Apocalyptic Phenomenology: The Culmination of the Phenomenological Movement
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Maybe it would be useful to connect the concept of phenomenological newness with the concept of abductive idea, which is according to Charles Sanders Peirce the only new knowledge, because inductive method is just generalization of something already known meanwhile abductive reasoning creates new ideas.
Author Response
Replies to the Referee reports on the article entitled Phenomenology as Philosophy of Revelation
Report 1
The report says: “Maybe it would be useful to connect the concept of phenomenological newness with the concept of abductive idea, which is according to Charles Sanders Peirce the only new knowledge, because inductive method is just generalization of something already known meanwhile abductive reasoning creates new ideas.”
General answer: Thank you for this important hint.
Specific answer: I have thoroughly read relevant parts of Peirce’s writings. Indeed, he attempts to formulate a certain conception of newness. However, newness for Peirce means facts that were not known before and now they are discovered. The logic of discovery is formulated by what Peirce terms abduction. As he writes, “Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis. Deduction proves that something must be, Induction shows that something actually is operative, Abduction merely suggests that something maybe.” (The Essential Peirce, vol 2, p. 216). This shows that for Peirce, abduction is by which new facts are interpreted hypothetically. The hypothesis for him is guesswork (“something maybe”). This is very far from what I mean by newness in the paper – he even claims that there is only relative newness (ibid., p. 88).
However, I made a reference to Peirce’s notion of abduction and even use a quote from him in the new version of my paper.
23.10.2022
Reviewer 2 Report
Although the author presents the methodology of the authors he discusses, I feel he should briefly describe his own methodology in a distinct section (a small one, perhaps half a page). Concretely, he should indicate who preceded him in doing something similar and what, how, and why he does what he does in this article. Other than that, everything is fine. Lest I should forget: it would be best if the author could reveal one or two possible directions for further research.
Author Response
Replies to the Referee reports on the article entitled Phenomenology as Philosophy of Revelation
Report 2
The report claims: “Although the author presents the methodology of the authors he discusses, I feel he should briefly describe his own methodology in a distinct section (a small one, perhaps half a page). Concretely, he should indicate who preceded him in doing something similar and what, how, and why he does what he does in this article. Other than that, everything is fine. Lest I should forget: it would be best if the author could reveal one or two possible directions for further research.”
General answer: Very good points.
Specific answer: As a matter of fact, there are long passages in the paper on methodology. The word “method” occurs 24 times in the original version. Plus, there is a section beginning with the word “Methodologically…” where I explain the method of phenomenology leading to the application of the principle of refusivum sui generating newness.
However, in the new version of my paper I have added a separate paragraph on the method applied beginning with the words “In the present article…”. (See the new text).
Triggered by the proposal to reveal possible further directions of investigation, I added a footnote to the last sentence of the article (the only footnote in the text) about the background and connections of the author’s orientation and his interest in further research.
23.10.2022
Reviewer 3 Report
The project of this article is very promising, since its aim is to develop the concept of an apocalyptic phenomenology, which would be imbedded in the fundamental idea of phenomenology as such. However, the article does not present the necessary conceptual analysis in order to argue for this idea. It mostly offers a very general and not always exact history of phenomenology (thus, it is not clear what the author means by noumenology, and how it relates to phenomenology, p. 2, l. 85, a lot of different phenomenology authors are only rapidly evoked, I also doubt that the concept of co-constitution applies to Husserl's phenomenology p.2, l. 92, unless it is used in an intersubjective context) and of the concept of apocalypsis.
It would be necessary to analyse the concepts of self-disclosure and revelation, which are central in this article. How do they relate for example to the concepts of givenness/Gegebenheit (Husserl) and givenness/donation (Marion)? Does the author propose his own concepts of self-disclosure and revelation, or does he draw on a specific author or several specific authors? This is not at all clear by reading this article. Also, it is not clear how the author correlates apocalupsis, which is a religious and theological concept, to these fundamental phenomenological concepts, whose scope is not only religious.
