Comprehensive Review of UAV Detection, Security, and Communication Advancements to Prevent Threats
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Study Related to Regulations
- The users or operators of a registered UAV must carry the proof of license while operating the UAV.
- The maximum height at which the UAV can maneuver is 400 feet only.
- UAVs must be kept away from the airfields and, in case of necessity, one may acquire the written permission from relevant boards or authorities.
- In the case of a UAV crash, legal action can be taken against any harmful actions or the damage that occurred from UAV failure.
- UAVs with computer vision or camera surveillance are not allowed to maneuver within 50 m of people or any crowd.
- UAVs will be summoned if they are not flown within the operator’s line of sight.
- UAVs will be summoned if they are flown at night without proper lighting.
3. Classification of UAVs
3.1. Classification of Drones
- Rotary-wing drones;
- Fixed-wing drones;
- Hybrid-wing drones;
- Flapping-wing drones.
3.2. Classification of UAVs Based on Ground Command and Control
- Fully autonomous controlled UAVs: These are the UAVs that can perform different tasks without any intervention from human beings and are fully automated.
- Remotely operated UAVs: These UAVs are designed to execute the task as directed by a human being. Thus, they have a human as their main operator.
- Remotely pilot-controlled UAVs: Drones where all tasks and maneuvers are performed by the human-based remote control from the GCR.
4. Communication Methods and Architecture
- Drone airframe;
- Onboard controller;
- Payload capability;
- Communication system;
- Efficient batteries.
Communication Methods
5. Utilization of UAVs in Different Domains
6. Security Threats Related to UAVs
- It is a high probability that a drone can be hacked or may deviate from its path due to heavy wind disturbance. Thus, there should be a reset option available which may turn the drone to a hovering condition only and help to gain the control back.
- There are certain areas where drones may face signal jammers and, later, can be controlled for a cyberattack. Thus, drones must have some sort of filter that may detect if there is any signal jammer nearby.
7. Current Vulnerability Issues of UAVs
8. Current State-of-the-Art Solutions
- Rule-based IDS;
- Signature-based IDS;
- Anomaly-based IDS.
9. Open Research Areas and Recommendations
- There is a need to address the area of high-speed mobility, as there are huge chances to hack the communication links through the ground control room or with neighboring UAVs.
- In some of the integrated solutions, i.e., the space-air-ground network, one may see a frequent issue of synchronization, and thus, it is desirable to re-design some cooperation incentives for using cross-layered protocols with linked reliability. In this way, there will be less chances of any security attacks.
- One more aspect is to recommend a lightweight mechanism for UAVs to prevent attacks, such as eavesdropping, a man-in-the-middle attack [112,113], and so on. There are a number of artificial intelligence solutions which are recommended in [28] for addressing the security in cellular network-based controlled UAVs for delivering packages.
- Integrating UAVs with the IoT can result in endurance and reliability, but at the same time, it consumes the maximum battery capacity which is generally small; thus, this may lead UAVs toward possible collisions and can be a high-risk threat.
- Lastly, proposing a big data deep reinforcement learning approach to enable the dynamic arrangement of networking, caching, and computing resources for improving the performance of UAVs with secure operations in smart cities.
10. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Sr. No. | Bandwidth | Description |
---|---|---|
1 | 2.4 KHz to 2483.500 MHz | The appropriate standard is EN 300 328, which is digital wideband data transmission equipment, and sometimes, the standard used is EN 300 440, which is general short-range devices. |
Purpose: Mostly used for short-range surveillance or short-range maneuvering missions. | ||
2 | 5.47 KHz to 57250 MHz | Operational power is less or equal to 1 watt, whereas the power spectral density is less the 50mW/1 MHz frequency. The standard is EN 201 893, which is known as RLAN equipment. |
Purpose: Long stay in sky operations, used mainly for aerial photography. | ||
3 | 5.725 KHz to 5875 MHz | Its operational power rating is less than 25 mW and standard is EN 300 440, which is general short-range devices. |
Purpose: Used for short-range surveillance with fast maneuvering and manipulating tasks. | ||
4 | 5030 to 5091 MHz | This is the frequency used only for the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and, therefore, cannot be used for communication with drones. |
Purpose: Used in such operations where data sharing is important with ground control room (GCR). |
Factors | Based on Wing Type | Based on Altitude | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Fixed-Wing Type | Rotary-Wing Type | Hybrid-Wing Type | Low Altitude Below 400 ft | High Altitude Above 400 ft | |
