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Review

Environmental Policy vs. the Reality of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Top Emitting Countries

by
Nerea Portillo Juan
1,*,
Vicente Negro Valdecantos
1,*,
Javier Olalde Rodríguez
1 and
Gregorio Iglesias
2
1
Environment, Coast and Ocean Research Laboratory, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Campus Ciudad Universitaria, Calle del Profesor Aranguren 3, 28040 Madrid, Spain
2
Civil Engineering Department, University College Cork, College Road, T12 K8AF Cork, Ireland
*
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Energies 2024, 17(22), 5705; https://doi.org/10.3390/en17225705
Submission received: 10 October 2024 / Revised: 5 November 2024 / Accepted: 12 November 2024 / Published: 14 November 2024
(This article belongs to the Collection Feature Papers in Energy, Environment and Well-Being)
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Abstract

:
The 21st century climate crisis has been compounded by the COVID-19 health crisis and the Russian war. What at first appeared to be an opportunity to move towards sustainable growth and development has turned into the opposite. In this context, it seems necessary to pause and analyze what countries are doing and where they are heading in order to ensure that their environmental efforts are not in vain. This article analyzes the environmental policies of the seven countries emitting the most GHGs from 1990 to the present day and compares them with the reality of their emissions. These behaviors are extrapolated into the future and, finally, conclusions are drawn as to which countries are not fully living up to their commitments, which have implemented the most effective measures, and where particular attention needs to be directed for maximum efficiency in decarbonizing the energy mix.

1. Introduction

In 1992, the United Nations recognized climate change as a problem for the first time [1]. Since then, most countries have developed, to a greater or lesser extent, different policies and measures to cut their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. A total of twenty-six climate change conferences have taken place and two big international agreements have been adopted: the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
The Kyoto Protocol (1997) was the first international agreement in which nations committed to reducing their emissions by 5%, taking 1990 as the base year [2]. The Kyoto Protocol distinguished between developed countries, which were annexed countries with real commitments, and developing countries, which did not have quantified commitments. In 2012, the Kyoto Protocol was extended to 2020 with the Doha Amendment, whereby nations took on more ambitious targets and pledged to reduce their emissions by 18% for 2020 [3].
Finally, the most recent effort of world leaders to face climate change was the Paris Accord, which came into effect in 2016 and abandoned the distinction between developed and developing countries. Its main objective was to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 °C [4].
Despite international agreements, global emissions rose by 68% between 1990 and 2019 [5]. While the Kyoto Protocol achieved its goal—annexed countries reduced their emissions by 72%—overall global emissions continued to rise. This was largely due to a shift in responsibility: the annexed countries from the Kyoto Protocol accounted for 68% of global emissions in 1990 but only 11% by 2019 [6].
A similar situation is unfolding with the Paris Agreement. Evidence suggests that limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5 °C is becoming increasingly unattainable. The climate crisis has been compounded by the COVID-19 health crisis and the Russian war conflict. The global pandemic led to a sudden reduction in GHG emissions and air pollutants [7]. A 17% reduction in daily CO2 emissions was observed in April 2020 compared to 2019 levels [8]. However, this reduction in emissions has not been sustained in the long term, and the International Energy Agency (IEA) claims that CO2 emissions from energy combustion and industrial processes rebounded in 2021 to reach their highest ever annual level. Fossil fuel consumption has increased, with the largest annual increase in emissions associated with energy production in 2021. The largest increase in CO2 has been in the power and heat production sector, and China is almost entirely responsible for this increase [9]. What appeared to be an opportunity to move towards sustainable development and towards the 2050 horizon has turned out to be the opposite. In addition, with the outbreak of the Russian war, this situation has been further aggravated, as countries such as those in the European Union dependent on Russian gas have switched back to fossil fuels, leading to an increase in emissions associated with coal.
In this context, it is essential to analyze the current state of the climate crisis and assess where countries are heading. This article builds on the analysis by Portillo et al. (2022) [6]. Their research highlighted that nearly 50% of global GHG emissions are produced by China and the USA. However, when they examined the increase in emissions, they found that China, India, and Iran had seen the most significant growth in emissions. Iran, for instance, rose from the 23rd to the 7th largest emitter, with a 336% increase, while India’s emissions grew by 400%.
Despite these trends, environmental policies and GHG emissions analyses often focus on China, the USA, and the EU27 + UK, frequently overlooking the critical roles of countries like India and Iran. Moreover, these nations are not only among the most energy-intensive, but have also undergone significant economic, industrial, and environmental transformations in recent years. This is why our analysis extends to the seven countries with the largest emissions: China, the USA, the EU27 + UK, India, Russia, Japan, and Iran, which together account for 70% of global GHG emissions. To obtain a comprehensive view of the global emissions landscape, it is essential to include countries like India and Iran, whose growing influence plays a pivotal role in shaping the current situation. Without considering their impact, we cannot fully grasp the dynamics of global emissions.
This paper reviews the environmental policies of these seven major emitters from 1990 to the present. It evaluates their commitments and actions, comparing pledges with actual emission trends to assess the effectiveness—and sincerity—of their policies. Finally, this study extrapolates these findings to future commitments, aiming to assess the likelihood of achieving global environmental targets.
To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to systematically compare the pledges of the top emitting countries against their real-world emissions. This offers a clearer understanding of the gap between what countries promise to do versus what they achieve. Additionally, this paper breaks new ground by including an in-depth analysis of Iran’s environmental role within the global context, comparing its contributions and policies to those of other leading emitters. This broader perspective contrasts with previous studies that typically focused solely on Iran’s domestic environmental policies.
Each country is examined in detail, with a thorough analysis of their respective environmental policies, helping to build a nuanced understanding of the global emissions landscape today. A dedicated section on Europe provides further granularity, analyzing the influence and role of individual European nations within the broader regional and global context.
Finally, based on our findings, we offer a set of recommended best practices aimed at closing the gap between commitments and actions. These recommendations are designed not only to contribute to the academic and scientific discourse, but also to provide practical, actionable insights for policymakers, political leaders, and key stakeholders. This study’s conclusions emphasize the urgent need for transparent, accountable, and evidence-based environmental strategies if the global community is to meet its long-term climate goals.

2. Review Methodology

The methods employed in this article can be divided into two distinct phases.
The first phase involved a comprehensive review of the state of the art, following the PRISMA methodology to ensure a systematic and transparent approach. The environmental policies of seven countries were closely examined, with a historical reconstruction of these policies undertaken to identify key developments and shifts. This analysis drew on a wide range of sources, including scientific articles, official country reports, policy communications, and other relevant documents. Most of the materials were retrieved from reputable databases such as Web of Science (WOS), Scopus, Google Scholar, and PubMed (accessed on 6 October 2024).
While official databases with political and environmental reports are available for Europe, the authors primarily relied on previous scientific papers to obtain policy information for the other countries analyzed. In addition, the United Nations has two books that present a general picture of the global environmental situation [1,10]. Table 1 summarizes all the specific sources and scientific papers used by the authors to gather data on environmental policies for these nations.
In the second phase, the focus shifted to an in-depth analysis of each country’s emissions data. For this, datasets and reports were sourced from the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), allowing for a thorough examination of emissions trends over time [77].
The final step in this phase involved comparing two realities: the actual emissions data and the environmental policy commitments and pledges made by these countries. By contrasting these two aspects, this study provides a clearer picture of the alignment—or lack thereof—between policy intentions and real-world outcomes, highlighting potential gaps and inconsistencies in environmental governance.