I encourage the author to deepen the conceptual analysis of this work, since I think that it is a very interesting topic.
Author Response
Replies to the Referee reports on the article entitled Phenomenology as Philosophy of Revelation
Report 3
The report claims: “The project of this article is very promising, since its aim is to develop the concept of an apocalyptic phenomenology, which would be imbedded in the fundamental idea of phenomenology as such. However, the article does not present the necessary conceptual analysis in order to argue for this idea. It mostly offers a very general and not always exact history of phenomenology (thus, it is not clear what the author means by noumenology, and how it relates to phenomenology, p. 2, l. 85, a lot of different phenomenology authors are only rapidly evoked, I also doubt that the concept of co-constitution applies to Husserl's phenomenology p.2, l. 92, unless it is used in an intersubjective context) and of the concept of apocalypsis. It would be necessary to analyse the concepts of self-disclosure and revelation, which are central in this article. How do they relate for example to the concepts of givenness/Gegebenheit (Husserl) and givenness/donation (Marion)? Does the author propose his own concepts of self-disclosure and revelation, or does he draw on a specific author or several specific authors? This is not at all clear by reading this article. Also, it is not clear how the author correlates apocalupsis, which is a religious and theological concept, to these fundamental phenomenological concepts, whose scope is not only religious.”
General answer: This criticism has proved to be very useful for the revision of my paper. Using this perspective, I have amended the entire text and attempted to insert specifications so that the necessary analysis become more evident.
Specific answer: I added references with page numbers to the historical overview so that the reader can easily check out my points. Of course, my historical overview is cursory, but I emphasize that what is at stake here is not so much the phenomenological movement as a historical development but “the phenomenological movement” as the self-development of a problematic underdetermined by the series of historical authors. –
Already in the original version there are two references to the notion of noumenology, the work of Hyppolite and Seifert, who introduced this expression into the debates on phenomenology. The distinction between a phenomenon and a noumenon – appearance and essence – is certainly ancient, but I did not want to enter philology here. Yet I refer to Schuhmann’s work on the history of the term of phenomenology, which is among the best works produced on this topic so far. –
“Co-constitution” is an expression used by phenomenologically oriented sociologists. Not the word, but the idea is massively present in Husserl’s thoughts on “constitution”. I refer to Ideas II in the new version of the text where this notion is elaborated – with page numbers. –
The notion of self-disclosure is rooted in Husserl’s term Selbsgegebenheit and it is explained in works referenced in the text. In the new version, I add a short genealogy of Gegebenheit through es gibt to donation. I skip Lévinas’s il y a – for il y a is a misunderstanding of Gegebenheit. But the text is getting too long anyway, so I leave this as it is now. –
I am a little puzzled by the reviewer’s words to the effect that “it is not clear how the author correlates apocalupsis, which is a religious and theological concept, to these fundamental phenomenological concepts, whose scope is not only religious.” As a matter of fact, in sections 3 and 4 of the original version, I thoroughly explain the genealogy of apocalupsis up to phenomenology in clear terms denoting the notion of illumination as the methodological bottom line. I even add various references to underpin this genealogy. I refer to the debate linked to Janicaud and point out that his criticism of “the theological turn” of phenomenology is not a robust one – it goes against the entire design of phenomenology.
I add here that a technical and non-religious phenomenology is not the real picture in my view, only an abstraction generated by some thinkers beginning with Sartre. But Lévinas makes it clear that phenomenology and religion (even revelation) hang strictly together, as has been recognized by various reviewers of phenomenology. I mention a few of them in the text. B. Waldenfels e.g. writes that without the religious background, Lévinas cannot be properly understood. BUT the same can be said, mutatis mutandis, about every single phenomenologist and about “the phenomenological movement” as such as well.
23.10.2022
Round 2
Reviewer 3 Report
I appreciate the author's efforts to amend this article.
