Games

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Open AccessEditorial

Psychology of Game Playing: Introduction to a Special Issue

by Andrew M. Colman and Briony D. Pulford

Games 2015, 6(4), 677-684; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040677 - 21 Dec 2015

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 7279

Game theory has focused attention on different problems at different times in its history. Currently, attention is devoted to investigating how human decision makers with bounded rationality choose strategies in interactive decisions. Behavioral economics, and more generally experimental games, have appeared in the [...] Read more.

Game theory has focused attention on different problems at different times in its history. Currently, attention is devoted to investigating how human decision makers with bounded rationality choose strategies in interactive decisions. Behavioral economics, and more generally experimental games, have appeared in the literature with accelerating frequency since 1990, and this cannot continue indefinitely without a proportional expansion of journal space. This Special Issue includes contributions to behavioral economics, experimental games, and evolutionary game theory, using theoretical, experimental, and agent-based modeling techniques. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Psychological Aspects of Strategic Choice)

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394 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Evidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information

by Ali Al-Nowaihi and Sanjit Dhami

Games 2015, 6(4), 637-676; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040637 - 16 Nov 2015

Cited by 11 | Viewed by 7341

Abstract

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoners’ dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will [...] Read more.

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoners’ dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign diagnostic significance to their own actions in forming beliefs about the actions of other like-minded players. This is best viewed as a heuristic or bias relative to the standard approach. We provide a formal theoretical framework that incorporates ER into static games by proposing evidential games and the relevant solution concept: evidential equilibrium (EE). We derive the relation between a Nash equilibrium and an EE. We illustrate these concepts in the context of the prisoners’ dilemma game. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Psychological Aspects of Strategic Choice)

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Open AccessArticle

The Role of Implicit Motives in Strategic Decision-Making: Computational Models of Motivated Learning and the Evolution of Motivated Agents

by Kathryn Merrick

Games 2015, 6(4), 604-636; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040604 - 12 Nov 2015

Cited by 7 | Viewed by 6952

Abstract

Individual behavioral differences in humans have been linked to measurable differences in their mental activities, including differences in their implicit motives. In humans, individual differences in the strength of motives such as power, achievement and affiliation have been shown to have a significant [...] Read more.

Individual behavioral differences in humans have been linked to measurable differences in their mental activities, including differences in their implicit motives. In humans, individual differences in the strength of motives such as power, achievement and affiliation have been shown to have a significant impact on behavior in social dilemma games and during other kinds of strategic interactions. This paper presents agent-based computational models of power-, achievement- and affiliation-motivated individuals engaged in game-play. The first model captures learning by motivated agents during strategic interactions. The second model captures the evolution of a society of motivated agents. It is demonstrated that misperception, when it is a result of motivation, causes agents with different motives to play a given game differently. When motivated agents who misperceive a game are present in a population, higher explicit payoff can result for the population as a whole. The implications of these results are discussed, both for modeling human behavior and for designing artificial agents with certain salient behavioral characteristics. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Psychological Aspects of Strategic Choice)

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Open AccessArticle

The Role of the Decision-Making Regime on Cooperation in a Workgroup Social Dilemma: An Examination of Cyberloafing

by Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González and Matthew W. McCarter

Games 2015, 6(4), 588-603; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040588 - 5 Nov 2015

Cited by 16 | Viewed by 11082

Abstract

A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different [...] Read more.

A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different types of decision-making regimes: autocratic decision-making and group voting. Using a laboratory experiment to simulate a data-entry organization, we find that, while autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both curtail cyberloafing (by over 50%), it is only in group voting that there is a substantive improvement (of 38%) in a cyberloafer’s subsequent work performance. Unlike autocratic decision-making, group voting leads to workgroups outperforming the control condition where cyberloafing could not be stopped. Additionally, only in the group voting regime did production levels of cyberloafers and non-loafers converge over time. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games)

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2427 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Commitment to Cooperation and Peer Punishment: Its Evolution

by Tatsuya Sasaki, Isamu Okada, Satoshi Uchida and Xiaojie Chen

Games 2015, 6(4), 574-587; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040574 - 3 Nov 2015

Cited by 39 | Viewed by 9505

Abstract

Theoretical and empirical studies have generally weighed the effect of peer punishment and pool punishment for sanctioning free riders separately. However, these sanctioning mechanisms often pose a puzzling tradeoff between efficiency and stability in detecting and punishing free riders. Here, we combine the [...] Read more.