3. Results

The seven countries studied in this country account for 70% of global emissions. Therefore, their environmental policies and actions are key and analyzing them is necessary to tackle climate crisis. This section is divided into two parts: in the first part, historical environmental policies and commitments are presented, and in the second part, the reality of emissions is shown.

3.1. The Formulation of Environmental Policy

The policies and actions taken are divided into four groups: power industry, other industrial combustion, transport and cities, and others. These four categories were selected because they are the main four sectors that EDGAR proposes in its reports for quantifying CO2 emissions [5,78].
In this section, there are a total of seven subsections, corresponding to each of the countries. In each subsection, a general overview of the environmental policies of the country is presented. At the end of the section, a table with the detailed measures implemented by the countries as well as their achievements and promises is presented (Table 2).
  • China
China began addressing environmental issues through legislation in 2005, with the introduction of its 11th Five-Year Plan (FYP) for economic development (2006–2010). The 11th FYP set specific targets for energy savings and CO2 reduction [13]. Despite being one of the countries with the greatest potential for renewable energy development, prior to the 1990s, China’s use of renewable energies (REs) was primarily aimed at addressing agricultural fuel shortages. It was not until 2005 that more comprehensive policies and laws supporting renewable energy development started to be implemented [14].
The 12th FYP (2011–2015) marked a significant shift in China’s approach to energy and environmental policy. In addition to setting targets for reducing coal consumption, it introduced the Energy Development Strategy Action Plan, which prioritized transitioning away from coal. This plan also addressed the growing concerns over atmospheric pollution and the dominance of energy-intensive industries [13].
With the 13th FYP (2016–2020), China took a more long-term view by setting ambitious emissions reduction and energy targets for 2030. By 2015, China had become the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal, with fossil fuels accounting for about 86% of its energy production and 89% of its consumption [12].
Recognizing the need for a structural shift, the Chinese government committed in the 13th FYP to significantly increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption. This period saw a stronger focus on REs; China improved their energy efficiency and has implemented efforts to reduce the country’s reliance on coal [79].
2.
USA
The United States and China together account for nearly half of global CO2 emissions. However, unlike China, the US has a longer history of environmental policy, dating back to 1963 with the passage of the Clean Air Act. This legislation marked the first major effort by the US government to regulate air pollution. In 1992, the US developed its first energy policy in response to growing concerns about climate change.
Since then, the US government has implemented a series of plans and strategies aimed at reducing emissions and promoting sustainability. These initiatives have focused on expanding REs, fostering a circular economy, and supporting the electrification of transportation. Additionally, there has been a growing emphasis on sustainable building practices to improve energy efficiency and reduce the environmental footprint of the construction industry. These policies reflect the US’s ongoing commitment to addressing climate change. However, progress has been influenced by political shifts and varying levels of ambition across different administrations [24,80].
3.
EU27 + UK
The European Union (EU) has long been a global leader in environmental policy, with its efforts dating back to the 1990s. In 1995, the EU initiated legal frameworks to promote the development of renewable energy (RE), making it one of the first regions to prioritize RE as part of its environmental agenda. That same year, the EU published the Green Paper, which provided general guidance for the energy sector and set the stage for future policies aimed at sustainability and energy transformation [81].
A major turning point in the EU’s environmental policy came in 2019 with the launch of the European Green Deal, a strategy aimed at achieving net-zero GHG emissions by 2050. The Green Deal outlines a vision where economic growth is decoupled from resource use, promoting sustainability without compromising development [28,44]. This long-term approach has been key to the EU’s success in driving environmental progress.
The EU’s commitment to sustainability is further reflected in its Europe 2020 Strategy, launched in 2010, which set specific targets for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth. Building on this, the EU’s current targets focus on achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, along with a reduction of 80–95% in emissions compared to 1990 levels [45]. Their latest targets are to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and to reduce emissions by 80–95% with respect to 1990 levels [17].
4.
India
One of India’s longstanding challenges has been ensuring reliable energy supply. In 2001, approximately 44% of Indian households lacked access to electricity [62]. With around 70% of the country’s GHG emissions linked to energy production and consumption [58], addressing energy access and sustainability has been critical. Despite these challenges, India has become one of the leading nations in investing in RE and developing technologies to harness its potential [61].
As a result, a significant portion of India’s environmental policies focuses on transforming the energy sector. The country’s ambitious goals include increasing the share of renewables in its energy mix, enhancing energy efficiency, and reducing dependence on fossil fuels. India’s commitment to expanding RE capacity, particularly solar and wind power, reflects its strategy to meet growing energy demands while mitigating climate impacts. This energy-centered approach is key to India’s broader environmental and climate policy framework, aiming for a balance between economic development and environmental sustainability.
5.
Russia
Russia is one of the world’s largest producers of oil and gas, with the energy sector playing a crucial role in its economy. Approximately 27% of Russia’s GDP, 43% of its budget revenues, and 63% of the value of its exports are tied to energy production and exports [82]. In addition, Russia has the world’s largest district heating industry, further emphasizing its dependence on the energy sector. As a result, similar to India, much of Russia’s environmental policy is concentrated on energy-related issues.
However, unlike many other major economies, Russia’s environmental policies lack clear, quantitative climate change targets or definitive commitments to reducing GHG emissions [83]. This has raised concerns about the country’s long-term strategy for tackling climate change.
In terms of renewable energy development, Russia faced significant challenges during the 1990s due to the post-Soviet economic recession, which hindered investment in renewable energy infrastructure. Despite these early setbacks, Russia has since emerged as a major producer of REs, thanks to its abundant natural resources, including hydropower, biomass, and wind potential [19]. Nonetheless, the renewable energy sector still represents a relatively small portion of Russia’s overall energy mix, with fossil fuels continuing to dominate. This dynamic reflects the country’s complex relationship between energy production, economic dependency, and environmental policy.
6.
Japan
Japan is a global leader in RE development and has been implementing energy plans since 1997. In 2003, Japan established a Renewable Portfolio Standard to promote the use of renewable energy in electricity generation [14]. However, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster significantly impacted the country’s energy strategy. Due to the Fukushima disaster, Japan drastically reduced its reliance on nuclear power, and fossil fuels became the primary sources of electricity generation [63]. This shift led to an increase in carbon emissions, highlighting the challenges Japan faces in balancing energy security, environmental sustainability, and public safety.
In addition to its focus on RE, Japan has a robust policy framework for promoting the circular economy (CE), with strong initiatives in recycling and waste management [65]. Japan’s circular economy policies are designed to reduce waste, enhance resource efficiency, and minimize environmental impact. These efforts align with the country’s broader goals of sustainable development, emphasizing innovation in both energy and resource management. Despite the challenges posed by the Fukushima disaster, Japan continues to lead in renewable energy innovation and CE practices, positioning itself as a key player in global environmental policy.
7.
Iran
Iran’s climate policy is relatively underdeveloped, with most of its legislation focusing primarily on economic growth rather than environmental or climate goals. A critical issue for Iran is its energy system, which is characterized by its exceptionally high levels of consumption and intensity. Per capita energy consumption in Iran is 68% higher than the global average [72,84].
The Iranian energy system is heavily reliant on fossil fuels, which account for over 97% of its energy mix. This reliance on fossil fuels is exacerbated by substantial energy subsidies that contribute to excessive consumption and inefficiencies. The Iranian government has attempted to address this problem through subsidy reforms, but these efforts have largely been unsuccessful and, in some cases, have exacerbated the situation rather than alleviating it [74,76].
The lack of effective climate policy and the difficulties in reforming the energy subsidy system highlight the significant challenges Iran faces in transitioning to a more sustainable energy framework. As a result, the country continues to grapple with high energy consumption levels and environmental impacts, underscoring the need for more targeted climate and energy policies.

