as they prefer to dissect the influence of social relationships on the behavior of the partners, for example, Zhai understands trust in terms of religion, custom, morality, contract, law, etc., which sees trust as a tendency to show control over partners in a complex environment so that one can face the uncertain events and risks that occur next with openness [18]. From an economic perspective, trust is based on rational choice. Blind, unconditional trust in a partner may make it difficult for the giver to survive in the market, so the risks associated with trust do not outweigh the potential benefits of trust. Trust in the context of an all-consulting project involves both an ex-ante consideration of the consultant’s ability to calculate and a positive expectation that the owner is willing to trust that they will not act opportunistically even if the consultant reveals weaknesses during the cooperation process.

2.2. Contract Governance

Contract governance under the principal–agent theory is the rational use of contracts to curb adverse selection and moral hazard problems [19]. Both behavioral and outcome-oriented contract design require a clear and detailed design of the contract to achieve ex-ante risk sharing and incentive compatibility between the parties in future project situations, to prevent or eliminate agency problems, and to maximize investment returns. Contract governance from the perspective of incomplete contract theory aims to reduce or eliminate ex-ante investment distortions and thus achieve incentive effects; contract governance from the perspective of transaction cost theory considers that the cost of coordination or renegotiation in the performance process caused by ambiguity can be controlled and the cost of monitoring in the transaction process can be reduced through, for example, a reasonable choice of contract type, as well as a detailed description of the project scope and final product in the contract and the specification of key control points [20]. In the context of a whole process engineering consulting project, contract governance means that the division of powers and obligations, as well as the allocation of risks and benefits, between the owner and the consultant are set out in a written text, to minimize speculative behavior during the life cycle of the construction project, thereby restraining the behavior of both partners to a certain extent, curbing possible opportunistic behavior, and providing a legal and institutional framework for a long-term relationship between the two parties.

2.3. Knowledge Sharing

Social exchange theory assumes that when partners perceive an increase in potential value from each other, they will voluntarily exchange their resources to obtain a balance in their relationship, thus maintaining a long-term cooperative relationship. As a typical social exchange activity, knowledge sharing in the context of whole process engineering consulting projects specifically refers to the communication, exchange, and learning of knowledge between the owner and the consultant through a series of channels and methods, to better resolve the occurrence of uncertainty events in the process of cooperation and improve project efficiency. This study further divides knowledge sharing into explicit knowledge sharing and tacit knowledge sharing. Explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that can be explicitly expressed, such as knowledge acquired through books, media, software, and databases, while tacit knowledge generally transfers knowledge through informal means, such as experience and competencies.

2.4. Project Management Performance

Traditionally, project management performance has been measured by the “iron triangle” index system, which includes schedule, cost, and quality. With the increase in project size and complexity, many scholars believe that the traditional “iron triangle” is no longer sufficient to make a comprehensive evaluation of project management performance, and many scholars have introduced other variables to measure project management performance. In other words, the measurement of project management performance in whole process engineering consulting should include not only the traditional “iron triangle”, including the three dimensions of schedule, cost, and quality, but should also include stakeholder satisfaction and the achievement of overall project objectives [20].

2.5. Hypothesis Development

2.5.1. Contract Governance and Project Management Performance

The most popular measure both parties use to stifle opportunistic behavior and guarantee the project’s success is contract governance. The formal contract outlines the division of duties, rights, and interests of the parties and specifies the goals that the expert must meet. It also includes procedures to follow in the event of disagreement [21]. According to studies on project management performance, strict contract governance can significantly boost project management effectiveness [22]. On the one hand, the clarity and strict performance of contract terms can inhibit the occurrence of opportunistic behavior of partners, thus improving project management performance [23]; on the other hand, the contract stipulates a series of procedures to solve future uncertain events, reserves corresponding space for them, and increases the flexibility of both parties in the process of cooperation, so as to ensure the success of the project. Therefore, this paper puts forward the following assumption:
H1: 
Contract governance promotes project management performance.