Theoretical and empirical studies have generally weighed the effect of peer punishment and pool punishment for sanctioning free riders separately. However, these sanctioning mechanisms often pose a puzzling tradeoff between efficiency and stability in detecting and punishing free riders. Here, we combine the key aspects of these qualitatively different mechanisms in terms of evolutionary game theory. Based on the dilemmatic donation game, we introduce a strategy of commitment to both cooperation and peer punishment. To make the commitment credible, we assume that those willing to commit have to make a certain deposit. The deposit will be refunded as long as the committers faithfully cooperate in the donation game and punish free riders and non-committers. It turns out that the deposit-based commitment offers both the efficiency of peer punishment and the stability of pool punishment and that the replicator dynamics lead to transitions of different systems: pool punishment to commitment to peer punishment. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Trust, and Reciprocity)

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382 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Risk Aversion and Engagement in the Sharing Economy

by Jessica Santana and Paolo Parigi

Games 2015, 6(4), 560-573; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040560 - 26 Oct 2015

Cited by 26 | Viewed by 11977

Abstract

The sharing economy is a new online community that has important implications for offline behavior. This study evaluates whether engagement in the sharing economy is associated with an actor’s aversion to risk. Using a web-based survey and a field experiment, we apply an [...] Read more.

The sharing economy is a new online community that has important implications for offline behavior. This study evaluates whether engagement in the sharing economy is associated with an actor’s aversion to risk. Using a web-based survey and a field experiment, we apply an adaptation of Holt and Laury’s (2002) risk lottery game to a representative sample of sharing economy participants. We find that frequency of activity in the sharing economy predicts risk aversion, but only in interaction with satisfaction. While greater satisfaction with sharing economy websites is associated with a decrease in risk aversion, greater frequency of usage is associated with greater risk aversion. This analysis shows the limitations of a static perspective on how risk attitudes relate to participation in the sharing economy. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Online Social Networks and Behavior: A Game Theory Approach)

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Open AccessArticle

Salience and Strategy Choice in 2 × 2 Games

by Jonathan W. Leland and Mark Schneider

Games 2015, 6(4), 521-559; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040521 - 23 Oct 2015

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 7998

Abstract

We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent’s payoffs. When own payoffs [...] Read more.

We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent’s payoffs. When own payoffs are salient, the model’s predictions correspond to those of Level-1 players in a cognitive hierarchy model. When it is the other player’s payoffs that are salient, the predictions of the model correspond to those of traditional game theory. The model provides unique predictions for the entire class of 2 × 2 games. It identifies games where a Nash equilibrium will always occur, ones where it will never occur, and ones where it will occur only for certain payoff values. It also predicts the outcome of games for which there are no pure Nash equilibria. Experimental results supporting these predictions are presented. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Psychological Aspects of Strategic Choice)

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1829 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Names for Games: Locating 2 × 2 Games

by Bryan Randolph Bruns

Games 2015, 6(4), 495-520; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040495 - 22 Oct 2015

Cited by 23 | Viewed by 11893

Abstract

Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, Stag Hunts, and other two-person two-move (2 × 2) models of strategic situations have played a central role in the development of game theory. The Robinson–Goforth topology of payoff swaps reveals a natural order in the payoff space of 2 [...] Read more.

Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, Stag Hunts, and other two-person two-move (2 × 2) models of strategic situations have played a central role in the development of game theory. The Robinson–Goforth topology of payoff swaps reveals a natural order in the payoff space of 2 × 2 games, visualized in their four-layer “periodic table” format that elegantly organizes the diversity of 2 × 2 games, showing relationships and potential transformations between neighboring games. This article presents additional visualizations of the topology, and a naming system for locating all 2 × 2 games as combinations of game payoff patterns from the symmetric ordinal 2 × 2 games. The symmetric ordinal games act as coordinates locating games in maps of the payoff space of 2 × 2 games, including not only asymmetric ordinal games and the complete set of games with ties, but also ordinal and normalized equivalents of all games with ratio or real-value payoffs. An efficient nomenclature can contribute to a systematic understanding of the diversity of elementary social situations; clarify relationships between social dilemmas and other joint preference structures; identify interesting games; show potential solutions available through transforming incentives; catalog the variety of models of 2 × 2 strategic situations available for experimentation, simulation, and analysis; and facilitate cumulative and comparative research in game theory. Full article

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334 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Reciprocity in Labor Market Relationships: Evidence from an Experiment across High-Income OECD Countries

by Israel Waichman, Ch’ng Kean Siang, Till Requate, Aric P. Shafran, Eva Camacho-Cuena, Yoshio Iida and Shosh Shahrabani

Games 2015, 6(4), 473-494; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040473 - 9 Oct 2015

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 6557

Abstract

We study differences in behavior across countries in a labor market context. To this end, we conducted a bilateral gift-exchange experiment comparing the behavior of subjects from five high-income OECD countries: Germany, Spain, Israel, Japan and the USA. We observe that in all [...] Read more.