3.2. The Reality of Environmental Policy

In this section, the emissions and emissions intensity of the seven top emitting countries in 1990, 2005, 2019, and 2020, and their variation, are presented in Table 3 and Table 4, respectively. The data are taken from EDGAR reports [5,78]. We use 1990 because it is the base of all international agreements, 2005 because it is taken as the reference year in many environmental policies, and 2019 and 2020 to see the effect of COVID-19 on CO2 emissions, and because this is when the Kyoto Protocol finished.
Only the EU presents a clearly decreasing trend in total emissions. This decline is likely a result of the strong environmental policies and regulatory frameworks that have been implemented across EU member states, including stringent emissions targets, the expansion of renewable energy sources, and carbon reduction initiatives like the European Green Deal.
In contrast, countries such as China, India, and Iran have seen significant increases in their emissions. This rise can be attributed to rapid economic growth and industrialization in these regions, which inevitably lead to higher energy consumption, predominantly from fossil fuels. China’s massive manufacturing sector and ongoing urbanization, India’s expanding infrastructure and energy needs, and Iran’s industrial activities are all major contributors to these increases. While these countries are advancing economically, this growth often comes with the environmental cost of rising carbon emissions, underscoring the complex balance between economic development and environmental sustainability.
The divergent trends between the EU and countries like China, India, and Iran underscore significant global disparities in emission patterns. Developed regions such as the USA and EU27 + UK tend to have greater financial capacity and technological infrastructure to invest in clean energy technologies, allowing them to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation. In contrast, rapidly developing nations like China, India, and Iran have historically relied heavily on fossil fuels to drive their economic expansion. This dependence on carbon-intensive energy sources reflects the developmental challenges these countries face, where economic growth and improved living standards often require increased energy consumption and, consequently, higher emissions.
These disparities further emphasize the critical need for international cooperation and the development of tailored climate policies. Effective strategies must consider both global climate goals and the unique economic development needs of individual countries. Developed nations, with their established low-carbon growth models, must support developing economies by providing technological and financial assistance, helping them transition to cleaner energy systems without compromising their development.
Regarding emissions intensity, conclusions are in the same line. All countries except Iran present a clearly decreasing trend. This may be related to the Environmental Kuznets Curve theory, which states that the emissions of CO2 follow an inverted U-shape with economic growth [52,85]. According to this theory, as economies develop and transition from industrial to post-industrial stages, emissions intensity tends to decrease. This is because developed economies, characterized by advanced technology and service-oriented industries, generally have lower emissions relative to their economic output. Their economic activities are less reliant on energy-intensive processes compared to developing economies, leading to improved efficiency and reduced emissions per unit of GDP.
In contrast, Iran’s emissions intensity does not follow this trend, reflecting the ongoing challenges associated with its energy system and economic structure. Its high reliance on fossil fuels and energy subsidies contributes to sustained high emissions intensity, indicating a need for more substantial policy reforms and energy diversification to align with global trends in emissions reduction.
The impact of the Russian war and COVID-19 should also be analyzed. Table 5 and Table 6 show the results obtained [77].
By analyzing the data presented in the tables, we can observe that the COVID-19 pandemic had a temporary impact on global emissions, with all major emitters—except China—either reducing or maintaining their levels of emissions during the pandemic-induced economic slowdown. This exception highlights China’s continued reliance on industrial activity and fossil fuels, even in a global downturn, which contrasts with the more moderate emissions trends in other parts of the world.
From 2020 to 2022, most countries experienced an increase in their CO2 emissions. This can largely be attributed to the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. As global economies began to recover and restrictions were lifted, transportation systems resumed normal operations, and both economic and social activities returned to pre-pandemic levels. This resurgence in activity inevitably led to a rise in energy consumption, particularly from fossil fuels, resulting in higher carbon emissions during this period.
When examining the changes in CO2 emissions between 2022 and 2023, the global landscape was further influenced by the geopolitical tensions of the Russian–Ukrainian war. Interestingly, despite the widespread disruptions caused by the conflict, total global emissions remained relatively stable overall. However, one notable outlier is India, which recorded a significant increase in emissions during this period. India’s rapid industrial growth and expanding energy demands, driven by its growing population and economy, likely contributed to this rise, despite global efforts to transition to cleaner energy sources.
A key point that warrants further attention is emission intensity relative to GDP. Most countries succeeded in reducing their emission intensity between 2022 and 2023. However, Russia stands as an exception to this trend, where the ongoing war has likely hindered efforts to improve efficiency and reduce emissions. The war has disrupted supply chains, led to increased military operations, and caused economic instability, all of which may have contributed to Russia’s higher emission intensity during this period.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the evolution of emissions and emissions intensity of the 7 top emitting countries from 1990 to 2021.
To enable a more precise comparison of environmental policy intensity across countries, we quantified the performance of each nation using the Environmental Performance Index (EPI), developed by Yale University and Columbia University [86]. This index provides a standardized score on a 0–100 scale, where higher values indicate stronger environmental performance. The use of the EPI allows us to construct a clearer picture of each country’s environmental efforts in the context of the global landscape (Table 7).
The highest EPI scores were achieved by the EU27 + UK, followed closely by Japan and the USA, highlighting these regions’ comparatively stronger environmental policies and performance. Conversely, China and India received the lowest EPI scores among the selected countries, indicating greater challenges in their environmental policy frameworks and implementation.