2.5.2. Trust and Project Management Performance

As a temporary social network organization, the whole consulting project is characterized by long-term complexity. The cooperation between the owner and the consultant is not only a simple economic transaction but also a certain relationship exchange in the process of cooperation. According to social exchange theory, the two parties are not independent of each other in the process of activity but depend on each other, and the behavior of one party is influenced by the behavior of the other party. In order to achieve what they expect to achieve, they will take actions beyond the prescribed task or mobilize the resources they have to ensure their trustworthiness, and the association of the counterparties in the resource exchange is constantly developed and strengthened [24]. Many scholars believe that trust is an important relation governance mechanism in the exchange of relations between parties and is different from formal contracts, institutions, etc., but includes “invisible contracts” based on the normative role of human and social relations [25]. In the collaborative process of engineering projects, trust is extremely important. According to Du Yaling’s analysis from the perspective of transaction cost theory, a strong trust relationship between two partners can assist in lowering the occurrence of transaction costs during cooperation, speeding up the efficiency of dealing with uncertainties, and thereby significantly raising the level of project management performance [26]. Accordingly, this paper puts forward the following assumption.
H2: 
Trust promotes project management performance.

2.5.3. Contract Governance and Knowledge Sharing

Contract governance primarily refers to the ability of both parties to decrease opportunistic conduct in the course of collaboration by using the contract to define each party’s rights, obligations, and desired outcomes [16]. The contract is an important instrument to coordinate the knowledge sharing behavior of both parties, since knowledge sharing between different partners sometimes requires the conduct of several subjects. The relationship between contract governance and information exchange among current researchers does, however, differ in some ways.
Some academics believe that contract governance promotes the occurrence of knowledge sharing. This is primarily due to the following factors. First, contract governance can prevent and limit partners’ potential opportunism, reduce the occurrence of opportunistic behavior, and increase partners’ willingness to transfer and share knowledge. Second, the contract specifies both parties’ rights and responsibilities, the goals to be achieved, and the project progress, which effectively reduces differences and conflicts caused by incorrect rights and responsibilities during the cooperation process and can improve the efficiency of knowledge sharing. Finally, through the contract, the partner can agree on the content and quantity of knowledge to be generated by the other party, ensuring that the corresponding knowledge content can be obtained during the cooperation process. Many scholars have conducted additional empirical research on promoting the cooperative relationship between the two parties, and they believe that the contract promotes the occurrence of knowledge sharing.
However, some academics believe that contract governance will limit knowledge sharing among partners to some extent. On the one hand, the strict contract terms create a strong defensive mentality among the partners, allowing only the explicit knowledge specified in the contract documents to be exchanged. Strict monitoring reduces both parties’ trust, and the other party reserves some tacit knowledge in the process of knowledge transfer. On the other hand, overly detailed contract design frequently limits the transaction relationship’s flexibility and participants’ willingness to innovate, which means that some tacit knowledge, such as experience, know-how, and intuition, is difficult to share [27]. Based on the above analysis, this paper divides knowledge sharing behavior into explicit and tacit knowledge sharing and believes that the contract governance of the owner to the consultant in the whole consulting projects can promote explicit knowledge and inhibit tacit knowledge sharing. Therefore, the following research assumptions are proposed:
H3a: 
Contract governance promotes explicit knowledge sharing.
H3b: 
Contract governance inhibits tacit knowledge sharing.

2.5.4. Trust and Knowledge Sharing

Inter-organizational trust is founded on subjective beliefs and predictions that partners will fulfill their obligations, and it serves as the foundation for organizations to maintain strategic alliances and facilitate inter-organizational communication and interaction. Scholars generally believe that building inter-organizational trust mechanisms is the key to improving inter-organizational knowledge sharing behavior [28], and that mutual trust facilitates the transfer and sharing of knowledge among members. The scope and nature of knowledge sharing are determined by project partners based on trust. It has been argued that trust is a necessary condition for inter-organizational knowledge sharing, and inter-organizational trust continues to be an important factor in facilitating the generation of knowledge sharing behavior between parties [29]. Trust is more flexible in solving relationship problems and unforeseen problems in the cooperation process between the two parties of a transaction than formal contractual governance mechanisms, which are conducive to the establishment and maintenance of long-term cooperative relationships between the two partners. It follows that establishing a trusting relationship between partners will not only restrain both parties’ behavior and avoid opportunistic behavior but will also effectively promote the partners’ willingness to conduct knowledge transfer. As a result, the following research assumptions are proposed:
H4a: 
Trust promotes explicit knowledge sharing.
H4b: 
Trust promotes tacit knowledge sharing.

