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Experiments on Dishonesty in Strategic Interactions
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Experiments on Dishonesty in Strategic Interactions

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336). This special issue belongs to the section "Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (10 July 2021) | Viewed by 18290

Special Issue Editors

Dr. Rainer Michael Rilke

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
WHU—Otto Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, Germany
Interests: behavioral and experimental economics; behavioral business ethics
Dr. Stefania Bortolotti

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy
Interests: experimental and behavioral economics; cross-cultural cooperation, inequality, and moral behavior

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

A large body of economic experiments on dishonest behaviour in games has generated many insights into the general principles of ethical behaviour. The majority of papers in this field has focused on individual decision-making environments and explored individual and situational determinants of dishonest behaviour.

The special issue “Experiments on Dishonesty in Strategic Interactions” aims to encourage submissions of experiments where dishonesty unfolds in strategic interactions, i.e., where a subject’s dishonest conduct has immediate consequences for others. Relevant topics include (but are not limited to): lying in collaborative situations and the effect of competition on dishonest behaviour. We also welcome submission of experiment where lying has no direct monetary consequences on others (e.g., payoff interdependence) but where the mere presence of unaffected observers might condition dishonesty. Examples include the role of peer pressure, reputation, observability, and accountability (whistleblowing) on lying. We accept both laboratory and field experiments, with or without monetary incentives. To promote the verifiability and replicability of empirical results, submissions should include a power analysis, and all data should be made available upon publication.

Dr. Rainer Michael Rilke
Dr. Stefania Bortolotti
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Games is an international peer-reviewed open access semimonthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • Experiments
  • Lying and dishonesty
  • Strategic interaction

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Published Papers (4 papers)

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Research

11 pages, 217 KiB  
Article
Gender Differences in Repeated Dishonest Behavior: Experimental Evidence
by Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Joo Young Jeon, Chulyoung Kim and Sang-Hyun Kim
Games 2021, 12(2), 44; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020044 - 21 May 2021
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 4027
Abstract
We investigate gender differences in lying behavior when the opportunity to tell lies is repeated. In specific, we distinguish the situations in which such an opportunity can be planned versus when it comes as a surprise. We utilize data from an existing published [...] Read more.
We investigate gender differences in lying behavior when the opportunity to tell lies is repeated. In specific, we distinguish the situations in which such an opportunity can be planned versus when it comes as a surprise. We utilize data from an existing published research and show that when the opportunity to tell a lie comes as a surprise, then on the first occasion, males lie more than females. However, when telling lies can be planned, then there is no gender difference in telling a lie. When planning is possible, females tell more lies in the first occasion compared to when it is not possible to plan; males do not show such behavior. On the second and final occasion, males tell more lies than females when they either could not plan but had the opportunity to a lie before, or could plan but did not have to tell a lie before. These observations can be interpreted in terms of the gender differences in consistent versus compensatory moral behavior. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Dishonesty in Strategic Interactions)
13 pages, 792 KiB  
Article
To Condemn Is Not to Punish: An Experiment on Hypocrisy
by Michael von Grundherr, Johanna Jauernig and Matthias Uhl
Games 2021, 12(2), 38; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020038 - 26 Apr 2021
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 4353
Abstract
Hypocrisy is the act of claiming moral standards to which one’s own behavior does not conform. Instances of hypocrisy, such as the supposedly green furnishing group IKEA’s selling of furniture made from illegally felled wood, are frequently reported in the media. In a [...] Read more.
Hypocrisy is the act of claiming moral standards to which one’s own behavior does not conform. Instances of hypocrisy, such as the supposedly green furnishing group IKEA’s selling of furniture made from illegally felled wood, are frequently reported in the media. In a controlled and incentivized experiment, we investigate how observers rate different types of hypocritical behavior and if this judgment also translates into punishment. Results show that observers do, indeed, condemn hypocritical behavior strongly. The aversion to deceptive behavior is, in fact, so strong that even purely self-deceptive behavior is regarded as blameworthy. Observers who score high in the moral identity test have particularly strong reactions to acts of hypocrisy. The moral condemnation of hypocritical behavior, however, fails to produce a proportional amount of punishment. Punishment seems to be driven more by the violation of the norm of fair distribution than by moral pretense. From the viewpoint of positive retributivism, it is problematic if neither formal nor informal punishment follows moral condemnation. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Dishonesty in Strategic Interactions)
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23 pages, 692 KiB  
Article
Are People Willing to Tell Pareto White Lies? A Review and New Experimental Evidence
by Edward Cartwright, Lian Xue and Charlotte Brown
Games 2021, 12(1), 1; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010001 - 23 Dec 2020
Cited by 5 | Viewed by 4574
Abstract
We explore whether individuals are averse to telling a Pareto white lie—a lie that benefits both themselves and another. We first review and summarize the existing evidence on Pareto white lies. We find that the evidence is relatively limited and varied in its [...] Read more.
We explore whether individuals are averse to telling a Pareto white lie—a lie that benefits both themselves and another. We first review and summarize the existing evidence on Pareto white lies. We find that the evidence is relatively limited and varied in its conclusions. We then present new experimental results obtained using a coin-tossing experiment. Results are provided for both the UK and China. We find evidence of willingness to tell a partial lie (i.e., inflating reports slightly) and high levels of aversion to telling a Pareto white lie that would maximize payoffs. We also find no significant difference between willingness to tell a Pareto white lie and a selfish black lie—a lie that harms another. We find marginal evidence of more lying in China than the UK, but the overall results in the UK and China are very similar. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Dishonesty in Strategic Interactions)
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21 pages, 2818 KiB  
Article
The Role of Suggestions and Tips in Distorting a Third Party’s Decision
by Daniel Parra
Games 2020, 11(2), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g11020023 - 19 May 2020
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 4037
Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of suggestive messages and tipping on a third party’s judgment. The experimental design uses a model with three players, wherein two players (A and B) create a joint project, and the third player (C) decides how to [...] Read more.
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of suggestive messages and tipping on a third party’s judgment. The experimental design uses a model with three players, wherein two players (A and B) create a joint project, and the third player (C) decides how to divide the project’s earnings between the first two players. In two treatments, player B has an opportunity to influence player C’s decision via a numeric message or an ex-post tip. The main finding of this paper is that giving player B the option to suggest a specific amount to the allocator does not increase his share. In contrast, when player C knows that player B can send him a tip, the share awarded to player B increases. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experiments on Dishonesty in Strategic Interactions)
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