4. Discussion

Despite the environmental measures implemented by various countries, there remains a significant gap between actual emissions and the targets and pledges set by global leaders. This section aims to compare these two aspects, highlighting the discrepancies between ambitious climate goals and real-world emissions outcomes. A summary of this comparison is provided in Table 8, where fulfilled promises are highlighted in green and unmet targets are marked in red. This visual representation allows for a clear understanding of where progress aligns with pledges and where challenges persist.
It is essential to interpret these results in the context of each country’s economic and developmental status. Developed nations, such as those in the EU, or the US, generally face fewer obstacles in implementing and maintaining environmental policies, thanks to their established economies, robust institutional frameworks, and advanced technological capabilities. In contrast, countries still developing these systems, such as Iran, may encounter more significant challenges in meeting environmental commitments due to limited resources, evolving regulatory frameworks, and competing economic priorities.
Additionally, since the EU consists of various countries and its member states have changed over the period studied, which may influence the results, the authors deemed it necessary to include a dedicated subsection on the matter (Section 4.1). This section provides a deeper analysis of the environmental policies of the EU27 + UK, distinguishing between individual countries and reviewing all relevant factors that may impact the statistics and outcomes.
China
China has focused a significant portion of its environmental policies on the power sector, with a primary emphasis on reducing emissions intensity. However, China has primarily fulfilled its pledges related to emissions intensity, rather than achieving broader emissions reduction goals. Emissions intensity is influenced by two main variables: total emissions and the level of production. While China has succeeded in reducing its emissions intensity, this does not necessarily indicate that effective environmental measures have been implemented. In fact, China’s total emissions have continued to rise.
As countries reach a certain level of technological and industrial development, emissions per unit of GDP tend to decrease with relatively minimal additional effort. Although China has made progress in improving its emissions intensity, this advancement does not reflect a comprehensive or aggressive approach to environmental policy. With China responsible for over 30% of global emissions, the effectiveness of climate efforts by other nations could be significantly undermined if China does not escalate its climate actions.
A notable issue with China’s climate policy is its short-term focus. Once short-term objectives are met, there is often insufficient follow-up or sustained effort to build on those achievements. The vast size and diversity of the country further complicate the situation, as broad national measures may not be well suited to the specific needs of its diverse provinces. Local governments often make limited efforts to adapt general climate guidelines to local conditions, and many small companies and industries still operate with inefficient energy systems. Addressing these challenges is crucial for China to enhance the effectiveness of its environmental policies.
USA
The US, along with China, stands as one of the world’s largest emitters of GHGs. However, the environmental measures taken by the US have been both more assertive and effective in certain areas. It has successfully reduced both total emissions and emissions intensity and has made notable strides in supporting the electrification of transportation. Despite these advancements, the US faces several challenges in its environmental policy development. One major issue is the influence of political and business lobbies with conflicting interests [87]. These groups advocate for policies that may hinder progress on climate goals, creating obstacles to implementing effective environmental measures.
Another challenge is the political polarization surrounding environmental issues. The US is home to some of the most radical and opposing views on climate change, which can obstruct the passage and enforcement of effective policies. This polarization often results in a lack of cohesive action and delays in addressing environmental challenges.
Additionally, public awareness and engagement vary widely across states. The decentralized nature of the US means that individual states have significant autonomy in shaping and implementing environmental policies. States like California have developed some of the most progressive and robust environmental policies in the nation. In contrast, other states lag behind, which can impede overall national progress on climate change.
These factors collectively highlight the complexity of advancing environmental policies in the US. Addressing political and business influences, bridging divides on climate issues, and fostering greater public awareness and state-level consistency are crucial for enhancing the effectiveness of US environmental efforts and achieving more substantial progress in combating climate change.
EU27 + UK
The European Union (EU) is widely regarded as a leading benchmark in environmental policy. Since 1990, it has successfully reduced its emissions by 41%, and as early as 2005, renewable energies accounted for 10.2% of its energy supply [27]. The EU’s environmental policies are considered among the most effective globally, reflecting its commitment to sustainability and climate action.
However, the effectiveness of the EU’s ambitious environmental measures is contingent upon the global community’s collective efforts. If other major emitting countries do not adopt similarly robust environmental policies, the progress made by the EU could be undermined. The interconnected nature of global emissions means that significant reductions in one region can be compromised by insufficient action elsewhere.
Within the EU itself, there are notable disparities. Some member states, particularly those with advanced technology sectors and robust green economies, have made significant strides in environmental sustainability. In contrast, other countries, often in Eastern Europe, face greater challenges due to less-developed technologies and limited funding. These disparities can affect the overall coherence and effectiveness of the EU’s environmental policies, as varying levels of progress among member states can create imbalances in achieving collective climate goals.
To ensure that the EU’s environmental efforts have a meaningful impact, it is essential to address these internal disparities through targeted investment and support for less advanced member states. Additionally, continued diplomatic efforts are needed to encourage other major emitting countries to enhance their environmental commitments, thereby fostering a more unified and effective global approach to climate change.
India
Along with China, India is one of the countries that has seen the most significant increase in emissions since 1990. Both nations were developing economies at the start of this period, and their rapid economic and industrial growth over the years has driven this rise in emissions. Similar to China, India’s environmental policies have largely focused on reducing emissions intensity. This metric is particularly relevant for developing economies because it can be improved with relatively less effort compared to total emissions.
India possesses substantial potential for RE development due to its abundant natural resources. However, a major challenge facing the country is the need to address issues of poverty and energy access. A large portion of India’s population still lacks reliable access to electricity, which complicates efforts to fully harness its renewable energy potential.
To effectively exploit its renewable energy capacity, India must first modernize its energy infrastructure and technology. This modernization is crucial for improving energy efficiency and expanding access to clean energy across the entire population. Addressing these foundational issues will be key to enabling India to transition to a more sustainable energy system and make meaningful progress in reducing overall emissions.
Russia
Although Russia has seen a reduction in emissions, this decrease is often attributed more to economic decline than to robust environmental policies. The country lacks strong quantitative environmental measures, which limits the effectiveness of its climate efforts. As a major oil producer, Russia’s energy sector is heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with natural gas playing a dominant role in its energy market.
Despite investing in REs, Russia’s utilization of solar and wind power remains significantly below the global average. While the world average for solar and wind power use is around 10%, Russia’s contribution from these sources is a mere 0.2% [88]. This stark contrast underscores the gap between Russia’s investment in REs and their actual deployment and use.
Additionally, Russia continues to exhibit high levels of energy intensity, despite its commitments to reducing it. This high energy intensity reflects the inefficiencies within its energy system and highlights the need for more effective policies and technological advancements to improve energy efficiency and further reduce emissions. Overall, while Russia has made some progress, significant challenges remain in aligning its environmental policies with global standards and achieving meaningful reductions in both emissions and energy intensity.
Japan
Japan has made notable progress in reducing both its emissions and emissions intensity. The country has also made significant efforts to develop RE, becoming a leading example in this sector, particularly with its advanced technologies in ocean energy. Japan’s innovations in harnessing ocean power set it apart from many other nations.
Despite these advancements, Japan remains heavily dependent on energy imports and continues to consume substantial amounts of coal and oil. This reliance on fossil fuels poses a challenge to achieving long-term sustainability and reducing overall emissions. Additionally, there is room for improvement in terms of energy efficiency in Japan. Enhancing energy efficiency across various sectors is crucial for further reducing energy consumption and emissions, and for moving toward a more sustainable energy system.
Overall, while Japan’s achievements in emissions reduction and RE development are commendable, addressing its energy dependence and improving efficiency are essential steps for achieving its long-term environmental and climate goals.
Iran
Iran has often received less attention in the scientific literature than other countries, despite being the seventh largest emitter of greenhouse gases. Since 1990, Iran’s emissions have surged by 237%, marking the third-largest increase among the countries studied, following China and India. Notably, Iran is the only country in this study that has seen an increase in emissions intensity, meaning emissions per unit of GDP have risen.
The Iranian government has shown little intention of implementing consistent environmental policies. With its emissions and GDP-related emissions both on an upward trajectory, Iran poses a potential threat to global efforts. Although its absolute emissions are not as high as those of China or the US, Iran’s growing emissions intensity and lack of proactive climate policies highlight its significant role in the fight against climate change.
Given Iran’s current trends and the potential for continued increases in emissions as it develops economically and technologically, the country’s impact on global climate goals should not be underestimated. Without significant policy changes and technological advancements, Iran’s emissions are likely to keep rising, further complicating international efforts to combat climate change.

4.1. Analysis of EU27 + UK

The EU27 and the UK consist of various countries that, while adhering to the same regulations, face distinct political, economic, and social circumstances. Additionally, the composition of the EU27 + UK has changed over the period under study, potentially affecting statistical outcomes. This section presents an in-depth analysis of these factors and their potential impact.