Hovering | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Small Size | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
Transport goods | Yes | Low weight | Yes | Yes | No |
Battery time (in hour) | >1 h | 1 h | >1 h | >1 h | >1 h |
Maneuver speed | High Speed | Low speed | High speed | High Speed | High Speed |
Flexible deployment of communication | No | No | No | Yes | No |
Cost effective | Expensive | Cheap | Expensive | Cheap | Cheap |
Endurance | High | Low | Medium | Low | High |
Technique | Channel Width | Band | Bit Rate | Range | Latency | Mobility Support |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Wi-Fi | 20 MHz | 2.4 GHz to 5.2 GHz | 6–54 Mbps | 100 m | 10 ms | Low |
GPS | 2 MHz | 1176 to 1576 MHz | 50 bps | - | 10 ms | Higher |
UMTS | 5 MHz | 700 to 2600 MHz | 2 Mbps | 10 Km | 20–70 ms | High |
5G | 2.16 GHz | 57 to 64 GHz | Up to 4 Gbps | 50 m | - | Ultra-High |
LTE | 20 MHz | 700 to 2690 MHz | Up to 300 Mbps | 30 Km | 10 ms | Very High |
LTE-A | Up to 100 MHz | 450 MHz to 4.99 GHz | Up to 1 Gbps | - | Very High |
Type of Communication | Elevation in Km | Number of Satellites | Satellite Life | Handoff Frequency | Doppler | Gateway Cost | Propagation Path Loss |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) | Up to 36,000 | 3, no polar coverage | 15+ | NA | Low | Very expensive | Highest |
Medium Earth orbit (MEO) | 5000–15,000 | 8–20 global | 10–15 | Low | Medium | Expensive | High |
Low Earth orbit (LEO) | 500–1500 | 40–800 global | 3–7 | High | High | Cheap | Least |
Vulnerability Type | Description |
---|---|
Malware issue | In various cases, it has been observed that these UAVs are generally connected and controlled via cell phone or any sort of remote control. These techniques are, thus far, not safe [43] and, therefore, the UAVs are easy to be hacked using a reverse-shell TCP payload that can be injected into UAV memory. Furthermore, this leads to installation of malware over UAVs automatically. |
Spoofing | These are the issues related to the communication method, usually with serial port connections that are not encrypted properly [44]. Due to this spoofing issue, the information associated with GPS can be taken and altered. |
Manipulation and other common concerns | The flying paths which UAVs must track are pre-programmed before; therefore, these paths can be altered [45], whereas the common issues are related to wind, overheating, or any predator bird harming the lightweight drone easily [46]. |
Physical design and control system constraints | There are various challenges with unmanned aerial vehicle control system design, such as the sluggish convergence rate, which prevents the drone from performing fast or aggressive maneuvers, and one may notice faults in the flight or divergence from the target trajectory [47,59,60]. This slow convergence rate and glitches are caused by the physical architecture of drones or the planned control system, which is primarily intended to stabilize the drone in uncertain conditions. |
Sensorization issue | Since these UAVs depend on sensors, thus, it is also proved that the ultrasonic waves may attack the MEMS gyro sensors [47]. |
Wi-Fi constraints | Operating drones using a Wi-Fi facility may be risky. This is proved in [48] where the connection was disrupted with the help of software and changing the control of the UAV. |
GPS issue | Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast depends on the GPS module, which is not encrypted sometimes and may lead to spoofing [49]. |
Firmware issue | The bugs available in the first prototype and first algorithm which come to the front after usage [50]. |
Sky Jack-based attacks | Sky Jack is one software used to conduct the attacks related to de-authentication of targets during control [51]. |
Controller issues | These issues are related to the operation control unit and may puzzle the controller by changing the live feed to some other video [52]. |
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Abro, G.E.M.; Zulkifli, S.A.B.M.; Masood, R.J.; Asirvadam, V.S.; Laouiti, A. Comprehensive Review of UAV Detection, Security, and Communication Advancements to Prevent Threats. Drones 2022, 6, 284. https://doi.org/10.3390/drones6100284
Abro GEM, Zulkifli SABM, Masood RJ, Asirvadam VS, Laouiti A. Comprehensive Review of UAV Detection, Security, and Communication Advancements to Prevent Threats. Drones. 2022; 6(10):284. https://doi.org/10.3390/drones6100284
Chicago/Turabian StyleAbro, Ghulam E. Mustafa, Saiful Azrin B. M. Zulkifli, Rana Javed Masood, Vijanth Sagayan Asirvadam, and Anis Laouiti. 2022. "Comprehensive Review of UAV Detection, Security, and Communication Advancements to Prevent Threats" Drones 6, no. 10: 284. https://doi.org/10.3390/drones6100284
APA StyleAbro, G. E. M., Zulkifli, S. A. B. M., Masood, R. J., Asirvadam, V. S., & Laouiti, A. (2022). Comprehensive Review of UAV Detection, Security, and Communication Advancements to Prevent Threats. Drones, 6(10), 284. https://doi.org/10.3390/drones6100284