BBAP-WSN: A New Blockchain-Based Authentication Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks
Abstract
:1. Introduction
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- A blockchain-based authentication protocol is developed for high-security applications. While non-blockchain authentication protocols are vulnerable to certain attacks, the blockchain structure, proven to be high security, is applied in this study. Compared to the existing limited work involving blockchain-based WSNs, very good results are achieved in terms of security and efficacy.
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- Blockchain-based WSN authentication models in the literature are examined.
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- A private blockchain structure is created considering security, transaction speed, ownership criteria, and suitability for WSNs.
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- Proof of Authentication (PoAh) is used as the consensus mechanism.
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- A WSN System model is created as Sensor Node (SN), Cluster Node (CN), Base Station (BS), Blockchain Network (BCN), and User (U).
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- The developed protocol consists of the Initialization section, where the initial values are generated, the registration section, where the nodes in the network are registered, the authentication section, where the nodes in the network are verified, and the unregistration section, which is the removal of the nodes leaving the network for any reason.
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- The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), ECC, and Smart Contract are used in the developed protocol.
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- A detailed security analysis of the study is made.
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- The proposed protocol is implemented to real sensor nodes and efficiency analysis is carried out in this way.
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- In addition to being used in applications requiring high security, the proposed authentication protocol is also efficient considering the latency-energy-memory usage criteria.
2. Related Works
3. Blockchain
- A node sends a transaction request to the Chain network.
- A new block containing the requested transaction is created and forwarded to the nodes in the Chain network.
- Nodes in the network verify and validate the block.
- The block is approved by the consensus protocol.
- The verified block is sent to all nodes for inclusion in the existing chain.
- A new block is added to all nodes.
- The process is completed.
4. System Model
5. Proposed Protocol
5.1. Initialization
5.2. Registration
Algorithm 1 CN registration |
begin if time_check = error; Return error(); if IDCNi_check = error; Return error(); if IDcardCni_check = error; Return error(); register(IDCNi, IDcardCni); end |
Algorithm 2 SN registration |
begin if time_check = error; Return error(); if IDCNi_check = error; Return error(); if IDSNi_check = error; Return error(); if IDcardCni_check = error; Return error(); register(IDSNi, IDCni); end |
5.3. Authentication
Algorithm 3 CN-SN authentication |
begin if time_check = error; Return error(); if IDCNi_check = error; Return error(); // Is the node alive? // Is the node registered? if IDSNi_check = error; Return error(); // Is the node alive? // Is SN a member of the CN here? if IDcardCni_check = error; Return error(); // Is the signature information correct? return true; // secure connection end |
Algorithm 4 U authentication |
begin if time_check = error; Return error(); if IDU_check = error; Return error(); // if permission ok return true; // secure connection end |
5.4. Unregistration
Algorithm 5 SN unregistration |
begin if time_check = error; Return error(); if IDCNi_check = error; Return error(); if IDSNi_check = error; Return error(); if IDcardCni_check = error; Return error(); delete(IDSNi); end |
5.5. Smart Contracts
6. Security and Efficiency Analysis
6.1. Security Analysis
6.2. Efficiency Analysis
6.2.1. Latency
6.2.2. Memory Usage
6.2.3. Energy
6.2.4. Message Size
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- In the registration process, while the message sizes in other studies are 190 bytes of SN, 380 bytes of CN, and 170 bytes of the BS, in the proposed protocol they are 90 bytes of SN, 270 bytes of CN, and 140 bytes of the BS.
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- In the authentication process, while the message sizes in other studies are 110 bytes of SN, 290 bytes of CN, and 180 bytes of the BS, in the proposed protocol they are 60 bytes of SN, 200 bytes of CN, and 150 bytes of the BS.
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- In the proposed protocol, IDcard is kept only in CNs. Only small-size IDs and PVKs are kept in SNs. In other studies, IDcards are kept both in SNs and CNs. This is the reason why the message size is low in the SN.
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- The proposed protocol uses the ECC algorithm for transactions between SN-CN. The reason for this situation is the insufficient capacity of the nodes, as explained earlier.
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- The size of the message increases because it is used in the digital signature in smart contract transactions.
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- Other studies’ use of blockchain at the SN-CN level is unsuitable for the WSN’s structure. This situation may be the reason for the higher results obtained by other studies.
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- During the registration and authentication stages, the message size of CNs is significant because they communicate with both SNs and the BS.
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- In other studies, blocks are held on CNs, while in ours they are held on the BS.
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- In other studies, transactions are slower because blocks are kept at the CN level. As the number of blocks increases, problems arise in terms of time and efficiency.
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- The most important difference is that they use the public blockchain (permissionless) structure and we use the private blockchain (permissioned) structure.