4.1.1. EU27 + UK Member Countries: Evolution from 1990 to Present

The history of the European Union dates back to 1951, when Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands established the European Coal and Steel Community. This was followed in 1957 by the creation of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community [89].
Subsequent expansions included Denmark, Ireland, and the UK joining in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. The major changes in the EU from 1990 to the present are summarized in Table 9.
It should be noted that, in 2020, the UK left the EU, but we have considered it in the statistics (EU27 + UK).
As shown in Table 9, the most significant change in the composition of the EU27 + UK occurred in 2004, with the addition of ten new member states from Eastern Europe. These countries generally had less-developed economies and lower levels of technology at the time, which, according to the Kuznets Curve theory, may have contributed to higher emissions. The Kuznets Curve suggests that GHG emissions follow an inverted U-shaped trajectory as economies develop. In the early stages of development, emissions rise alongside economic growth until they reach a peak. After this point, advancements in technology and increased wealth enable countries to reduce emissions while continuing to grow economically [34,52,85].
If we examine the emissions data for the EU27 + UK in 2005, the year following the incorporation of the ten new member states, we observe a 3.62% reduction in overall emissions and a 28.02% decrease in emissions per GDP. This suggests that, despite the addition of these new countries with less-developed economies, the EU as a whole made a concerted effort to implement and uphold environmental policies. Furthermore, a country-by-country analysis of GHG emissions, already conducted by the authors in [6] and thus not repeated here, shows that nearly all member states reduced their emissions. Notably, the countries that joined the EU in 2004, 2007, and 2013 were among those with the most significant reductions.

4.1.2. Industrial Development and Heavy Industry Concentration in EU Member States

Analyzing the patterns of industrial concentration is crucial for evaluating environmental policies and understanding the evolution of GHG emissions within countries. This is particularly relevant in the context of the EU, which comprises diverse member states with distinct industrial profiles. Traditionally, the countries with the most powerful industrial sectors have been Germany, France, and the UK [90]. However, in recent years, these nations have undergone significant deindustrialization, shifting their focus toward greener sectors, technology investments, and the promotion of renewable energy, largely driven by EU regulations and sustainability goals [91].
The incorporation of Eastern European countries into the EU has significantly influenced industrial dynamics, resulting in a substantial shift of heavy industry from Western to Eastern Europe. Many heavy industrial activities are now concentrated in these Eastern member states, which benefit from lower labor costs and favorable investment conditions. This shift has altered the industrial landscape of Europe, as Eastern Europe emerges as a hub for various traditional industries [92].
Despite this shift, certain sectors remain concentrated in Western Europe, such as automation and advanced manufacturing in Germany. However, the approach to industrial development in these countries has evolved markedly compared to three decades ago. Concepts such as innovation, sustainability, and the use of green fuels are now integral to their industrial strategies.
Moreover, the EU’s Green Deal and initiatives aimed at achieving climate neutrality by 2050 are encouraging industries to adopt cleaner production methods and invest in renewable energy sources. This regulatory framework not only fosters the growth of green technologies, but also reshapes the competitive landscape of traditional heavy industries [39,93].
However, it is important to note that many countries, responding to the pressures of these new policies, have begun relocating their industries to non-European countries where production costs are lower and environmental regulations are less strict. This trend must also be considered, and an analysis of this is presented in the next section.

4.1.3. Relocation of Industrial Activities

Relocation refers to the process by which companies and countries move their industrial activities, energy sectors, production facilities, and other operations to different countries. This strategic move is often driven by the pursuit of various advantages, such as reduced operational costs, fewer regulatory restrictions, access to cheaper labor, and proximity to new markets [94]. By relocating, businesses can enhance their competitiveness, increase profitability, and adapt to changing global economic conditions.
However, this phenomenon can lead to significant distortions in statistics related to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and environmental impacts. When industries relocate, the environmental burden may shift from one country to another, potentially masking the true global environmental impact. Consequently, it is crucial to consider and discuss the broader implications of industrial relocation, including its effects on environmental sustainability and the accuracy of environmental reporting.
However, relocation does not only have consequences for environmental statistics and policies. It is a complex and multifaceted issue that significantly impacts the entire production system, leading to the extension of supply chains and monopolization within industries [95].
Relocation can result in extended supply chains, which in turn heighten both complexity and vulnerability. With greater distances and more intricate logistics networks, companies face increased exposure to risks stemming from international conflicts, global crises, and political instability—factors that can disrupt the supply of essential resources like energy, food, and goods. The COVID-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine have underscored these vulnerabilities, leading many firms to reassess their global supply chain structures [96].
Moreover, relocation can contribute to industry monopolization. When large multinational corporations relocate their production facilities, they often consolidate their market power, making it difficult for smaller, local firms to compete. This can lead to reduced competition and increased market concentration, which may have negative implications for innovation and consumer choice.
This also significantly impacts employment in the host countries where industries are relocated. Local industries and commerce often struggle to compete with large multinational corporations, leading to the disappearance of smaller businesses and a loss of jobs. This phenomenon can exacerbate unemployment and economic instability in the affected regions [97].
Moreover, the relocation of industries affects land use and urbanization. The establishment of new industrial sites often leads to the conversion of agricultural or undeveloped land into industrial zones, contributing to urban sprawl and environmental degradation. This process can result in a loss of biodiversity, increased pollution, and changes in local ecosystems [98,99].
Within Europe, there has been a notable movement of industrial sectors from Western Europe to Eastern Europe. This shift is driven by the search for lower production costs and more favorable regulatory environments in Eastern European countries. As a result, GHG emissions statistics can become skewed. While Western European countries may report reduced emissions due to the relocation of heavy industries, Eastern European countries may experience an increase in emissions [100].
If we look globally, the pattern is similar. European industries have increasingly shifted their operations to developing regions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This global relocation is driven by the same factors: lower labor costs, fewer regulatory restrictions, and access to emerging markets. However, this shift can lead to significant environmental consequences. While Europe may benefit from reduced local emissions, the host countries often face increased pollution and environmental degradation [94,101].
Global relocation raises important questions about environmental and social justice and sustainability. It is crucial to implement policies that ensure the fair distribution of environmental responsibilities and benefits, promote sustainable industrial practices, and support the development of cleaner technologies in host countries.

