Prospect Theory with Bounded Temporal Horizon for Modeling Prosumer Behavior in the Smart Grid
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Related Work
2.1. Game-Theoretic Approach
2.2. Prospect-Theoretic Approach
2.3. Temporal Decision Horizons
3. Energy Market Simulation Study
4. Modeling Approach
4.1. Prosumer Behavior Model Using Prospect Theory
4.2. Bounded Temporal Horizon Model of Prosumer Behavior Using Prospect Theory
4.3. Modeling Prosumer Behavior Using EUT and EUTTW
5. Data Fitting and Results
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
Coefficient of loss aversion. | |
Coefficient of risk aversion. | |
Coefficient of risk seeking. | |
D | Total number of days in the energy grid experiment. |
Price on offer for a unit of energy for any given day d. | |
J | The maximum possible price. |
Number of units available for sale on day d. | |
n | Number of units sold at price on day d. |
Lowest price for which a sale of one unit on day d yields a positive expected | |
value. | |
Lowest price for which the expected gain is greater than the expected loss | |
from a sale for a | |
time period of days. | |
Expected gain for a hold on day d. | |
Expected gain for a hold on day d with time window of . | |
Lowest price on day d for which the gain from a sale is greater than the | |
expected gain from a hold. | |
Lowest price for which gain from a sale is greater than the expected gain | |
from a hold for a time window of days. | |
Single-day probabilities of each of the 15 possible wholesale electricity prices. | |
Number of remaining days. | |
Optimum units predicted to be sold by the model on day d. | |
PT | Prospect Theory |
EUT | Expected Utility Theory |
TW | Time Window |
MAND | Minimum Average Normalized Deviation |
DSM | Demand-Side Management |
Appendix A
Appendix A.1. Proof of the Theorem 1
- Case I If , due to framing effect in which we have , we can infer that expected utility is always negative regardless of the value of n, i.e., . Hence the best strategy in this case is to sell no units, i.e., .
- Case II If , considering the condition , then expected utility of selling a unit of energy, , is always positive,Therefore, . However, the expected utility function is a nonlinear function of n, and for the condition , the growth rate of is greater than ’s. Therefore, there exists a threshold , for which . Hence,For given and , and , Equation (A5) holds for any . Consequently, for any ,
Appendix A.2. Proof of the Theorem 2
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Price($) | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 |
0.03 | 0.06 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
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Rajabpour, M.; Yousefvand, M.; Mulligan, R.; Mandayam, N.B. Prospect Theory with Bounded Temporal Horizon for Modeling Prosumer Behavior in the Smart Grid. Energies 2021, 14, 7134. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14217134
Rajabpour M, Yousefvand M, Mulligan R, Mandayam NB. Prospect Theory with Bounded Temporal Horizon for Modeling Prosumer Behavior in the Smart Grid. Energies. 2021; 14(21):7134. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14217134
Chicago/Turabian StyleRajabpour, Mohsen, Mohammad Yousefvand, Robert Mulligan, and Narayan B. Mandayam. 2021. "Prospect Theory with Bounded Temporal Horizon for Modeling Prosumer Behavior in the Smart Grid" Energies 14, no. 21: 7134. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14217134
APA StyleRajabpour, M., Yousefvand, M., Mulligan, R., & Mandayam, N. B. (2021). Prospect Theory with Bounded Temporal Horizon for Modeling Prosumer Behavior in the Smart Grid. Energies, 14(21), 7134. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14217134