2.5.5. Knowledge Sharing and Project Management Performance

According to social exchange theory, social exchange is the foundation of interpersonal interaction to obtain valuable resources. Knowledge sharing, to some extent, embodies interpersonal exchange interaction with knowledge as an object. Social exchange theory can adequately explain the behavior of inter-organizational knowledge sharing. Knowledge, as an important resource among organizations, can not only alleviate constraints within the organization due to its knowledge structure but also reduce transaction costs and risks while avoiding the problem of stereotyped thinking due to the organization’s accumulated single problem-solving perspective [30]. Since it can be easily expressed and exchanged between enterprises using codable formats, explicit knowledge sharing can considerably improve project performance. Moreover, explicit knowledge sharing makes it easier for the cooperation process to apply summarized knowledge again, which can lead to more effective project management [31]. The tacit knowledge sharing habit is typically more likely to be exposed when unexpected circumstances are encountered. Tacit knowledge is rooted in the interaction and communication process between two parties. The conduct creates the required conditions for reaching an agreement to deal with unforeseen circumstances, and its access channel depends on frequent and ongoing interactions between organizations. Therefore, this paper puts forward the following assumptions:
H5a: 
Explicit knowledge sharing promotes project management performance.
H5b: 
Tacit knowledge sharing promotes project management performance.

2.5.6. The Intermediary Role of Knowledge Sharing

Contracts are frequently the key to coordinating knowledge sharing because whole consulting projects frequently involve several subjects. The contract generally stipulates the specific contents of the rights, responsibilities, and interests of both parties, risk sharing, etc., and stipulates that both parties are different. Cooperation objectives are to be completed within the period and the contract has a certain flexibility, providing corresponding solutions for unpredictable problems in the decision-making process. This will, in part, encourage partners to share their knowledge and enhance project management effectiveness. Moreover, mutual trust between the two parties is a foundational element of knowledge sharing. Li emphasizes that when organizational members engage in defensive and self-protective behaviors, the trust among members can reduce such behaviors and increase cooperative behaviors, engage in more knowledge sharing, and shift the focus to creating more value for the organization, ultimately enhancing innovation capacity and performance [32]. Based on the above research, this paper believes that there may be the following relationship between inter-organizational contract and trust, knowledge sharing and project management performance, that is, the contract governance and trust of the client to the consultant is conducive to the generation of knowledge sharing behavior by the consultant and has an indirect impact on project management performance through knowledge sharing behavior. Therefore, this study proposes the following assumptions:
H6a: 
Explicit knowledge sharing plays an intermediary role in the relationship between contract governance and project management performance.
H6b: 
Tacit knowledge sharing plays an intermediary role in the relationship between contract governance and project management performance.
H7a: 
Explicit knowledge sharing plays an intermediary role in the relationship between trust and project management performance.
H7b: 
Tacit knowledge sharing plays an intermediary role in the relationship between trust and project management performance.

2.6. Conceptual Model

Based on the above assumptions, the final study model of this paper is shown in Figure 1.

3. Methods

3.1. Study Design

The measurement items were designed based on an extensive review of the literature. The theoretical model involves five variables: contract governance, trust, explicit knowledge sharing, tacit knowledge sharing, and project management performance. All measurement items were adapted from the existing literature with necessary changes made by the research project without changing their original intent. The measures were first developed in English and then translated into Chinese. After that, a back-translation process was conducted to ensure the conceptual equivalence. During the whole of this session, some original items were rectified to clarify the ambiguities, avoid cultural bias, and then be more relevant to project practice in the context of whole consulting projects.
Contract governance is mainly based on the research of Lusch and Cavusgil [33]; trust mainly draws on the relevant research of Lou and Cheung [34]. Knowledge sharing is mainly based on the research of Chang and Qiang [35], and it is divided into two dimensions: explicit knowledge sharing and tacit knowledge sharing. Project management performance is mainly based on the relevant research of Jha and Chen [36]. The questionnaire was designed using Likert’s 7-point measurement method, with each item scored on a scale of 1–7, where 1 indicates complete non-conformity and 7 indicates complete conformity.

3.2. Data Collection

The interviewees in this study were mostly from the consulting parties. This is primarily because the consultant is the direct object of the owner’s governance mechanism implementation and can feel the owner’s contractual and trust intensity; additionally, the corresponding knowledge sharing feedback is made based on the owner’s governance intensity. As a result, the interviewees for this paper are members of the consulting team who have worked on whole process engineering consulting projects.
We sent online questionnaires to collect data from target respondents, and a snowball method was adopted to expand the collection of questionnaires’ scope. Respondents were asked to recall one of the projects that they had participated in or were participating in, which left a deep impression on them. And the respondents to the questionnaire had the following characteristics: Substantive participation in the whole process of consultation projects and relevant experience in the whole process of consultation projects. The distribution scope of the questionnaire covers Henan, Hebei, and other places. A total of 358 questionnaires were collected, with 312 valid questionnaires obtained after eliminating invalid questionnaires. The effective rate of questionnaire data recovery was 80.8%.