5. Conclusions

Based on the information presented, a set of global best practices emerges that can be effectively implemented across all countries to combat climate change. It is crucial for nations that heavily rely on fossil fuels to renew their energy systems, as the energy sector is one of the largest contributors to GHG emissions. Therefore, efforts must be directed toward promoting renewable energy sources such as solar, wind, hydro, and geothermal. Governments can incentivize investments in clean energy technologies and infrastructure to facilitate this transition.
Additionally, addressing regional inequalities is essential for effective climate action. This can be achieved by ensuring equitable access to resources and technology across different regions, particularly in developing countries. Targeted investments in infrastructure and capacity-building initiatives can help less-developed areas catch up, allowing for a more uniform approach to emissions reduction and sustainable development. It is also imperative to tackle the influence of political lobbies that often prioritize short-term economic gains over long-term environmental sustainability. Strengthening transparency and accountability in environmental policymaking can help mitigate the impact of conflicting interests, enabling the implementation of effective and cohesive climate strategies.
Moreover, countries with outdated industrial systems need to modernize their economies to reduce GHG emissions. This involves investing in clean technologies and practices that enhance efficiency and minimize waste. Implementing stricter emissions standards and encouraging innovation in sustainable practices can help industries transition to greener alternatives without sacrificing economic growth.
All these measures must be implemented in a manner that prioritizes and protects the social welfare of nations, ensuring that economic and social development are not compromised. It is essential that these changes are enacted progressively, allowing time for communities to adapt to mitigate the risk of social unrest or displacement.
In the transition to sustainable practices, the needs of vulnerable populations, particularly those who may be disproportionately affected by environmental policies, should be considered. Engaging communities in the policymaking process is also critical. By involving local populations in the development and implementation of environmental policies, governments can ensure that these measures are not only effective but also equitable.
Moreover, education and training programs should be prioritized to equip the workforce with the skills needed for a green economy. Investing in human capital not only enhances employability, but also encourages innovation in sustainable practices.
Finally, Iran’s experience illustrates that subsidy systems can exacerbate GHG emissions rather than mitigate them. Countries should reconsider their subsidy policies and redirect financial support toward sustainable practices and renewable energy initiatives.
By analyzing each country individually, we can also draw several important conclusions tailored to their specific circumstances. This approach allows us to identify unique research gaps that need to be addressed for each nation.
The EU is widely recognized for implementing the most robust and effective environmental policies. However, the substantial costs and economic impacts associated with these measures raise questions about their overall efficacy. This raises a critical issue: whether the EU’s efforts will yield significant environmental benefits if other major emitting countries, such as China, India, and Russia, do not adopt comparable policies. Future research should investigate the economic costs incurred by the EU in implementing these policies and assess whether these costs are justified in light of the broader global context. Additionally, it is essential to evaluate the environmental impact of the EU’s measures if other significant emitters do not take similar actions.
China and India have predominantly focused their environmental policies on reducing emissions intensity. This approach can create a misleading impression of commitment, as reductions in emissions intensity often correlate with economic and technological development rather than substantial reductions in total emissions. Consequently, while progress in emissions intensity is notable, it does not necessarily reflect a real commitment to addressing climate change.
Iran deserves particular attention, as it has been relatively underexplored in previous environmental studies. Despite being one of the top emitters, Iran’s approach mirrors that of China and India, with an emphasis on economic growth over environmental concerns. This could potentially undermine global climate efforts if Iran continues to prioritize economic objectives while neglecting its environmental responsibilities. Future research should explore Iran’s role in the global climate change landscape and evaluate how its policies might impact international climate goals.
However, reducing emissions does not require the same level of effort in developed countries as it does in developing countries. Developed nations often have more resources, technology, and infrastructure to implement environmental policies effectively. In contrast, developing countries may face significant challenges, such as limited financial resources, a lack of technology, and pressing economic development needs. Therefore, it is crucial for developed countries to assist developing nations in achieving their environmental goals. This support can come in various forms, including financial aid, technology transfer, capacity building, and collaborative research.
While the EU’s environmental policies set a high standard, the global effectiveness of such measures depends on the actions of other major emitters and of the cooperation between countries. Research should focus on the cost-effectiveness of the EU’s policies, the implications of emissions intensity strategies in developing countries, the cooperation between developed and developing countries, and the potential impact of Iran’s environmental stance on global climate efforts.
Moreover, many countries need to enhance the transparency and accessibility of their environmental data. While European nations benefit from robust tools and services like EUROSTAT, which provide robust and reliable data, obtaining similar data from other countries can be challenging. In many cases, data from non-European countries are either incomplete, inconsistent, or difficult to access, complicating efforts to conduct thorough and accurate environmental assessments.
Improving data transparency is crucial for several reasons. It allows for more accurate benchmarking and the comparison of environmental performance across countries. This is essential for tracking progress, identifying best practices, and formulating effective policies. Additionally, transparent data support better decision-making by policymakers, businesses, and researchers.
To address these challenges, it is important to develop and implement international standards for data reporting and transparency and to encourage countries to adopt these standards. Future research should also focus on strategies to improve global data transparency, including the development of standardized reporting frameworks and international partnerships to support data sharing. Additionally, efforts should be made to strengthen the capacity of countries with limited resources to improve their data collection and reporting practices.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, N.P.J., J.O.R., G.I. and V.N.V.; methodology, N.P.J., J.O.R., G.I. and V.N.V.; software, N.P.J., J.O.R., G.I. and V.N.V.; validation, N.P.J., J.O.R., G.I. and V.N.V.; formal analysis, N.P.J., J.O.R., G.I. and V.N.V.; investigation, N.P.J. and J.O.R.; resources, N.P.J., J.O.R., G.I. and V.N.V.; data curation, N.P.J. and J.O.R.; writing—original draft preparation, N.P.J.; writing—review and editing, G.I. and V.N.V.; visualization, J.O.R.; supervision, G.I. and V.N.V.; project administration, N.P.J., J.O.R., G.I. and V.N.V.; funding acquisition, N.P.J. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

Author Nerea Portillo is a beneficiary of the FPU scholarship from the Spanish Government (FPU21/00812). She also received financial support from the Polytechnic University of Madrid (UPM) to conduct this research at UCC (international research stays funding).

Data Availability Statement

All data sources are given in the main text.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Energies 17 05705 g001
Figure 1. Historic evolution of the emissions of the 7 top emitting countries.
Figure 1. Historic evolution of the emissions of the 7 top emitting countries.
Energies 17 05705 g001
Energies 17 05705 g002
Figure 2. Historic evolution of emissions intensity of the 7 top emitting countries.
Figure 2. Historic evolution of emissions intensity of the 7 top emitting countries.
Energies 17 05705 g002
Table 1. Environmental policies references.
Table 1. Environmental policies references.
CountrySourcesReferences
ChinaScientific papers[11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21]
USAScientific papers[22,23,24,25]
EU27 + UKScientific papers
EUROSTAT [26,27]
European Climate Policy [28]		[19,23,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53]
IndiaScientific papers
IEA [54,55]		[17,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69]
RussiaScientific papers
JapanScientific papers
JEPIC [70]		[63,64,65,66,67,68,69]
IranScientific papers[71,72,73,74,75,76]
Table 2. Measures, accomplishments, and promises of the 7 top emitting countries.
Table 2. Measures, accomplishments, and promises of the 7 top emitting countries.
ActivityPolicies and Actions Taken
1990–2022		AccomplishmentsPromises
China
Power
industry		11th FYP (2006–2010):
-
Revision of Energy Conservation Law with ten Key Energy Conservation Projects and 1000 Enterprises Program
-
Revision of the REs Law
-
Golden Sun Demonstration Project
12th FYP (2011–2015):
-
Energy Development Strategy Action Plan
13th FYP (2016–2020):
-
RE Development FYP with non-fossil and capacity targets for RE technologies
-
Financial instruments for RE technology support (tax reliefs, feed-in tariffs)
11th FYP:
Reduction of 132 Mt CO2 in energy consumption
12th FYP:
20.8% non-fossil fuel energy
73.9% CO2 intensity reduction (1971)
Reduction in coal consumption to 63.7%
13th FYP (2016–2020):
Capacity of solar, wind and hydro power installations increased at annual rates of 135.3%, 34.6%, and 7.1%		Increase to 15% (2005) non-fossil fuels by 2020

20% non-fossil fuels by 2030
Other
industrial combustion		11th FYP (2006–2010):
-
Elimination of Backward Production Capacity Project
-
Strategic Plans
12th FYP (2011–2015):
-
Strategic Plans
13th FYP (2016–2020):
Strategic Plans
 22% reduction (2005) in carbon industry by 2020

