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2 pages, 151 KiB

Open AccessEditorial

A Preface for the Special Issue “Economics of Conflict and Terrorism”

by João Ricardo Faria and Daniel Arce

Games 2022, 13(2), 29; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13020029 - 1 Apr 2022

Viewed by 1922

Abstract

The current Special Issue presents an interesting collection of seven articles that expand the existing literature on the subjects of terrorism and conflict [...] Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Conflict and Terrorism)

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12 pages, 1729 KiB

Open AccessEditor’s ChoiceArticle

Conflicts with Momentum

by James W. Boudreau, Timothy Mathews, Shane D. Sanders and Aniruddha Bagchi

Games 2022, 13(1), 12; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010012 - 19 Jan 2022

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 3213

Abstract

Take the fort, then take the city. In a two-stage, two-party contest, victory in the initial stage can provide an advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a [...] Read more.

Take the fort, then take the city. In a two-stage, two-party contest, victory in the initial stage can provide an advantage in the final stage. We examine such momentum in conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid a Pyrrhic victory. Our main finding is that although the elasticity of effort—which we allow to vary between the two stages—does impact the contestants’ effort levels, it has no bearing on the endogenously determined value of momentum itself. Further, rent dissipation in the two-stage conflict is equal across party whether or not an individual obtains first-stage momentum. Thus, momentum helps a player solely by enhancing marginal ability for victory in the second-stage contest. It does not, however, change the player’s net calculus of second-stage contest spending. Such contestable advantage is also found to be more rent-dissipative than innate/uncontestable advantage. Therefore, Pyrrhic victories should be more common for contests with an intermediate stage or stages in which advantages can be earned, ceteris paribus. While intermediate targets appear as useful conflict benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected contest rents. This additional rent-dissipative toll exists even for backward-inductive equilibrium behavior in a complete information setting. Whereas the quagmire theory suggests parties can become involved in problematic conflicts due to incomplete information, the present paper finds that the setting of conflict—namely, contestable intermediate advantage—can alternatively generate rent-dissipative tolls. Similarly, contestable advantage can lead parties to optimally forego contest participation (i.e., if conflict parameters do not meet the participation constraint). This is in contrast to a one-stage simultaneous contest with second-stage parametric values of the present contest. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Conflict and Terrorism)

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16 pages, 1419 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Self-Enforcing Collective Counterterror Retaliation

by Andre Rossi de Oliveira and Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva

Games 2022, 13(1), 1; https://doi.org/10.3390/g13010001 - 21 Dec 2021

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2352

Abstract

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is [...] Read more.

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target of a terrorist attack finds it desirable to be a member of the international counterterror coalition, holding the choices of all other nations as given. The incentives to join the coalition are the group-specific benefits from retaliation enjoyed by each coalition member, the relatively lower spillover benefit from retaliation enjoyed by each stand-alone nation, and the inability of pre-emptive measures to avert terrorist attacks. The disincentive to join is the anticipated backlash from retaliation, which targets coalition members only. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Conflict and Terrorism)

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15 pages, 1868 KiB

Open AccessEditor’s ChoiceArticle

The Hybridisation of Conflict: A Prospect Theoretic Analysis

by Pieter Balcaen, Cind Du Bois and Caroline Buts

Games 2021, 12(4), 81; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12040081 - 26 Oct 2021

Cited by 4 | Viewed by 3583

Abstract

Revisionist actors are increasingly operationalising a broad number of non-violent threats in their quest to change the status quo, popularly described as hybrid conflict. From a defensive point of view, this proliferation of threats compels nations to make difficult choices in terms of [...] Read more.

Revisionist actors are increasingly operationalising a broad number of non-violent threats in their quest to change the status quo, popularly described as hybrid conflict. From a defensive point of view, this proliferation of threats compels nations to make difficult choices in terms of force posture and composition. We examine the choice process associated with this contemporary form of state competition by modelling the interactions between two actors, i.e., a defender and a challenger. As these choices are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, we study the choice from the framework of prospect theory. This behavioural–economic perspective indicates that the defender will give a higher weight and a higher subjective value to conventional threats, inducing a higher vulnerability in the domain of hybrid deterrence. As future conflict will increasingly involve choice dilemmas, we must balance threats according to their probability of occurrence and their consequences. This article raises awareness regarding our cognitive biases when making these choices. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Conflict and Terrorism)

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20 pages, 1014 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Validating Game-Theoretic Models of Terrorism: Insights from Machine Learning

by James T. Bang, Atin Basuchoudhary and Aniruddha Mitra

Games 2021, 12(3), 54; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12030054 - 30 Jun 2021

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3799

Abstract

There are many competing game-theoretic analyses of terrorism. Most of these models suggest nonlinear relationships between terror attacks and some variable of interest. However, to date, there have been very few attempts to empirically sift between competing models of terrorism or identify nonlinear [...] Read more.