3.3. Analysis Model

3.3.1. The Structural Equation Model

With the help of AMOS 26.0 software, the relationship model between variables was constructed to empirically test the direct effects of trust and contract governance on project management performance and the indirect effects of contract governance and trust on project management performance under the medium of knowledge sharing.

3.3.2. The Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

This method can analyze multiple parallel paths that produce the same result and deal with complex relationships among different condition variables. Through the steps of variable assignment and calibration, truth table construction, necessity and adequacy analysis, and result analysis, this study attempts to analyze the antecedent configuration of the combined effects of trust, contract governance, explicit knowledge sharing, and implicit knowledge sharing on project management performance.

4. Structural Equation Model Analysis

4.1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis

After careful analysis of the collected data, the positions, educational background, working hours, and business items of the respondents will be analyzed. The specific information of the sample is shown in Table 1:

4.2. Reliability and Validity Test and Model Fitting Analysis

The specific reliability test results are shown in Table 2. This paper analyzes the reliability of the questionnaire using the statistical analysis software SPSS25.0 and sets Cronbach’s α > 0.7 as the judgment threshold of reliability. The Cronbach’s α indices of the variables involved in this paper are both greater than 0.7, indicating that the data reliability level is good. Furthermore, the validity of the data in this paper is further tested, that is, the validity of the measurement results of the data is tested, primarily including the aggregation validity and the discrimination validity. Table 2 displays the results. According to the table, the AVE of this paper is greater than 0.5, and the CR is greater than 0.7, indicating that the data in this study have good aggregation validity; in terms of differentiated validity, this paper primarily employs the AVE method to test the differentiated validity of the scale, which requires that the square root of the AVE value of each variable is greater than the correlation coefficient between the variables. The results are shown in Table 2. The square root of the AVE value of each variable is greater than the standardized correlation coefficient of other variables, so the model scale has good, differentiated validity. Finally, because the maximum likelihood method is universal and suitable for this study, it is adopted in this study to analyze the fitness of the model. The results are shown in Table 2. All indicators are within the standard range, which indicates that our model construction is ideal.

4.3. Test of Common Method Variance

As all of the variables were measured from the same source at one time, one important issue about the survey methodology is common method variance (CMV) [37]. This paper is based on Harman’s single-factor analysis method. We performed factor analysis on the five items of the independent variable and found two factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, with the first factor explaining only 35.556% of the variance, not exceeding 50%, which indicates that our research did not suffer from serious disturbance of CMV.

4.4. Direct Effect Test

Through AMOS 26.0 software, the correlation statistical value of the model analysis results is obtained. As shown in Table 3, all path coefficients have p values less than 0.05, which can be considered valid at the 95% confidence level, and H1–H5b have passed the validation.

4.5. Mediation Effect Analysis

To further validate the intermediary effect of knowledge sharing between contract governance, trust, and project management performance, we draw on Hayes and Scharkow’s practice [38]. We use the Bootstrap method in AMOS 26.0 software (set the sample size to 2000 and the confidence interval to 90%). If the bias-corrected left and right intervals do not contain 0, we reject the original hypothesis that there is no intermediary, and we can conclude that the intermediary effect exists. It can be seen from Table 4 that there are three intermediary effects: explicit knowledge sharing has an intermediary effect between contract governance and trust on project management performance, and tacit knowledge sharing has an intermediary effect between trust and project management performance. In addition, from Table 4, the indirect effect value of contract governance→tacit knowledge sharing→project management performance is −0.038 < 0, while the direct effect value is 0.106 > 0. The two signs are opposite. According to the judgment methods of Wen and Ye on intermediary effect and “masking effect”, we can see that tacit knowledge does not play an intermediary role in the relationship between “contract governance→project management performance”, but produces part of “suppressing effects”, that is, the relationship is not significant and is masked, and this relationship is different from and related to the mediation effect.