40% reduction (2005) in carbon industry by 2025
Transport and cities11th FYP (2006–2010):
-
Low-carbon pilot projects in 5 provinces and 8 cities
12th FYP (2011–2015):
-
Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution
-
Low-carbon pilot projects in 29 provinces and 45 cities
13th FYP (2016–2020):
-
87 low-carbon pilot projects
Green Building Evaluation Standard and Evaluation Standard for Green Retrofit of Existing Buildings		11th FYP (2006–2010):
Recycling of 72 Mt of steel scrap, 5.2 Mt of nonferrous metals, and more than 16 Mt of plastic

12th FYP (2011–2015):
260 Mt GHG due to energy-efficient buildings
Others11th FYP (2006–2010):
-
Circular Economy (CE) Law with 178 pilot projects
National Demonstration Bases for Recovering Mineral Resources from City Waste project		 2020: 40–45% reduction in GHG (2005) intensity
2020: 15% reduction in GHGs (2015)
2030: 60–65% reduction in GHG (2005) intensity
USA
Power
industry		1992: Energy Policy Law
2005: Energy Policy Act of 2005
2007: Energy Independence Security Act
2014: Clean Energy Plan
2017: State-level renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and tax relief
2020: Climate Zero Action Plan		12.6% of primary energy from RE sources
0.9% annual growth of the use of REs for electricity from 2007 to 2017		GHGs reduced by 70% by 2030 (2005)
Decarbonizing the power industry by 2035
Non-fossil fuels to increase from 48% in 2022 to 80% in 2030, and to 100% in 2035
Other
industrial combustion		1963: Clean Air Act
1993: Climate Change Action Plan
2013: Climate Action Plan
2021: Long-Term Strategy to Net-Zero GHG		4.7% per
year intensity improvement
Transport and cities2021: Build Back Better Act
2021: Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad		 Design planned after 2020 should be Zero Net Carbon by 2030
Large-scale electrification in transportation
Others2003: Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships56% reduction in emissions/GDP in 2021 (1990)Net-zero emissions by 2050
GHG reduction by 17% by 2020, 30% by 2025, and 42% by 2030 (2005)
EU27 + UK
Power
industry		1991: SAVE Program
1993: ALTENER Program
1995: Green Paper
1995: White Paper
2001: Renewable Electricity Directive
2008: Climate Energy Package
2009: RE Roadmap
2012: Energy Efficiency Directive		Primary energy consumption did not exceed 1483 Mtoe in 2020
Final energy consumption did not exceed 1086 Mtoe in 2020
22.1% RE share in 2020		RE share: 8% in 2005
Increase RE share to 40% to reduce GHGs to 55% by 2030 (1990)
Reduce primary and final energy consumption to 36 and 39% by 2030
Other
industrial combustion		2000: European Climate Change Programme
2021: European Climate Law
Transport and cities2010: Energy Performance of Buildings Directive
Others2007: 20-20-20 by 2020
2015: First Action Plan for CE
2019: European Green Deal
2021: Plan for dealing with organic pollutants, waste, and spills from ships
2022: Fit for 55		11% reduction in GHGs in 2012 (1990)
25% reduction in GHGs in 2019 (1990)
34% reduction in GHGs in 2020 (1990)		Net-zero emissions by 2050
Reduction in emissions of 80–95% by 2050 (1990)
India
Power
industry		2005: National Electricity Policy
2006: Integrated Energy Policy
2007: Generation-Based Incentives (GBIs) and Feed-in Tariffs for REs
2008: Missions to enhance energy efficiency
2010: Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission
2017: Draft National Energy Policy		Clean energy investment increased to USD 12.3 billion in 2011, 36% higher than 2010;
India ranked fifth in the world for RE investment		The wind energy sector: 24% of Indian energy demand by 2030
Other
industrial combustion
Transport and cities2018: Energy Conservation Building Code Rules Universal electrification by 2022
Others Reduce emissions/GDP by 20–25% by 2020 (2005)
Russia
Power
industry		2009: Energy Efficiency Legislation
2009: Energy Strategy for 2030		6th largest producer of REA 40% reduction in energy intensity (GDP) by 2020 (2007)
Total investment in RE: USD 53 billion by 2035
Other
industrial combustion		2009: Climate Doctrine
2011: Climate Action Plan 		Reducing market imbalance
Transport and cities
Others2013: The Level of GHG Emissions draft. Reduction in emissions of 25% by 2020 (1990)
Reduction in emissions of 30% by 2030 (1990)
Japan
Power
industry		1997: Keidanren VAP for energy efficiency
1998: Top Runner Program efficiency standards
2003: Renewable Portfolio Standard
2006: Strategic Energy Plan
2010: Sector benchmarks for energy efficiency
2012: Feed-in tariff scheme for energy
2014: Adaptation of the Energy Plan due to Fukushima disaster
2015: Governmental Energy Outlook		Decreasing trend of the use of energy since 2007