We study differences in behavior across countries in a labor market context. To this end, we conducted a bilateral gift-exchange experiment comparing the behavior of subjects from five high-income OECD countries: Germany, Spain, Israel, Japan and the USA. We observe that in all countries, effort levels are increasing while rejection rates are decreasing in wage offers. However, we also find considerable differences in behavior across countries in both one-shot and repeated relationships, the most striking between Germany and Spain. We also discuss the influence of socio-economic indicators and the implications of our findings. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games)

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471 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Cooperate without Looking in a Non-Repeated Game

by Christian Hilbe, Moshe Hoffman and Martin A. Nowak

Games 2015, 6(4), 458-472; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040458 - 30 Sep 2015

Cited by 11 | Viewed by 7915

Abstract

We propose a simple model for why we have more trust in people who cooperate without calculating the associated costs. Intuitively, by not looking at the payoffs, people indicate that they will not be swayed by high temptations to defect, which makes them [...] Read more.

We propose a simple model for why we have more trust in people who cooperate without calculating the associated costs. Intuitively, by not looking at the payoffs, people indicate that they will not be swayed by high temptations to defect, which makes them more attractive as interaction partners. We capture this intuition using a simple four-stage game. In the first stage, nature draws the costs and benefits of cooperation according to a commonly-known distribution. In the second stage, Player 1 chooses whether or not to look at the realized payoffs. In the third stage, Player 2 decides whether to exit or let Player 1 choose whether or not to cooperate in the fourth stage. Using backward induction, we provide a complete characterization for when we expect Player 1 to cooperate without looking. Moreover, we show with numerical simulations how cooperating without looking can emerge through simple evolutionary processes. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Trust, and Reciprocity)

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Open AccessArticle

Indirect Reciprocity with Optional Interactions and Private Information

by Jason Olejarz, Whan Ghang and Martin A. Nowak

Games 2015, 6(4), 438-457; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040438 - 30 Sep 2015

Cited by 22 | Viewed by 6667

Abstract

We consider indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information. A game is offered between two players and accepted unless it is known that the other person is a defector. Whenever a defector manages to exploit a cooperator, his or her reputation is [...] Read more.

We consider indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information. A game is offered between two players and accepted unless it is known that the other person is a defector. Whenever a defector manages to exploit a cooperator, his or her reputation is revealed to others in the population with some probability. Therefore, people have different private information about the reputation of others, which is a setting that is difficult to analyze in the theory of indirect reciprocity. Since a defector loses a fraction of his social ties each time he exploits a cooperator, he is less efficient at exploiting cooperators in subsequent rounds. We analytically calculate the critical benefit-to-cost ratio above which cooperation is successful in various settings. We demonstrate quantitative agreement with simulation results of a corresponding Wright–Fisher process with optional interactions and private information. We also deduce a simple necessary condition for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Trust, and Reciprocity)

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507 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Evolution of Decisions in Population Games with Sequentially Searching Individuals

by Tadeas Priklopil and Krishnendu Chatterjee

Games 2015, 6(4), 413-437; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040413 - 29 Sep 2015

Viewed by 5667

Abstract

In many social situations, individuals endeavor to find the single best possible partner, but are constrained to evaluate the candidates in sequence. Examples include the search for mates, economic partnerships, or any other long-term ties where the choice to interact involves two parties. [...] Read more.

In many social situations, individuals endeavor to find the single best possible partner, but are constrained to evaluate the candidates in sequence. Examples include the search for mates, economic partnerships, or any other long-term ties where the choice to interact involves two parties. Surprisingly, however, previous theoretical work on mutual choice problems focuses on finding equilibrium solutions, while ignoring the evolutionary dynamics of decisions. Empirically, this may be of high importance, as some equilibrium solutions can never be reached unless the population undergoes radical changes and a sufficient number of individuals change their decisions simultaneously. To address this question, we apply a mutual choice sequential search problem in an evolutionary game-theoretical model that allows one to find solutions that are favored by evolution. As an example, we study the influence of sequential search on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. For this, we focus on the classic snowdrift game and the prisoner’s dilemma game. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Cooperation, Trust, and Reciprocity)

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Open AccessArticle

Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers

by Caleb A. Cox and Brock Stoddard

Games 2015, 6(4), 394-412; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6040394 - 25 Sep 2015

Cited by 39 | Viewed by 7100

Abstract

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in [...] Read more.

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games)

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Games, Volume 6, Issue 4 (December 2015) – 13 articles , Pages 394-684

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