4.6. Discussion of Empirical Analysis

Assume that H1, H3a, and H3b have passed the validation. This result is consistent with the findings of Lu [39] and Pei [40], both of whom concluded that trust significantly contributes to project management performance. This is because the contract has a certain legally binding effect, which can stipulate the rights and responsibilities distribution, risk-sharing principle, punishment measures, contract change procedures, and other contents among the whole process engineering consulting project through specific contract terms [4], thus reducing the speculative behavior of the consultant and significantly promoting project management performance. The reason why contract governance promotes explicit knowledge sharing is that by setting contract terms, the rights, responsibilities, and interests of both parties and risk sharing are clearly defined, so that the relationship between the two parties has a certain constraint [41]. This is consistent with the study by Jen and Susanty et al. With the improvement of the contract constraint level, the partners will reduce the occurrence of corresponding opportunism, thus improving the availability of knowledge between both parties. Contract governance inhibits tacit knowledge sharing. The study by Wang et al. also shows that contract completeness weakens the positive effect of shared goals on tacit knowledge acquisition [14]. On the one hand, this is mainly because tacit knowledge sharing cannot be determined by explicit way of a formal contract. On the other hand, tacit knowledge sharing is generally exchanged in an informal way, while the formal way of communication promoted by contract governance has no obvious effect on such knowledge sharing.
H2, H4a, and H4b are all assumed to pass validation. Trust promotes project management performance, explicit knowledge sharing, and tacit knowledge sharing. This is primarily because trust, as a lubricant to promote cooperation between the owner and the consultant, is the source of improving the general consulting project’s implementation efficiency and stimulating inter-organizational cooperation [29]. By effectively alleviating inter-organizational conflicts and suppressing opportunistic behaviors, it facilitates the organizational form to adapt to the uncertainty of the construction environment, which contributes to the success of the general consultation project in terms of the performance and satisfaction of all parties, which is also evidenced by the research of scholars such as Wang [42]. In addition, the establishment of a trust relationship between partners can increase the willingness of partners to share knowledge by reducing the uncertainties in the process of tacit knowledge sharing, which is also shown by Zhang and Gupta [43,44]. In the whole process engineering consulting project, when the owner gives the consultant a sense of trust, it will promote the frequency of active communication between the consultant and the owner, and then exchange some project experience that cannot be specified in writing in the contract.
Both H5a and H5b are assumed to pass validation. This indicates that both explicit and tacit knowledge sharing can promote the improvement of project management performance, which is consistent with the results of Li [45] and Ma [46]. Because the consultant, as a knowledge-intensive enterprise, primarily provides an intelligent service to the owner in the general consultation project, knowledge sharing improves project management performance. On the one hand, the consultant’s sharing of tacit knowledge, such as similar project experience, can help the owner save time, make relevant decisions quickly, and improve decision-making efficiency. On the other hand, knowledge sharing can promote cooperation and exchange between the two parties, resulting in the generation of new ideas. The consultant’s sharing of project-related knowledge can help the owner understand the project’s progress and emergency solutions in a timely manner.

5. Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Fuzzy Sets

Charles Rajin proposed qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a research method that combines the qualities of both qualitative and quantitative research. In academia, traditional empirical research employs both qualitative (case-oriented) and quantitative (variable-oriented) research approaches. Quantitative approaches are based on statistical calculations, rely on huge data samples, and rarely focus on the special conditions of a given case. Qualitative methods focus on individual situations, and the conclusions gained reflect only individual cases and cannot be generalized. The strengths of “qualitative” and “quantitative” research approaches are combined in qualitative comparative analysis, which focuses on both the causal linkages between individual components and the impact of common patterns on overall case outcomes. The complex combination of main and secondary influences that affect the outcome of a case is evaluated by systematically investigating the internal relationships and logical combinations of causes and conditions that influence the course of events. Depending on the data and analysis procedures assigned, qualitative comparative analysis can be split into three types: clear sets, fuzzy sets, and multi-valued sets. The type of variables must be separated between 0 and 1 for qualitative comparative analysis utilizing clear sets. Not all variables can be dichotomized to define relationships in practice. On the contrary, there is no explicit requirement for dichotomization in the analysis of fuzzy sets or multi-valued sets, and various values can be utilized to construct variable dependencies.
Due to different combinations of contract governance, trust, explicit knowledge sharing, and tacit knowledge sharing having different effects on project management performance, the traditional quantitative research method of “explanatory variables—mediating variables—explained variables” cannot fully and thoroughly examine the effects of multiple combinations of conditional variables, whereas the qualitative comparative analysis method can effectively analyze the effects of multiple combinations of conditional variables. The qualitative comparative analysis method is appropriate for this study since it can successfully assess several conditional variables. Due to the difficulty in assigning values to some of the variables in this study that cannot be dichotomized into affiliations, this study employs the fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis method to investigate the effect of the proposed factors on the combination of the outcome variable of project management performance.

5.1. Variable Selection and Calibration

In this study, the mean values of contract governance, trust, explicit knowledge sharing, tacit knowledge sharing, and project management performance were used as intersection points, and the upper and lower quartiles were used as full and non-complete affiliation points of each variable.