World leadership in RE		Electric retailers: use 1.6% annually from REs

RE share: 22–24% by 2030

20–22% nuclear power in total electricity generation by 2030

100% energy independence by 2050
Other
industrial combustion		2013: Environmental impact assessments for coal-fired power plantsEnergy efficiency in industry sector improved 0.4% annually (1991–2008) and 0.9% (2000–2008)20% green industry by 2020
Transport and cities2015: Zero-Energy House/Building Roadmap Net-zero energy of new buildings by 2030
Others2005: Japan’s Voluntary Emissions Trading Scheme (JVETS)
2020: CE Vision
2020: Green Growth Strategy towards 2050 Carbon Neutrality
2021: CE Finance Disclosure Guidance		2018 cyclical usage rate (resource): 18% (80% increase since 2000)
2018 cyclical usage rate (waste): 47% (30% increase since 2000)		Reduction in emissions of 26% by 2030 (2013)
Reduction in emissions of 80% by 2050 (1990)
25% green technologies of total R&D
Iran
Power
industry		2010: Iran’s subsidy reform Improve energy efficiency
Other
industrial combustion
Transport and cities
Others2005: Twenty-Year Vision Document
Table 3. CO2 emissions of the 7 top emitting countries.
Table 3. CO2 emissions of the 7 top emitting countries.
Country1990 Mt2005 Mt2019 Mt2020 Mt%Increase 2005–1990%Increase 2020–2005%Increase 2020–2019
EU27 + UK4408.724249.143303.92605.11913−3.62%−38.69%−21.15%
USA5065.055948.475107.24464.10581+17.44%−24.95%−19.46%
China2404.746273.3611,53511,948.1196+160.87%+90.46%+12.50%
Russia2393.651734.0317921797.59527−27.56%+3.67%+0.17%
Japan1149.471276.931153.71054.90415+11.09%−17.39%−2.99%
India599.821219.352597.32396.33652+103.29%+96.53%−6.08%
Iran204.756468.88701.986690.864022+128.99%+47.34%−0.34%
Table 4. CO2 emissions/GDP of the 7 top emitting countries.
Table 4. CO2 emissions/GDP of the 7 top emitting countries.
Country1990 t/kUSD2005 t/kUSD2019 t/kUSD2020 t/kUSDIncrease
2005–1990		Increase
2020–2005		Increase
2020–2019
EU27 + UK0.3150171580.2267578260.1471670820.139526444−28.02%−38.47%−5.19%
USA0.5018573870.3706273310.2443594940.225358619−26.15%−39.20%−7.78%
China1.500658790.9113648930.5233304980.51956513−39.27%−42.99%−0.72%
Russia0.7536341680.6031685940.4704270630.461789077−19.97%−23.44%−1.84%
Japan0.2889081040.2631330210.2162884470.209211249−8.92%−20.49%−3.27%
India0.3789543050.3262886570.2804745880.280681825−13.90%−13.98%+0.07%
Iran0.3887872940.5002357390.5420367830.549403806+28.67%+9.83%+1.36%
Table 5. Effect of the Russian war and COVID-19 on CO2 emissions of the 7 top emitting countries.
Table 5. Effect of the Russian war and COVID-19 on CO2 emissions of the 7 top emitting countries.
Country2020 Mt2022 Mt2023 Mt%Increase 2020–2022%Increase 2022–2023
EU27 + UK2605.119132824.3021382804.8056548.41%−0.69%
USA4464.1058124768.8734434853.7802226.83%1.78%
China11,948.119612,717.6553112,667.428436.44%−0.39%
Russia1797.5952721932.6954271909.0393117.52%−1.22%
Japan1149.471075.6629751082.645436−6.42%0.65%
India2396.3365172528.1334762693.0341055.50%6.52%
Iran690.8640221677.8153336686.4157248−1.89%1.27%
Table 6. Effect of the Russian war and COVID-19 on CO2 emissions/GDP of the 7 top emitting countries.
Table 6. Effect of the Russian war and COVID-19 on CO2 emissions/GDP of the 7 top emitting countries.
Country2020 t/kUSD2022 t/kUSD2023 t/kUSD%Increase 2020–2022%Increase
2022–2023
EU27 + UK0.139526440.142922290.136957422.43%−4.17%
USA0.225358610.225702750.225076750.15%−0.28%
China0.519565130.509950490.49318389−1.85%−3.29%
Russia0.461789070.469956330.474012841.77%0.86%
Japan0.209211240.208570950.20778547−0.31%−0.38%
India0.280681820.268990430.26777708−4.17%−0.45%
Iran0.549403800.513768910.50639301−6.49%−1.44%
Table 7. Environmental Performance Index score.
Table 7. Environmental Performance Index score.
Country EPI Score
EU27 + UK67.2
USA57.2
China35.3
Russia46.7
Japan61.4
India27.6
Iran41.8
Table 8. Reality of the pledges of the 7 top emitting countries.
Table 8. Reality of the pledges of the 7 top emitting countries.
ActivityTargetsReality
China
Power
industry
  • Increase to 15% (2005) non-fossil fuels by 2020
  • 20% non-fossil fuels by 2030
Increase in emissions associated with power industry of 123% from 2005 to 2020
Other
industrial combustion
  • 22% reduction (2005) in carbon industry by 2020
  • 40% reduction (2005) in carbon industry by 2025
Increase in emissions associated with other industrial processes of 123% from 2005 to 2020
Others
  • 2020: 40–45% reduction in GHG (2005) intensity
  • 2030: 60–65% reduction in GHG (2005) intensity
Reduction in emissions intensity of 43% (2020–2005)
  • 2020: 15% reduction in GHGs (2015)
Increase in emissions of 12% (2020–2015)
USA
Power
industry
  • GHGs reduced by 70% by 2030 (2005)
  • Decarbonizing the power industry by 2035
  • Increase non-fossil fuel use from 48% in 2022 to 80% in 2030 and 100% in 2035
Reduction in emissions of 41% (2020–2005)
Transport and cities
  • Designs planned after 2020 should be Zero Net Carbon by 2030
  • Large-scale electrification of transportation
Tax rebates to support electric vehicles
Others
  • Net-zero emissions by 2050
  • GHG reduction by 17% by 2020, 30% by 2025, and 42% by 2030 (2005)
  • Reduction in emissions of 25% (2020–2005)
  • Reduction in emissions intensity of 39% (2020–2005)
EU27 + UK
Power
industry
  • RE share: 8% in 2005
  • Increase RE share to 40% to reduce GHGs by 55% by 2030 (1990)
  • Reduce primary and final energy consumption to 36 and 39% by 2030
  • 10.2% of REs in 2005
  • 22.1% of REs in 2020
  • Primary energy consumption target exceeded by 5.8% and final consumption by 5.4% (2020)
Others
  • Net-zero emissions by 2050
  • Reduction in emissions of 80–95% by 2050 (1990)
  • Reduction in emissions of 41% (2020–1990)
  • Reduction in emissions intensity of 56% (2020–1990)
India
Power
industry
  • Wind energy sector: 24% of Indian energy demand in 2030
Increase in emissions associated with power industry of 97% (2020–2005)
Wind capacity: 30% addition to global capacity
Transport and cities
  • Universal electrification by 2022
Not achieved
Others
  • Reduce emissions/GDP by 20–25% by 2020 (2005)
  • Increase in emissions of 97% (2020–2005)
  • Reduction in emissions intensity of 14% (2020–1990)
Russia
Power
industry
  • A 40% reduction in energy intensity (GDP) by 2020 (2007)
  • Total investment in RE: USD 53 billion by 2035
  • Wind and solar: 0.2% of electricity generation
  • No reduction in energy intensity
Other
industrial combustion
  • Reducing market imbalance
Not achieved
Others
  • Reduction in emissions of 25% by 2020 (1990)
  • Reduction in emissions of 30% by 2030 (1990)
  • Reduction in emissions of 25% (2020–1990)
  • Reduction in emissions intensity of 39% (2020–1990)
Japan
Power
industry
  • Electric retailers: use 1.6% annually from RE
  • RE share: 22–24% by 2030
  • 21.2% use of RE in 2020
  • 20–22% nuclear power in total electricity generation by 2030
  • 100% energy independence by 2050
  • 8% nuclear power in electricity generation (2009)
  • Energy-dependent
Transport and cities
  • Net-zero energy of new buildings by 2030
  • 36% hybrid and electric vehicles
Others
  • Reduction in emissions of 26% by 2030 (2013)
  • Reduction in emissions of 80% by 2050 (1990)
  • 25% green technologies of total R&D
  • Reduction in emissions by 20% (2020–2013)
  • Reduction in emissions intensity by 21% (2020–1990)
Power
industry		Improve energy efficiency
  • Increase in emissions of 237% (2020–1990)
  • Increase in emissions intensity of 41% (2020–1990)
Table 9. Incorporation of countries to the EU.
Table 9. Incorporation of countries to the EU.
YearNew Members
1995Austria, Finland, and Sweden
2004Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
2007Bulgaria and Romania
2013 Croatia
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Portillo Juan, N.; Negro Valdecantos, V.; Olalde Rodríguez, J.; Iglesias, G. Environmental Policy vs. the Reality of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Top Emitting Countries. Energies 2024, 17, 5705. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17225705

AMA Style

Portillo Juan N, Negro Valdecantos V, Olalde Rodríguez J, Iglesias G. Environmental Policy vs. the Reality of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Top Emitting Countries. Energies. 2024; 17(22):5705. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17225705

Chicago/Turabian Style

Portillo Juan, Nerea, Vicente Negro Valdecantos, Javier Olalde Rodríguez, and Gregorio Iglesias. 2024. "Environmental Policy vs. the Reality of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Top Emitting Countries" Energies 17, no. 22: 5705. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17225705

APA Style

Portillo Juan, N., Negro Valdecantos, V., Olalde Rodríguez, J., & Iglesias, G. (2024). Environmental Policy vs. the Reality of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Top Emitting Countries. Energies, 17(22), 5705. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17225705

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