6.3. General Evaluation
7. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
IoT | Internet of Things |
WSN | Wireless Sensor Network |
Temp | Temperature |
Hum | Humidity |
PoAh | Proof of Authentication |
SN | Sensor Node |
CN | Cluster Node |
BS | Base Station |
BCN | Blockchain Network |
U | User |
ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm |
ECC | Elliptic Curve Cryptography |
ID | Identity |
MAC | Media Access Control |
PBK | Public Key |
PVK | Private Key |
DoS | Denial-of-Service |
DDoS | Distributed Denial-of-Service |
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Threat | Description | Analysis |
---|---|---|
Data Integrity | During communication, it ensures that the data sent from the source are not changed until they reach the destination. | In the proposed protocol, ECC is used for communication between SN and CN, while smart contract is used for communication between CN and BS. Communications between SN-CN cannot be changed without knowing the private keys of the nodes. Since there is a blockchain between CN-BS, data cannot be changed. Data integrity is successfully provided in the protocol. Also, data tampering, which is the act of deliberately altering (destroying, manipulating or editing) data by the attacker, cannot occur in the proposed protocol. |
Scalability | It is the ability of the network to keep up with this situation without any disruption in case the number of nodes or data in the network increases or decreases. | In the proposed protocol, a new node can join the network with permission. The security level is better as there is permission participation. At the same time, a node may leave the network for any reason. This node is removed from the system. That is, the system model can be shaped according to the addition of a new node to the network or the separation of nodes. A large-size blockchain has negative effects on performance. Both the need for storage capacity and processing time are increasing. In this case, it affects scalability negatively. One of the reasons why the private blockchain model is preferred in the system and the blockchain is used only in CN-BS communications is to keep the scalability of the network at a high level. In the blockchain, as data are produced, the number of blocks increases and the chain is constantly growing. The capacity of the nodes holding these blocks should not be limited. Under normal conditions, this chain cannot be kept in SNs or CNs because there is not enough storage. |
Non-Repudiation | After the data transfer from the source to the target, the source cannot deny that the data are sent and the target cannot deny that it has received the data. | In the proposed protocol, there can be no denial as communication is only through known private keys and digital signatures. |
Mutual Authentication | In an authentication protocol, two parties confirm each other’s identity at the same time. | The proposed protocol provides mutual authentication between SN-CN and CN-BS. Since PBK, PVK, ID, IDcard, smart contract with ECDSA are always used in the communications made by all nodes connected to the blockchain network, both the sender and the receiver are verified bilaterally. In addition, all transactions made are registered in the BCN and can be securely traced. |
Sybil Attack | It is a security threat that occurs when an attacker tries to take over the network by creating multiple pseudonymous identities. | In the proposed protocol, all nodes (SN, CN) in the network are registered in the BCN. All nodes have their own unique ID, PBK, PVK, IDcard information defined and this information is also registered in the BCN. During communication, nodes are verified with smart contract using this information. At the same time, this process is safer because the private blockchain structure is used, which is permission-based. It is not possible for a node with a false identity to enter the network or impersonate nodes. |
Spoofing Attack | A situation where an attacker is successfully identified as another identity by falsifying data. | As explained in the data integrity, mutual authentication, and sybil attack parts, the attacker cannot perform the relevant attack because it needs to know the private information of the nodes in the network. |
Message Substitution Attack | It refers to an attacker replacing a message. | In the proposed protocol, key and signature are used in all sent messages. If the Attacker modifies a message, they must sign it with a valid private key. However, since these keys are only in their owners and they are registered in the BCN, message substitution attacks cannot succeed. |
Message Replay Attack | The repetition of a valid data transmission by the attacker. | In the proposed protocol, an attacker must be authenticated before he can send a message. Only authenticated nodes can send messages on the network. On the BCN side, all blocks have a timestamp and a consensus is required for blocks to be valid. Therefore, the attacker’s message is not accepted by the consensus mechanism. In this way, data freshness is ensured. |
Man in the Middle Attack | It is a type of attack in which the attacker secretly transmits or changes the communication between two parties communicating directly with each other. | Since the attacker does not know the ID, PBK, PVK, IDcard information of the nodes, it will not be able to get permission from the authentication protocol to access the network or the attack process will not be terminated. |
Denial of Service–Availability—Dos Attacks Resistant | It is a type of attack that aims to temporarily or indefinitely disrupt the services of the network so that a node or network resources cannot be reached by the actual users. | Since private blockchain is used in the proposed protocol, access to the network is allowed and attacking nodes do not have access to the network. Blockchain architecture is strong against DoS/DDoS attacks. |
Increase | Normalize | |
---|---|---|
Traditional | 5.16 ms | 1.00 |
Blockchain-based | 6.27 ms | 1.21 |
Increase | ||
---|---|---|
ROM | RAM | |
Blockchain-based | 25% | 6.64% |
Energy (mAH) | Increase | |
---|---|---|
Traditional | 0.000147 | - |
Blockchain-based | 0.000156 | 6.0% |
[50] | [51] | Proposed Protocol (BBAP-WSN) | |
---|---|---|---|
Data Integrity | + | + | + |
Scalability | Low | Low | High |
Non-Repudiation | + | + | + |
Mutual Authentication | + | + | + |
Sybil Attack | + | + | + |
Spoofing Attack | + | - | + |
Message Substitution Attack | + | + | + |
Message Replay Attack | + | + | + |
Man in the Middle Attack | + | + | + |
Denial of Service | + | + | + |
Implementation | − | − | + |
Blockchain’s type | Public + Private | Public + Private | Private |
Consensus mechanism | Not specified | Not specified | PoAh |
Latency | High | High | Low |
Efficiency | Low | Low | High |
Throughput | Low | Low | High |
Energy Consumption | High | High | Low |
Transaction Cost | High | High | Low |
Transaction Speed | Slow | Slow | Fast |
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Dener, M.; Orman, A. BBAP-WSN: A New Blockchain-Based Authentication Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks. Appl. Sci. 2023, 13, 1526. https://doi.org/10.3390/app13031526
Dener M, Orman A. BBAP-WSN: A New Blockchain-Based Authentication Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks. Applied Sciences. 2023; 13(3):1526. https://doi.org/10.3390/app13031526
Chicago/Turabian StyleDener, Murat, and Abdullah Orman. 2023. "BBAP-WSN: A New Blockchain-Based Authentication Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks" Applied Sciences 13, no. 3: 1526. https://doi.org/10.3390/app13031526
APA StyleDener, M., & Orman, A. (2023). BBAP-WSN: A New Blockchain-Based Authentication Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks. Applied Sciences, 13(3), 1526. https://doi.org/10.3390/app13031526