5.2. Analysis of the Necessary Conditions

Necessity analysis is the prerequisite of configuration analysis, and its purpose is to judge whether a certain antecedent condition is a necessary condition for the result variable. In this paper, project management performance (PMP) is taken as the result variable; trust (TR), contract governance (CG), explicit knowledge sharing (EKS), and tacit knowledge sharing (TKS) and their negative sides (~TR, ~CG, ~EKS, ~TKS) are taken as the antecedent condition variables; and necessity analysis is carried out through fsQCA3.0 software. Generally, the threshold for consistency is set to 0.9; if the consistency of the antecedent condition is greater than 0.9, condition X can be used as a necessary condition for the result Y. As shown in Table 5, the maximum consistency value of the four antecedent conditions is 0.782, which is less than the judgment standard of 0.9. The result shows that all single conditional variables do not constitute a necessary condition for achieving project management performance in the general consulting project. This confirms that project management performance is not only the result of the influence of a single variable but also needs the joint matching of multiple variables to achieve.

5.3. Discussion of Configuration Analysis Results

According to Schneider and Wagemann, the consistency level for determining adequacy should not be less than 0.75. For small- and medium-sized samples, the frequency threshold is generally 1 or 2, while for large-sample studies, a higher frequency threshold will be considered. In this paper, considering the actual situation of the research object, the original consistency threshold is set to 0.8, the case frequency threshold is set to 2, and the PRI threshold is set to 0.7, according to Greckhamer’s advice [47]. A black circle (●) indicates that the antecedent condition is present (or at a high level), while a blank space indicates that the antecedent condition is “irrelevant” (that is, its presence or absence does not affect the outcome) [48]. Finally, according to the truth table analysis, two configuration results are obtained, as shown in Table 6. Because the simplified solution and the intermediate solution in this study are completely consistent, only the core condition exists in the final result. It can be seen from the table that the overall consistency of all configurations is 0.899, which is greater than the critical value of 0.8, indicating that 90% of the sample cases that meet these two configurations present a high degree of synergy. Because the coverage of the model solution is 0.532, the results of this study explain 53.2% of the reasons for the improvement of project management performance and meet the coverage standard proposed by Woodside [49].
According to the above table, the results of configuration analysis to improve project management performance can be classified into two models:
Model 1: The core conditions are contract governance, explicit knowledge sharing, and tacit knowledge sharing, regardless of the existence of trust. This configuration shows that project management performance can be enhanced regardless of whether the owner uses trust to control the consultant if certain contract governance is put into place along with the consultant’s explicit and tacit knowledge sharing behavior. The configuration of the path requires owners and consultants to have a more rigorous and clear industry to comply with the norms and guidelines, in addition to cooperation between the two sides to have a certain ability to develop detailed and complete contract terms. The research of Galvin and other scholars also believes that contracts are an important means to prevent and control opportunistic risks [50]. It is costly to violate contracts that clearly specify penalties for opportunistic behavior, and formal contracts facilitate the establishment of common goals among the partners, thus making it better to achieve project success. However, not only the contract terms drawn up between the owner and the consultant can effectively improve project management performance. The consultant also needs to share explicit and tacit knowledge with the owner independently to realize knowledge exchange [16].
Model 2: The core conditions are trust, contract governance, and explicit knowledge sharing, with tacit knowledge sharing not considered. This configuration indicates that when the owner jointly adopts contract governance and trust, it is not necessary to consider whether the consultant has carried out implicit knowledge sharing, but the owner only needs to cooperate with the consultant to share explicit knowledge to achieve project management performance. This configuration strategy requires the owner to have strong project management ability. On the one hand, the owner needs to use the design of flexible contract content to clarify the distribution of rights and responsibilities, the scope of consulting services, the schedule, the consulting results provided, and other matters, and to exert the legal enforcement of the contract to ensure the implementation of the contract terms [51]. On the other hand, the owner needs to maintain a certain level of trust with the consultant, which will enable the partners to properly consider the interests of the other party in the transaction process, and ultimately reduce transaction costs and information asymmetry, so that both parties can more easily reach a scientific and consistent decision [45]. However, in this process, explicit knowledge sharing between the consultant and the owner is still very important, mainly because part of the explicit knowledge content is the result stipulated in the contract governance, so it is still necessary for the consultant to share the explicit knowledge well, so as to achieve an improvement of the final project management performance.