There are many competing game-theoretic analyses of terrorism. Most of these models suggest nonlinear relationships between terror attacks and some variable of interest. However, to date, there have been very few attempts to empirically sift between competing models of terrorism or identify nonlinear patterns. We suggest that machine learning can be an effective way of undertaking both. This feature can help build more salient game-theoretic models to help us understand and prevent terrorism. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Conflict and Terrorism)

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11 pages, 322 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Algorithm for Computing Approximate Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Application to Continuous Blotto

by Sam Ganzfried

Games 2021, 12(2), 47; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020047 - 1 Jun 2021

Cited by 7 | Viewed by 4002

Abstract

Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games—in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite—is far more challenging. Nonetheless, many real-world domains have continuous action spaces, e.g., where actions [...] Read more.

Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games—in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite—is far more challenging. Nonetheless, many real-world domains have continuous action spaces, e.g., where actions refer to an amount of time, money, or other resource that is naturally modeled as being real-valued as opposed to integral. We present a new algorithm for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies in continuous games. In addition to two-player zero-sum games, our algorithm also applies to multiplayer games and games with imperfect information. We experiment with our algorithm on a continuous imperfect-information Blotto game, in which two players distribute resources over multiple battlefields. Blotto games have frequently been used to model national security scenarios and have also been applied to electoral competition and auction theory. Experiments show that our algorithm is able to quickly compute close approximations of Nash equilibrium strategies for this game. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Conflict and Terrorism)

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11 pages, 300 KiB

Open AccessArticle

The Path of Terror Attacks

by João Ricardo Faria and Daniel Arce

Games 2021, 12(2), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12020035 - 13 Apr 2021

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2533

Abstract

This paper derives a dynamic path of ongoing terror attacks as a function of terrorists’ capacity and a target government’s counterterror capacity. The analysis provides several novel insights and characterizations. First, the effect of counterterror policy is limited. Second, proactive counterterror policy affects [...] Read more.

This paper derives a dynamic path of ongoing terror attacks as a function of terrorists’ capacity and a target government’s counterterror capacity. The analysis provides several novel insights and characterizations. First, the effect of counterterror policy is limited. Second, proactive counterterror policy affects the depreciation (fatigue) of terrorists’ capacity, and defensive counterterror policy limits the worst-case scenario. Third, fluctuations in the time path of attacks are a function of terrorists’ time preferences and adjustment costs of changing tactics, which are policy invariant. Indeed, in our model, the oscillations of terror attacks occur irrespective of the government’s counterterror stance. Fourth, collective action inefficiencies associated with the underprovision of proactive counterterror policies and overprovision of defensive ones are further exacerbated by our finding that proactive counterterror policy is the more effective of the two. Hence, the more effective policy is underprovided. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Conflict and Terrorism)

18 pages, 353 KiB

Open AccessArticle

EU Demand for Defense, 1990–2019: A Strategic Spatial Approach

by Justin George and Todd Sandler

Games 2021, 12(1), 13; https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010013 - 1 Feb 2021

Cited by 17 | Viewed by 2904

Abstract

For 1990–2019, this study presents two-step GMM estimates of EU members’ demands for defense spending based on alternative spatial-weight matrices. In particular, EU spatial connectivity is tied to EU membership status, members’ contiguity, contiguity and power projection, inverse distance, and arms trade. At [...] Read more.

For 1990–2019, this study presents two-step GMM estimates of EU members’ demands for defense spending based on alternative spatial-weight matrices. In particular, EU spatial connectivity is tied to EU membership status, members’ contiguity, contiguity and power projection, inverse distance, and arms trade. At a Nash equilibrium, our EU demand equations are derived explicitly from a spatially based game-theoretical model of alliances. Myriad spatial linkages among EU members provide a robust free-riding finding, which differs from the spatial and non-spatial literature on EU defense spending. Even though the EU applies common trade policies and allows for unrestricted labor movement among members, members’ defense responses adhered to those of a defense alliance. Moreover, EU defense spending exhibits positive responses to GDP and transnational terrorist attacks, and a negative response to population. During the sample period, EU members did not view Russia as a military threat. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economics of Conflict and Terrorism)

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