Previous Issue
Volume 15, October
 
 

Games, Volume 15, Issue 6 (December 2024) – 4 articles

  • Issues are regarded as officially published after their release is announced to the table of contents alert mailing list.
  • You may sign up for e-mail alerts to receive table of contents of newly released issues.
  • PDF is the official format for papers published in both, html and pdf forms. To view the papers in pdf format, click on the "PDF Full-text" link, and use the free Adobe Reader to open them.
Order results
Result details
Section
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:
6 pages, 243 KiB  
Article
Evasion Differential Games in the Space of Square Summable Sequences
by Bekhzod Aminov and Marks Ruziboev
Games 2024, 15(6), 38; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15060038 - 19 Nov 2024
Viewed by 200
Abstract
In this article, we consider simple-motion pursuit–evasion differential games in the Hilbert space of square summable sequences. We show that when the players have the same dynamic capabilities, evasion is possible under some assumptions about the initial positions of the players. Full article
9 pages, 221 KiB  
Article
On Remoteness Functions of k-NIM with k + 1 Piles in Normal and in Misère Versions
by Vladimir Gurvich, Vladislav Maximchuk, Georgy Miheenkov and Mariya Naumova
Games 2024, 15(6), 37; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15060037 - 13 Nov 2024
Viewed by 604
Abstract
Given integer n and k such that 0<kn and n piles of stones, two players alternate turns. On each move, a player is allowed to choose any k piles and remove exactly one stone from each. The player who [...] Read more.
Given integer n and k such that 0<kn and n piles of stones, two players alternate turns. On each move, a player is allowed to choose any k piles and remove exactly one stone from each. The player who has to move but cannot is the loser in the normal version of the game and (s)he is the winner in the misère version. Cases k=1 and k=n are trivial. For k=2, the game was solved for n6. For n4, the Sprague–Grundy function was efficiently computed (for both versions). For n=5,6, a polynomial algorithm computing P-positions was obtained for the normal version. Then, for the case k=n1, a very simple explicit rule that determines the Smith remoteness function was found for the normal version of the game: the player who has to move keeps a pile with the minimum even number of stones; if all piles have an odd number of stones, then (s)he keeps a maximum one, while the n1 remaining piles are reduced by one stone each in accordance with the rules of the game. Computations show that the same rule works efficiently for the misère version too. The exceptions are sparse. We list some. Denote a position by x=(x1,,xn). Due to symmetry, we can assume wlog that x1xn. Our computations partition all exceptions into the following three families: x1 is even, x1=1, and odd x13. In all three cases, we suggest formulas covering all found exceptions, but it is not proven that there are no others. Full article
12 pages, 266 KiB  
Article
Monopoly and Quality Omission
by Amit Gayer
Games 2024, 15(6), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15060036 - 29 Oct 2024
Viewed by 487
Abstract
This study delves into a market characterized by vertical product differentiation. Product qualities are represented on a one-dimensional interval scale. The research investigates the equilibrium within a monopoly scenario, considering a production cost that is strictly convex. The monopoly offers a strategy comprising [...] Read more.
This study delves into a market characterized by vertical product differentiation. Product qualities are represented on a one-dimensional interval scale. The research investigates the equilibrium within a monopoly scenario, considering a production cost that is strictly convex. The monopoly offers a strategy comprising various quality–price combinations, with consumer choices determining profits. The analysis involves a comparison between two analogous models: one with a continuous range of consumers and the other with a finite number of consumers. The study explores disparities in the potential for market failure between these two settings. Notably, numerical illustrations underscore these divergences in both market contexts. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Game Theory to Industrial Organization)
18 pages, 740 KiB  
Article
On Isaac’s War Game of Attrition and Attack Using Dynamic Programming Approach
by Benghebrid Safa, Bouremani Touffik and Benterki Djamel
Games 2024, 15(6), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/g15060035 - 24 Oct 2024
Viewed by 883
Abstract
In this study, we use the dynamic programming method introduced by Mirică (2004) to solve the well-known war game of attrition and attack as formulated by Isaacs (1965). By using this modern approach, we extend the classical framework to explore optimal strategies within [...] Read more.
In this study, we use the dynamic programming method introduced by Mirică (2004) to solve the well-known war game of attrition and attack as formulated by Isaacs (1965). By using this modern approach, we extend the classical framework to explore optimal strategies within the differential game setting, offering a complete, comprehensive and theoretically robust solution. Additionally, the study identifies and analyzes feedback strategies, which represent a significant advancement over other strategy types in game theory. These strategies dynamically adapt to the evolving state of the system, providing more robust solutions for real-time decision-making in conflict scenarios. This novel contribution enhances the application of game theory, particularly in the context of warfare models, and illustrates the practical advantages of incorporating feedback mechanisms into strategic decision-making. The admissible feedback strategies and the corresponding value function are constructed through a refined application of Cauchy’s Method of characteristics for stratified Hamilton–Jacobi equations. Their optimality is proved using a suitable Elementary Verification Theorem for the associated value function as an argument for sufficient optimality conditions. Full article
Show Figures

Figure 1

Previous Issue
Back to TopTop