6. Conclusions

This paper attempts to investigate how contractual governance and trust between owners and consultants affects project management performance in whole process engineering consulting projects. A sample of 312 consultant–owner relationships in China is used to test the theoretical framework. The following conclusions have been reached: first, in addition to having a directly positive effect on project management performance, contract and trust also have an indirect impact through knowledge sharing; second, the results of the qualitative comparative analysis show that achieving project management performance is a combination of multiple factors, and contract and trust have different alternative and complementary relationships in different contexts.

6.1. Theoretical Contributions

(1) The “black box” of the influence of contract and trust on the whole process engineering consulting project management performance is opened. When studying the project management performance of whole process engineering consulting projects, scholars currently do not consider the knowledge-intensive characteristics of consulting firms and ignore the influence of consultant knowledge sharing on project management performance. We introduce social exchange theory in this paper and focus on the impact of contract and trust on project management performance through the mediation of knowledge sharing and reveal the influence path of contract and trust on project management performance. This paper offers a new theoretical perspective on project management research.
(2) The antecedent configuration influencing the management performance of the whole process engineering project is qualitatively examined. The current study focuses on the quantitative relationship between a single independent variable and project management performance, ignoring the impact of multiple factors combined. As a result, this paper will use qualitative comparative analysis to reveal the complexity of the causal relationship between different combinations of antecedent condition variables and outcome variables, with contract governance, trust, and knowledge sharing as antecedent variables and project management performance as outcome variables; the study’s findings show that contract governance and trust have different complementary substitution repercussions in different situations. The findings of this study offer a new perspective on project management performance research as well as a completely new solution.

6.2. Practical Implications

(1) This study aims to provide owners with clarity on the impact of governance mechanisms on project management performance and corresponding management insights. The findings of this study show that in addition to having a directly positive effect on project management performance, contract and trust have an indirect effect on project management performance through knowledge sharing. Therefore, to improve management performance, owners should use contracts and trust for consultants and encourage consultants to take the initiative to share knowledge in the governance process.
(2) This paper analyzes different ways to improve the management performance of the whole consulting project to provide corresponding strategies for the owner. The study uses qualitative comparative analysis to investigate two antecedent configurations for improving project management performance, making owners aware that improving project management performance is determined by a combination of multiple factors rather than a single factor. Based on this study’s findings, the various combination patterns are analyzed and discussed, providing owners with specific management insights for effective project management.

6.3. Management Enlightenment

(1) Reasonable contract term design. First, design clear contract terms, specify the rights, responsibilities, and obligations of the owner and the consultant, and clearly explain the risk-sharing principle between them in order to effectively reduce the cooperation risks of both parties and limit the opportunistic behavior of partners. Second, the entire engineering consulting project process has a long cycle, a complex project, and a high degree of uncertainty in the cooperation process. Contract terms must be flexible in design. It is necessary to clarify the handling process after the occurrence of future uncertain events when designing contract terms.
(2) Increase the level of governance trust. When selecting a consultant as a partner in the early stages of cooperation, the owner must fully exploit the ability to trust, that is, inspect the consultant’s ability, technology, and reputation level from multiple perspectives. During the collaboration process, the owner can adjust the consultant’s trust in real time based on the consultant’s performance. When the consultant performs well and can complete the project content specified in the contract, the owner should increase his or her trust in the consultant in due time.
(3) Pay attention to the knowledge sharing behavior of the consultant. The owner shall design contract terms with an incentive orientation, flexibly use contract coordination to govern the consultant, and promote the establishment and development of inter-organizational trust through formal contract incentives. In addition, in the process of project implementation after signing the contract, the owner pays attention to maintaining the relationship with the consultant through trust, mainly because trust is more conducive to the owner to obtain tacit knowledge from the consultant than contract governance.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, K.S. and Y.C.; methodology, J.W. and Y.C.; software, J.W. and Y.C.; validation, J.W. and Y.C.; formal analysis, K.S. and Y.C.; data curation, K.S. and Y.C.; writing—original draft preparation, J.W. and K.S.; writing—review and editing, J.W. and Y.C.; visualization, J.W. and Y.C. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are not publicly available due to the privacy requirements of the interviewees.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Buildings 13 03006 g001
Figure 1. Study hypothetical model based on SEM.
Figure 1. Study hypothetical model based on SEM.
Buildings 13 03006 g001
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample.
Basic InformationFeatureSample NumberPercentageBasic InformationFeatureSample NumberPercentage
Position TypeDepartment manager and above4213.40%Business item typeEarly consultation23575.20%
Project leader12138.90%Engineering design21568.80%
General management/technical personnel13944.50%Tendering agent20565.60%
Others103.20%Cost consulting22772.60%
EducationMaster’s degree or above9028.90%Project management20666.20%
Undergraduate course13844.20%Engineering Project Supervisor20365.00%
Junior college education8426.90%Others103.20%
Working timeUnder 3 years6821.80%
3–5 Years11637.18%
6–10 Years6621.15%
More than 10 years6219.87%
Table 2. Credit validity and model fit indicators.
Table 2. Credit validity and model fit indicators.
VariablesCronbach’s αAVECRCorrelation Coefficient and the AVE Arithmetic Square Root
Contract governance0.9200.7430.9200.862
Trust0.8870.6150.887−0.0820.784
Explicit knowledge sharing0.8830.6560.8840.125 *0.228 **0.810
Tacit knowledge sharing0.8540.6670.858−0.286 **0.178 **0.211 **0.817
Project management performance0.8880.6600.8860.116 *0.239 **0.455 **0.200 **
Index of model fit: χ2/df = 2.418, RMR = 0.049, NFI = 0.904, RFI = 0.941, TLI = 0.930, CFI = 0.941, RMSEA = 0.068
Note: ** is p < 0.01, * is p < 0.05, diagonal values are AVE square root, the rest are inter-variable correlation coefficient.
Table 3. Test of direct effects.
Table 3. Test of direct effects.
PathEstimateS.E.C.R.P
Contract governance→Explicit knowledge sharing0.1530.0462.4810.013
Contract governance→Tacit knowledge sharing−0.3050.053−4.893***
Trust→Explicit knowledge sharing0.2460.0543.916***
Trust→Tacit knowledge sharing0.1690.0602.7510.006
Contract governance→Project management performance0.1370.0472.2750.023
Trust→Project management performance0.1220.0532.0510.040
Explicit knowledge sharing→Project management performance0.4400.0676.798***
Tacit knowledge sharing→Project management performance0.1620.0572.5780.010
Note: *** is p < 0.001.
Table 4. Test of the mediation effect.
Table 4. Test of the mediation effect.
PathEffect ValueS.E.LowerUpperP
Contract governance→Explicit knowledge sharing→Project management performance0.0520.0220.0180.0910.010
Contract governance→Tacit knowledge sharing→Project management performance−0.0380.018−0.071−0.0110.017
Contract governance→Project management performance0.1060.0510.0230.1940.034
TE10.1200.0510.0350.2040.013
Trust→Explicit knowledge sharing→Project management performance0.0960.0410.0430.1790.002
Trust→Tacit knowledge sharing→Project management performance0.0240.0170.0030.0610.047
Trust→Project management performance0.1080.0510.0270.1910.027
TE20.2290.0650.1310.3430.001
Table 5. Analysis of the necessary conditions.
Table 5. Analysis of the necessary conditions.
Outcome VariableProject Management Performance
Pre-Cause ConditionsConsistencyCoverage
CG0.6710.731
~CG0.6190.673
TR0.7720.730
~TR0.5530.710
EKS0.7820.774
~EKS0.5330.644
TKS0.7480.757
~TKS0.5900.694
Table 6. Configuration results.
Table 6. Configuration results.
Pre-Cause ConditionsProject Management Performance
Configuration 1Configuration 2
Contract governance●●
Trust ●
Explicit knowledge sharing●●
Tacit knowledge sharing●
Original coverage0.4590.482
Net coverage0.0510.074
Consistency0.9260.901
Overall protocol coverage rate0.532
Overall protocol consistency0.899
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MDPI and ACS Style

Shang, K.; Wu, J.; Cao, Y. Study on the Impact of Trust and Contract Governance on Project Management Performance in the Whole Process Consulting Project—Based on the SEM and fsQCA Methods. Buildings 2023, 13, 3006. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13123006

AMA Style

Shang K, Wu J, Cao Y. Study on the Impact of Trust and Contract Governance on Project Management Performance in the Whole Process Consulting Project—Based on the SEM and fsQCA Methods. Buildings. 2023; 13(12):3006. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13123006

Chicago/Turabian Style

Shang, Kejian, Jie Wu, and Yunyun Cao. 2023. "Study on the Impact of Trust and Contract Governance on Project Management Performance in the Whole Process Consulting Project—Based on the SEM and fsQCA Methods" Buildings 13, no. 12: 3006. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13123006

APA Style

Shang, K., Wu, J., & Cao, Y. (2023). Study on the Impact of Trust and Contract Governance on Project Management Performance in the Whole Process Consulting Project—Based on the SEM and fsQCA Methods. Buildings, 13(12), 3006. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings13123006

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